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Based primarily on the Edward P. Costigan Papers in 
the University of Colorado's Norlin Library and on govern- 
ment documents, this study traces a progressive's career on 
the United States Tariff Commission. Costigan's early 
political experience is briefly examined to reveal the 
forces which caused him to enter reform politics. A highly 
moralistic individual with a deep faith in the efficacy of 
government regulation in a growing, corporate economy, the 
Coloradan entered politics primarily because he was inter- 
ested in eliminating corruption in municipal government and 
attaining a more predominant role in Denver's society.
The Tariff Commission was an idea which had been dis- 
cussed in political circles in the late nineteenth century. 
Woodrow Wilson finally made it a permanent institution in 
1916. Originally designed to gather data to help Congress 
in making scientific tariffs, the agency became, in 1922, a 
fact-finding body to aid the President in raising or lower- 
ing specific duties.
Edward Costigan served for five years on the
Commission without special distinction, probably because 
the other Commissioners shared his belief in a low tariff 
and because the agency was not involved in controversial 
tasks.
After 1922, he, David Lewis, and William S. Culbertson 
comprised a faction interested in a publicized, aggressive 
program for the agency. They wanted to force the President 
to lower tariffs on important consumer items. Furthermore, 
they were aware that the United States needed to open her 
markets to other nations so that foreign countries could 
acquire enough dollars to repay war-time debts and buy 
American goods.
Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge both acted to 
change the Commission's composition so that it would 
reflect their own views. By the spring of 1925, Costigan 
was the only original member remaining on the agency.
In the next three years, he proved to be a constant 
source of irritation to the President. He also fought hard 
within the Commission to influence its policy and maintain 
its independence from Coolidge and special interest groups. 
When this tactic failed, the Coloradan publicized the 
agency's problems in the hope of arousing public and Con­
gressional support. Although he succeeded in attracting
Vsome backing, he ultimately failed to preserve the board's 
non-partisan status. Neither the people nor their politi­
cal representatives really cared what happened to the 
board. Democrats and Progressives were both willing to 
embarrass coolidge over selected issues, but they did not 
unite to defend the Commission.
Costigan finally resigned in 1928, when it became 
apparent that the Senate would not reorganize the agency's 
personnel. For three years he had made a nuisance of him­
self, opposing the President's clearly authorized control 
of the agency. Not until the following decade was the 
Colorado Progressive able to work with a government which 
supported policies he had advocated most of his political 
life.
This abstract is approved as to form and content. I recom­
mend its publication.
Signed
Faculty member in charge of dissertation
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CHAPTER I
THE MOVEMENT TO CREATE A TARIFF COMMISSION
On March 21, 1917, amidst a diplomatic crisis with 
Germany, President Woodrow Wilson took time to send a list 
of Tariff Commission appointments to the Senate. This new 
federal agency was designed to furnish Congress accurate 
data on the tariff. Most of its appointees were well known 
in political circles and had distinguished backgrounds in 
academic or public life. For one of them, Edward P. 
Costigan, the assignment climaxed a career as a leading 
western Progressive.
Like many reformers of his generation, Costigan was 
a product of an urban environment. Much of his childhood 
was spent in Denver, and after graduating from Harvard in 
1899, he returned to the plains city to practice law.
By that time he had already formed some basic atti­
tudes toward society and government. In 1896 he had been 
completely captured by the excitement and adventure of the 
Spanish-American War. High strung, his frail body filled 
with strong ambitions and a sense of destiny, he associ­
ated his own future with that of his country. To Costigan, 
the conflict with Spain was but another step forward in the
2march of progress."*" He shared the enthusiasm of "Theodore 
Roosevelt and other advocates of an expansionist policy. 
Acquisition of the Philippines did not darken this feeling, 
and Costigan supported McKinley in 1900 both for his for­
eign policy and his dedication to a growing industrial
United States.
Even before finishing college, costigan was aware of 
major developments here and abroad, and many of the atti­
tudes and ambitions which he formed at Harvard marked the 
course of his life. While in Cambridge he had accepted the 
concept of Reform Darwinism which historian Eric F. Goldman
has described as a vital tool to the early twentieth cen- 
2tury reformer. Admitting the possibility, even the desir­
ability of society's natural evolution, Costigan rejected 
the slow, inevitable growth which Herbert Spencer had made 
so popular.3
Thus freed from prohibitions on social and economic
Larry DeLorme, "Edward P. Costigan: the Making of a 
Progressive," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of 
History, University of Colorado, 1965), 28. Hereafter 
cited as DeLorme, "Costigan."
2Eric F. Goldman, Rendevouz with Destiny (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1952), 93-97.
DeLorme, "Costigan," 13, 14.3
3legislation, he turned to politics to test his ideas and to 
gain a public reputation. Young, wealthy, and ambitious, 
he had every reason to keep a close watch on the way the
nation was heading.
Costigan entered politics well equipped with an ide­
ology and an awareness of the vast changes industry was 
making upon traditional patterns of life. Carl Degler has 
stated that Progressivism was basically a response to the 
challenge of the city and factory, an attempt to tame the 
forces which had reduced much of the American dream to a 
mockery.4 Costigan, though raised in a growing metropoli­
tan area, had seen the traditionally agrarian, small town 
elements of that vision diminished, but he was more 
affected by the distressing characteristics of urban 
growth. Political machines dominated government in the 
city and state, and they in turn were controlled by busi­
ness interests and their representatives. In Denver, for 
example, William G. Evans and the Denver Tramway Company 
were a dominant force in every election between 1900 and 
1906.5
4Carl Degler, Out of Our Past (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1959), 362.
5Benjamin Lindsey, "The Beast and the Jungle," 
Everybody1s, XXII (January, 1910), 45, passim.
4Anxious to make a name for himself, costigan, in 
1902, ran for a position in the state House of Representa­
tives. It was a disillusioning experience. His election 
was subverted by complicated political dealings between the 
Republican and Democratic campaign managers. Unhappy that 
political machinations had thwarted the will of the people, 
and indignant over personal affronts from roughhouse poll-
g
watchers, costigan embarked upon a career of public reform.
For the next decade and a half he was a reform 
leader in Colorado politics, helping to run the Honest 
Election League, supporting the Denver Civil Service Reform 
Association, and becoming one of the creators of the state's 
Progressive Party in 1910. He became an outspoken advocate 
of such measures as women suffrage, the initiative, refer­
endum, and recall, and unlike many Progressives, he
7actively supported labor's right to organize. He envi­
sioned, in those early years, a society in which government 
served as the guarantor of rights for both labor and capi­
tal, an advanced position for that day.
6DeLorme, "Costigan," 102, 104.
7Colin B. Goodykoontz, "Edward P. Costigan and the
United States Tariff Commission," Pacific Historical 
Review, XVI (November, 1947), 411. Hereafter cited as
Goodykoontz, "Costigan and the Tariff Commission."
6leaders, he gave his support to Wilson.
It was not a difficult decision. Costigan had 
changed his early belief that government should treat capi­
tal and labor impartially, and Wilson had modified the 
scope of his reform legislation. The Coloradan had come to 
realize that only a positive program of corporate regula­
tion, support for labor, and attention to the public needs 
could achieve the type of stability and material growth he 
felt the future should hold for his fellow man. ^  He had 
not supported the concepts of the New Freedom because it 
apparently advocated a return to the small industrial unit 
which characterized the manufacturing economy of the nine­
teenth century. He accepted the material prosperity that 
the corporation brought into being, but he was deeply con­
cerned with the indifference the new environment showed 
toward man. It was the human species whose progress was 
essential to the true growth of civilization, not business,
and Costigan wanted to regulate the corporate society for
12man's benefit.
Wilson, concerned by pleas to protect business from 
the anticipated post-war scramble for markets, and seeking
11 1 ?DeLorme, "Costigan," 233, 234. Ibid., 222 , 2 2 8.
7to take away from the Republicans as many campaign issues 
as possible, had widened his social and economic legisla­
tion and pushed through a bill creating a Tariff Commission 
in September, 1916. That the President had supported its 
establishment was interesting, since he had been hostile 
toward it earlier in his administration, but the political 
winds had shifted.
When Wilson moved toward Roosevelt's New National­
ism, Costigan became interested in his program. In early 
October, 1916, he publicly announced support for the
President, labeling his accomplishments ones which the
13Progressives of 1912 could confidently promote. As an 
important Democratic supporter and a moderate protection­
ist, Costigan was a logical choice to represent the Rocky
14Mountain region on the new Tariff Commission.
The idea for such a body had a long historical 
lineage. Shortly after the Civil War, Congress created a
Speech, October 1, 1916, MS in Costigan Papers.
14Fred Greenbaum, "Edward P. Costigan: Study of a 
Progressive," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of 
History, Columbia University, 1962), 263. Greenbaum's 
statement that Wilson staffed the agency with men of an 
"independent tone of mind" is incorrect. All were moder­
ate protectionists or theoretical free traders and had 
definite ideas on how to interpret data. See pp. 263, 
267.
8three-man commission to examine the nation's financial
15structure; President Andrew Johnson named David A.
Wells, Stephen Colwell and Samuel S. Hayes to serve on 
it."*"^  All three were protectionists, though Wells was
17later to become an outstanding spokesman for free trade.
The Revenue Commission reported to Congress in 1866
that the financial system was outdated and burdensome,
primarily because the excise tax supplied too much govern- 
18ment income. It recommended severe reductions in inter-
19nal taxes and continuation of the existing tariff.
The Commission proved to be a useful source of
20information, and it was eventually imitated by other 
administrations, though for different reasons. A decade
15U.S., Statutes at Large, XIV, Part 1, 487.
Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in 
the Nineteenth Century (2 vols. ; New York: Houghton Mifflin 
and Co., 1903), II, 159.
17Fred B. Joyner, David Ames Wells: Champion of 
Free Trade (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1939),
passim
18U.S., Congress, House, Report of Committee on 
Revenue, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1866, Executive Document
34, 4-13.
19Ibid., 17 .
20Ida Tarbell, The Tariff In Our Times (New York: 
Macmillan Co. , 1912), 100.
9later, as business revived from the depression of 187 3,
21the Treasury began to acrue an annual surplus. By 1881,
despite a recession, this reached a yearly rate of
2 2$100,000,000, and it became clear that the tariff had to 
be re-examined, though it was not certain that rates had 
to be reduced. A high rate of duties could also lower 
income.
Drawing upon the example of the Revenue Commission,
the suggestions of certain Republicans, and the various
state experiments with independent regulatory agencies,
President Arthur asked Congress to create a Tariff 
23Commission. Republicans, fearing Democratic efforts to 
present the recession as an excuse to lower the tariff, 
wanted the issue indefinitely postponed. Arthur's pro­
posals reflected these anxieties and the party used the 
agency to delay legislation designed to undermine protec­
tion. Congress responded to the President's suggestions
21James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Mes­
sages and Papers of the Presidents (12 vols. ; Bureau of
National Literature and Art, 1903), VIII, 45. Hereafter 
cited as Richardson, Messages.
22Ibid.
23Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory 
Commissions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 20-
25; Richardson, Messages, VIII, 49.
10
with an act providing for nine commissioners to "take into
consideration and to thoroughly investigate all . . .
questions relating to the agricultural, commercial, . . .
manufacturing, . . . and industrial interests of the
24United States."
After some difficulty in getting the men he wanted, 
Arthur settled on a group led by John L. Hayes of 
Massachusetts, Secretary of the National Association of 
Wool Manufacturers. Other members included representa­
tives of the iron and sugar industries, a statistician, an 
ex-officer of the New York Customs House, and public 
representatives from Georgia and Ohio. All were protec­
tionists. Operating under instructions to revise, not 
destroy, the tariff, they investigated business conditions
in twenty different locations throughout the eastern 
25United States.
In its report to Congress, the Commission pointed 
out that the nation's industries did not share tariff 
benefits equally, and urged an expanded protective system
U.S., Statutes at Large, XXII, Part 1, 64.
25 „U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Tariff com­
mission, 47th Cong., 2d Sess., 1882, House Miscellaneous 
Documents, 4.
11
to equalize the conditions of competition between all
2 0
domestic and foreign producers. If infant industries
were being established, further protection was desirable,
but they should demonstrate within twenty years an ability
. . 27to compete without unusual tariff subsidies. The com­
missioners glided easily over the implications of their 
suggestions. If equal conditions of competition was the 
standard, it logically meant that protection should allow 
reasonable profits to the domestic manufacturer. Thus the 
tariff could be raised to very high levels. Furthermore, 
if conditions of competition were truly equalized between 
foreign and domestic companies, foreign trade would cease. 
To its credit, the Commission recommended rate reductions 
designed to save the consumer hundreds of millions of 
dollars, it felt that its findings reflected "the best
conservative opinion of the country, " as well as "mere
28indiscriminate popular clamor."
The report was a pleasant surprise to many who had
been critical of independent agencies, for it was far more
2 9penetrating and disinterested than expected. Congress
26T, . , 27 . ^  28Ibid. Ibid. , 56. Ibid.
Tarbell, The Tariff In Our Times, 100.29
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did not accept all of the recommended rate reductions, but
many of them did become law and the Commission's suggested
30administrative reforms were later enacted. Most
observors, whatever their feelings on the protective
tariff, believed that the board had helped Congress pass
, . , _  31better legislation.
There was no serious inclination to have it recom­
mend rates. However, as Robert P. Porter, the statisti­
cian, reported, "far from being a disadvantage to protec­
tion, a properly constituted Tariff Commission would . . .
enable Congress to reduce duties . . . and retain . . .  or
increase them . . . where the rates are insufficient to
32protect . . . industries."
An advisory commission had clearly been used to 
maintain protection. The Republicans, faced with the loss 
of the House and a weak, three-seat margin in the Senate, 
used the report as a "reasonable" basis for revision and
U.S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1908, XLII, Part 4, 3778.
31Tarbell, The Tariff In Our Times, 100-101.
32Henry Tarleton Wills, Scientific Tariff Making, A 
History of the Movement to Create a Tariff Commission (New 
York: Blanchard Press, 1913), 14. Hereafter cited as 
Wills, Scientific Tariff Making.
13
managed to maintain protection for most producers in the
tariff act of 1883. As John L. Hayes put it, "reduction
was not desirable to us, it was a concession to public
33sentiment." The object was protection through reduction 
of some especially high rates. The agency was the non­
partisan symbol through which the barriers were maintained.
Despite the lesson of this tactic, the tariff com­
mission was not revived until after 1900. Although Grover 
Cleveland focused national attention on imports, he either 
overlooked what Arthur had done, or refused to imitate it. 
This could have been a contributing factor to his defeat 
in 1888, for an "impartial" agency might have swayed even 
more voters toward his position. Partially as a result of 
his agitation, Congress did direct the new Department of 
Labor to determine and compare costs of production for 
major goods produced in America and abroad. This reflected 
a growing suspicion that some nations could produce cer­
tain items more cheaply than others.34 If accepted, this
33Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the 
United States (8th ed. ; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1931), 319.
34Joshua Barnhardt, The Tariff Commission, Its 
History, Activities and Organization (Institute for 
Government Research, Monograph No. 5; New York: D. Apple­
ton and Co., 1922), 6-8.
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concept could have paved the way for lower tariffs, but
little came of it. The Department made reports in 1891 on
iron, steel, glass, textiles, coke, and coal; nothing else
35was done until 1912.
It was not until the end of the first decade of the
new century that a tariff commission was recreated, and
like many Progressive reforms, its initial impetus came
36from influential business groups.
Throughout the latter nineteenth century the Boston
Home Market Club, the Manufacturer's Club of Philadelphia,
the American Protective Tariff League and the American
Iron and Steel Association had led the business community's
quest for legislation. After the turn of the century,
these groups were challenged by an increasing number of
businessmen, many of whom had new thoughts on the meaning
37of the term "adequate protection. "
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A 
Re interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Glencoe: 
Free Press, 1963), 1-10. Hereafter cited as Kolko, The
Triumph of Conservatism.
37 ,Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study 
°f the Progressive Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962) , 94—95. Hereafter cited as Wiebe, Business — 
men and Reform.
15
The formation of trusts and the growing suspicion
that key industries such as steel were getting special
advantages from the tariff provoked a new look at the
38entire system. George E. Roberts, Republican banker and
protectionist from Iowa, suggested lowering the tariff
whenever it could be shown that it supported monopoly.
39This "Iowa Idea" was supported by many Republicans. 
Importers and exporters who would benefit greatly from 
lower rates were eager to see changes made, and New 
England industry, increasingly vocal in its demands for 
cheap raw materials, also favored reductions. Support in 
the Northwest and the Middle West for a reciprocal trade 
program was backed by railroads who were particularly 
interested in shipping Canadian wheat to American cities.
In April, 1902, these groups gathered in Chicago to
OOIbid., 56.
39 .Ibid. Concern about monopoly was a vital force 
which provoked much of the public outcry for reform. 
Gabriel Kolko has shown that in major corporate sectors 
monopoly was nonexistent, and the growth of competition 
served to produce big business support for a host of 
regulatory acts passed during the Progressive Era. Since 
the public of that day was unaware of this, the fear of 
monopoly had a strong impact and aroused reformers. See 
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, 11-56.
16
form the National Reciprocity League. Although it lasted
40barely a year, it was indicative of things to come.
More and more, businessmen, politicians, and economic 
theorists were questioning tariff-making methods which had 
produced unevenly distributed and often unnecessary 
protection.
Among the reformers, none was more influential and
outspoken than Herbert Edwin Miles. Educated at Lawrence
College and Harvard, Miles built the Racine-Sattley
Company of Racine, Wisconsin into one of the state's most
important manufacturers of agricultural implements. A
protectionist and a Republican, he believed that the
tariff's benefits should be spread among all areas of
industry and to all participants in production, labor as
, 41well as management.
As a manufacturer of agricultural tools he bought 
large amounts of steel, and in the course of business 
found that its domestic price exceeded the export level by 
about the amount of the duty. This turned his attention
Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 56-59.
41N.I. Stone, One Man's Crusade for an Honest 
Tariff, Story of Herbert E. Miles (Appleton: Lawrence Col­
lege Press, 1952), 1-8. Hereafter cited as Stone, One 
Man's crusade for an Honest Tariff.
17
to the tariff, which, he soon concluded, was biased in
favor of the trusts. His studies also convinced him that
the object of import duties should be to equalize the dif-
42ference in domestic and foreign costs of production.
One of Miles' early supporters was Alvin H. Sanders, 
Chicago publisher of the Breeders Gazette, who was dis­
turbed by McKinley's failure to get Senate approval for 
new commercial treaties. Committed to reciprocity,
Sanders worked diligently in the early years of the cen-
43tury to force trade negotiations with Germany. He 
pointed out that in 1900 more than 65 per cent of all 
American exports were agricultural products. Germany was 
the world's second largest buyer of such farm produce and 
unless she extended concessions from her high tariff, 
passed in 1902, these sales had to be curtailed. Sanders 
wanted to be sure that every attempt was made to keep 
agricultural receipts as healthy as possible. Miles, on 
the other hand, wanted reduction of the tariff as an act 
of justice to the small manufacturer and to the consumer 
who suffered from the power of the trusts.44
4 2 _ , 43Ibid. Ibid. . 7-9.
44Ibid. Again, Miles' attitude reflects the gen­
eral but erroneous popular conviction that monopolies
18
These two men expressed the uneasy feeling of many 
businessmen throughout the country, and it was this group 
which revived the idea of a tariff commission. They saw 
that Congress was so influenced by special interests that 
a fair, rational tariff could not be made.
The scientific approach to legislation was highly 
attractive to Progressives and the idea of establishing a 
non-partisan board to help congress make a better tariff 
appealed to them. Conscious of this, Miles and Sanders 
agitated for a permanent commission of "impartial experts"
to study costs of production in the United States and
45abroad. It was to report to Congress, making possible 
new rates equalizing domestic and foreign opportunities in 
the American market. They overlooked the fact that if 
this were accomplished, the incoming flow of items on the 
duty list would cease. Nevertheless, it was a popular 
principle, one which some Republicans had been discussing 
since 1881. Miles and Sanders also wanted to give to the 
President power to negotiate reciprocity agreements, 
within defined limits, without a two-thirds vote of
controlled prices and tariff rates. See Kolko, The 
Triumph of Conservatism, 1-10.
Stone, One Man's Crusade for an Honest Tariff, 9.
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approval in the Senate.
There was no mistaking the protectionist sentiment 
of these two men, yet their fervor for some kind of com­
mission, "not unlike the present Interstate Commerce Com-
46mission," was clear and direct. As in the 1880's, pro­
tection was to be helped along by a government agency, but 
henceforth the tariff would be equitable.
Since Theodore Roosevelt and the Republican Party
were in power, reformers worked to interest them in a
47tariff commission. With the President's support, Miles, 
Sanders, and organizations such as the National Associa­
tion of Manufacturers could have obtained from Congress an
agency to act for them in the best interests of the
. . 48nation.
Unfortunately, Roosevelt wanted to avoid the issue. 
He had once endorsed the commission idea, and would do so 
again, but he showed no interest in it while he was in the 
White House. Agitation for tariff change, he said, 
reflected only a periodic popular belief that there ought
46Ibid. , 30.
47 .Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 57.
48Ibid., 61; Wills, Scientific Tariff Making, 18.
20
to be a change in rates. So far as Roosevelt was con­
cerned, "business would be better if we could have it
understood definitely that for the next four or five years
50there would be . . .no revision. " Maintaining that the
"question of what tariff is best for our people is primar­
ily one of expedience," he found it expedient to leave it 
51alone.
This opposition effectively prevented serious con­
sideration of a new tariff and of the commission proposal. 
Nevertheless, some members of Congress, Senator Albert J. 
Beveridge of Indiana in particular, strongly supported a
change. In 1907, he had urged Roosevelt to recommend in
52his annual message the creation of a tariff commission.
At this point the Indiana Senator envisioned an agency in 
the form of a bureau within one of the executive
49
Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, May 15, 
1909. Quoted in William Henry Harbough, Power and Respon­
sibility , The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), 383.
50T. R. to Nicholas Murray Butler, August 22, 1904, 
Elting E. Morison, and John M. Blum (eds.), Theodore 
Roosevelt Letters (8 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951-54), IV, 899.
51Ibid. , 932.
Claude Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era 
(Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1932) , 269.
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departments, its primary function being to collect data.
Under Miles' influence he eventually introduced a bill to
53found a separate agency. When brought before the
. . .  54Senate, in January of 1908, it drew immediate criticism.
On the surface it appeared that it might have found
a more receptive audience. Beveridge was no renegade from
protectionist thinking, and he had ready support from a
small group of Republican insurgents, who, like himself,
55found tariff favoritism too strong for their liking.
Most of them believed that import duties had helped create 
the United States' prosperity, but confronted with obvious 
excesses and realizing that, "with a Tariff bill it is 
just as it is with the River and Harbor bill. . . . You 
tickle me and I tickle you , " they were hoping for changes 
which would create more equitable protection.56 The com­
mission proposal drew their support, for they believed 
that it could create a tariff which denied to large
53Ibid., 386.
54U.S., Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1908, XLII, Part 1, 504.
55Ibid., 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, XLIV, Part 2, 
1742, 1811
56Ibid. , 1880.
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corporations special benefits, while eliminating high 
rates which taxed consumers additional millions of dollars 
every year.
Unfortunately, the Panic of 1907 had generated 
strong feelings in favor of higher protection, the tradi­
tional Republican remedy for economic crises. The few 
insurgents in the Senate were not strong enough to fight 
this sentiment without Roosevelt's support. Beveridge 
finally had to abandon his bill. His efforts produced
only qualified support for tariff revision which the party
57placed in its platform in 1908.
However, in 1909 the tariff became a prominent 
issue for the first time in a decade. William Howard Taft 
had promised tariff reform and his victory raised again 
that issue in Congress. Also, the few Republican malcon­
tents in the Senate were bolstered by the successful races 
of Joseph L. Bristow in Kansas and Albert Cummins in Iowa. 
They, along with veterans such as Moses E. Clapp of 
Minnesota, Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, Jonathan P.
It called for a tariff to equalize differences in 
domestic and foreign costs of production, plus a reasonable 
profit. See Kirk H. Porter ed. , National Party Platforms 
(2d ed. : Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 158.
23
Dolliver of Iowa, and Beveridge of Indiana, were ready to 
force a downward revision of the Dingley Tariff.
Men outside congress were also active. With the 
election over, Miles and James van Cleave, President of 
the National Association of Manufacturers, stepped up 
their efforts to get Congress to pass a bill creating a 
tariff commission before the Republicans began revising 
schedules. The Association called a "business meet­
ing . . .  of business men," in Indianapolis in mid-
58February. After some discussion,it resolved to support
the drive for a tariff board as a fact-finding body to aid
59Congress and to promote the enlargement of foreign trade.
Beveridge's speech to the gathering eloquently sum­
marized this program. He realized that the pending tariff 
would be built by old methods. However, he stated that a 
tariff agency was needed to formulate scientific, equit­
able bills in the future.
For a moment revisionists from the East and Middle 
West— importers, politicians, and businessmen— were 
united; but once the Payne-Aldrich bill was introduced
58 .Wills, Scientific Tariff Making, 19.
59Ibid. , 22.
24
into Congress the coalition fell apart. Low tariff prin­
ciples broke under the impulse to seek special favors and
60businessmen found time to look out only for themselves.
Beveridge revived his tariff commission measure,
and in the House, Charles N. Fowler, Republican from New
jersey, introduced an even more drastic bill. He proposed
giving the agency power to fix duties between certain
61maximum and minimum rates established by Congress. Both
failed. Protectionists throughout the nation descended on
Washington for their first battle in over a decade, and
62the commission proposals had trouble from the start.
Herbert Miles quickly felt the pressure. Always 
sensitive to the charge that he was betraying the protec­
tionist cause, he had taken great pains to make clear his 
position. He was "firmly opposed to . . . tariff 
revision . . .  if the general interest is not at once
r o
safeguarded by sincere protectionists." While Miles
60Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 93.
51U.S. , Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st Sess.,
1909, XLIV, Part 5, 4854, Part 1, 35; Wills, Scientific 
Tariff Making, 47.
Wills, Scientific Tariff Making, 47.
r o
Herbert E. Miles, "Why Manufacturers Want Tariff 
Revision," North American Review, CLXXXVII (January, 1908),
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wanted the repeal of special benefits for large corpora­
tions, he had no desire to do away with the general pro­
tective system.
Nevertheless, Republicans considered his attitude 
risky, and in 1909 he was removed from the National Asso­
ciation of Manufacturers' Committee on the Tariff. 
Furthermore, the Association ceased agitating for duty 
reductions and began to praise the Dingley Tariff as the 
quintessence of protectionist policies. Frightened by the 
prospect of rate changes which might threaten American 
prosperity, the Association reversed the attitude it had 
held in early 1909, and business settled back to await a
more propitious time to do something about the distribu-
64tion of import duties.
However, Congress still had to deal with the Middle 
Western insurgents. Dividing schedules among themselves, 
they became expert enough to subject Representative Serano 
E. Payne and Senator Nelson W. Aldrich to numerous embar­
rassments concerning the iniquities of the existing 
tariff.^ But they could not preserve Beveridge's tariff
64 .Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 94-95.
65Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era. 339-
340.
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commission bill. Opponents pointed out that Congress, as
the representative of the people, was the best available
commission, and there were other fears that a tariff
agency might recommend widespread reductions which would
66destroy the protective system.
When the Payne-Aldrich Act was completed the only 
indication in it of the tariff commission movement was a 
provision which allowed the President to employ a group of 
men to help him administer the maximum-minimum rates which
0 *7the bill authorized. Under the new tariff a set of 
minimum rates applied to all foreign producers. Nations 
who discriminated against the United States faced a 25 per 
cent increase. This was to become effective on March 31,
1910, unless the Executive certified that no undue dis­
crimination existed. This he did.
Taft used this clause to create a Tariff Board. 
Believing that the recent hearings and discussions on pro­
tection had been hampered by a lack of good evidence for 
particular positions, he selected three Republicans to
U.S., Congressional Record. 61st Cong., IstSess.,
1909, XLIV, Part 2, 1856, 2288.
Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States,
404-405.
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examine all essential tariff facts "without reference to
68any party, any theory or any sectional interest." Henry
C. Emory, former Professor of Economics at Yale, was named
chairman of the group. Alvin Sanders 1 appointment pleased
Middle Westerners, while James B. Reynold's selection
brought to the Board a man with long experience as Assist-
69ant Secretary of the Treasury. Later, in response to 
criticism that this group was too biased, Taft added two 
Democrats to the agency, William M. Howard of Georgia, and 
Thomas Walker Page, Professor of Economics at the Univer­
sity of Virginia. Investigations into the cotton and wool 
schedules began immediately, and reports were scheduled 
for December, 1911.
The board, designed to insulate tariff making from 
partisan conflicts, soon found itself mired in politics. 
After winning the lower branch of Congress in 1910, the 
Democrats, together with Republican insurgents, forced
Annual message, December 7, 1910, U.S., Congres­
sional Record, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 1910, XLV, Part 1, 
30; Henry C. Emory's statement as to Taft's orders to the 
Commission is quoted in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and 
Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols. ; New York; Farrar 
and Rinehart, 1939), II, 599-600.
69U.S., Congressional Record, 62d Cong. , 2d Sess., 
1912, XLVIII, Part 2, 9632.
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through selected tariff reductions. These "pop-gun" bills 
were consistently vetoed by Taft who pleaded for a cessa­
tion of legislation until the Board had completed its
70studies. Despite this firm stand, some businessmen 
became increasingly concerned that downward revision might 
become inevitable. Taking a cue from the President's 
request to await the agency's findings, they argued that a 
permanent, non-partisan commission could prevent extreme 
changes in the schedules. The National Tariff Commission 
Association took up the issue again, but now for the pur­
pose of by-passing a "low-tariff" Congress in order to
. . . 71save protection.
Increasingly annoyed by Taft's vetoes, and his use
of the Board to postpone action, the Democrats cut off its 
72appropriation. In 1912 they went to the people with a 
denunciation of the commission idea, a plea for tariff 
reform, and a call to elect as President a man who had no 
favors to bestow or promises to keep. Their success was 
overwhelming.
70 .Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 96.
71Ibid.
72U.S., Congressional Record. 62d Cong., 2dSess., 
XLVIII, Part 2, 9632.
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Woodrow Wilson's campaign presented the public with
the kind of man not seen in national politics for many
decades. An eloquent intellectual endowed with a fierce
morality, Wilson had a penchant for viewing most issues as
contests between good and evil. He characterized the
tariff as part of an alliance between government and
special interests, labeling the Payne-Aldrich Act "wrong
73in detail and radically wrong in principle." To him the
tariff was a guarantor of profits and a shield against the
rigors of competition, neither of which was necessary to
domestic industry, particularly when protection placed
74such a burdensome tax on the consumer.
He intended to revise the tariff downward. Like 
Cleveland, he ignored the strategy of using a tariff com­
mission to support his program. Where Cleveland probably 
did not see any great advantage to be gained from it, 
Wilson simply saw it as a Republican device under Taft, 
and a part of the Progressive Party's program. That was 
enough for him, and he refused to reverse his criticism of 
government "through a board of trustees," even though the
William Diamond, The Economic Thought of Woodrow 
Wilson (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1943), 67.
Ibid., 54-55.74
group was supposed to be non-partisan.
Instead, he took his own ideas and research to
Congress, and with the able management of Senator Oscar
Underwood, fashioned the lowest set of duties since the
Tariff of 1857. The object was not free trade but rather
destruction of the special privileges Republican policies
7 6had conferred on domestic producers. The Democratic
goal was a competitive tariff under which the domestic
producer had to compete with foreign companies for the
American market. This, however, implied a fair profit and
protection was still an economic fact of life. However,
the Democrats wanted some imports; the Republicans
77allegedly tried to keep all of them out.
Although Wilson had worked closely with both houses
of Congress, the tariff still contained poorly constructed
78schedules. There was clearly a need for a tariff com­
mission to point out inadvertent errors, and to support
75Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1961), 56.
7 6Arthur S. Link, Wilson, The New Freedom (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 182.
77Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States,
419-420.
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own party who had supported his basic initial program but
who were now interested in additional social and economic
82legislation. Wilson, realizing their importance to his 
re-election in 1916, decided to do something about their 
demands and those of other organized reform groups.
In 1915, the Chamber of Commerce organized the 
National Tariff Commission League, whose goal was to estab­
lish a commission to recommend safeguards against foreign
83competition and to encourage world trade. James J.
Hill, Cyrus E. McCormick, and George Perkins were among
its board members. By the end of the year it claimed over
84700 endorsements from business organizations.
This agitation heightened Wilson's fears. The 
Democratic Party had to offer convincing proof of its 
ability to cope with economic problems prior to the
82Link, Wilson. The New Freedom, 241.
8 3George W. Perkins to Joseph Tumulty, September
11, 1915, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress. Hereafter cited as Wilson Papers: 
Harwood Lawrence Childs, Labor and capital in National 
Politics (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930), 
148-149.
84James J. Hill to Economic World, October 1, 1915, 
quoted by Senator Charles Thomas, U.S., Congressional 
Record. 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 13, 13823, 
13793; Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 148.
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administration policies. Yet the President, busy with the 
rest of his program, had little time or inclination to 
consider backing such an agency. He apparently saw no 
need for it before the Great War changed the world's 
financial structure, and political pressures in the United 
States made it a desirable piece of legislation.
The winter of 1915 was an important one for those 
groups supporting a tariff commission. A recession forced 
Wilson to pause in his legislative program,to strengthen
the business community's morale in order to hold its
79 .support. Furthermore, the war produced nationalistic
sentiments in the United States which increased interest
8 0in high protection. While the fighting in Europe theo­
retically, and actually, reduced competition in American 
markets, it also produced an irrational fear of post-war
competition. Wilson saw a political advantage in doing
81something to relieve these apprehensions.
He also faced a large group of reformers within his
79Link, Wilson, The New Freedom, 241.
8 0John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics 
of Morality (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1956), 79; 
Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 148.
81Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of 
Morality. 80-81.
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o relection of 1916. In early December, 1915, he at last 
yielded to Secretary of Agriculture David A. Houston's 
insistent appeals for consideration of the tariff commis-
i 86 sion proposal.
In January, Edward A. Filene, a Boston friend of
the President's and Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, chairman
of the Senate Banking Committee, suggested to Wilson that
a commission would conciliate some two to three million
Progressives most of whom would otherwise be lost to the
87party. To them and to other economic nationalists whom
Wilson wanted to attract, a scientific tariff was
synonymous with a protective tariff, and this was what
. 8 8they wanted from the administration.
Wilson seemed to accede to their demands. He asked
85Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Confusion and Crises, 
1915-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 
322. Hereafter cited as Link, Wilson, Confusion and 
Crises.
86Joseph Frederick Kenkel, "The Tariff Commission 
Movement: The Search for a Non-Partisan Solution of the 
Tariff Question," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, 
of History, University of Maryland, 1964) , 99.
87Link, Wilson, Confusion and Crises, 342.
88M.A. Matthews to Wilson, August 11, 1915; Wilson 
to James M. Cox, August 27, 1915; Ralph Blankenburg to 
Joseph Tumulty, September 19, 1916; Colonel George Pope 
to Wilson, February 28, 1916, Wilson Papers; Link, Wilson, 
Confusion and Crises, 342.
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Claude Kitchin, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
to introduce and guide through the House a bill creating a
fact-finding commission to help lawmakers obtain scientific
information on tariffs, international trade conditions,
and "dumping" in American markets. The President explained
that he had changed his mind on the issue because "all the
circumstances of the world have changed and . . . it is
absolutely necessary that we should have a competent
instrument of inquiry along the whole line of the many
89questions which affect our foreign commerce. " When 
Kitchin decided he could not support the proposal, Henry
90T. Rainey of Illinois introduced it on February 1, 1916.
Arthur S. Link's suggestion that the bill's chief
significance was as an indication of Wilson's shift from
low-tariff Democrats like Underwood and Kitchin to the
non-financial business community is not the whole explana- 
91tion. Even if political pressure from Progressives and 
business elements did produce some impetus for Wilson's 
decision, the agency suited his general purpose of keeping
89U.S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1916, LIII, Part 2, 1983.
90 .Link, Wilson, Confusion and Crises, 343.
91Ibid., 344.
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tariff policy compatible with world economic developments.
He understood, by 1916, that the war had radically altered
92trade relations. The United States was becoming a 
creditor nation, and this made it mandatory that a moder­
ate tariff be maintained so that foreign countries could 
sell goods to get the dollars that they needed to buy 
American products.
Soon after Wilson acceded to Houston's pleas, the
Secretary asked Frank W. Taussig, Harvard Professor of
93Economics, for his thoughts on the matter. Houston, who 
wanted the agency to be part of the Federal Trade Commis­
sion, was clearly interested in the accumulation of 
information on foreign trade. Taussig, sharing this
94interest, submitted in early 1916 a plan for an agency.
He envisioned a four-man group, holding overlapping 
terms, to investigate the administrative and fiscal 
aspects of customs laws, different duty combinations, 
arrangement of schedules, and classification of articles.
Wilson to Kitchin, January 24, 1916, quoted in 
Link, Wilson, Confusions and Crises, 343.
93D.F. Houston to Frank W. Taussig, December 18,
1915, Costigan Papers.
94Copy of Taussig's draft in ibid.
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It was also to report on tariff relations between the
United States and other countries, and to advise Congress
95in making tariffs. Houston submitted the plan to 
96Wilson.
Thus as the President was being advised by Filene, 
Owen, and a host of other men who advocated a tariff com­
mission, he was also getting a detailed plan for such an 
agency. Wilson was able to support a measure which osten­
sibly meant a move for greater protection, because it also
meant that he could have a commission which would support
97his low-tariff policies. Since he appointed the agency, 
it would reflect his views. It could also accumulate much 
needed data on changes in world trade.
After the bill was introduced, Wilson continued to 
elaborate his plans for the agency. These comments 
clearly showed that he was preparing to develop the com­
mission as a tool to help businessmen compete effectively
98m  world markets. He stated to President Samuel M.
95Ibid.
Q C.Houston to Taussig, January 17, 1916, ibid.
97"The New Tariff Commission," Journal of Political 
Economy. XXIV (December, 1916), 1014, 1015.
QOWilson to Edward N. Hurley, May 12, 1916, Ray 
Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), Woodrow Wilson,
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Hastings of the Illinois Manufacturing Association, "We 
have not been accustomed to the large world of interna­
tional business, but we must get acquainted with it
99immediately. " It was to be the "privilege and function
of the tariff commission to obtain and collate in an even
more systematic way ^/than the Federal Trade Commission/
the information which is desired as a basis for our future 
100action."
Wilson also enunciated the need for a rational
tariff policy. "The tariff has been revised," he stated,
"not on the principle of repelling foreign trade, but upon
the principle of encouraging it, upon something like a
footing of equality with our own in respect of the terms
of competition."'*'^ The tariff commission was to open
102"legislative policy to the facts as they develop. "
The Public Papers, Presidential Messages, Addresses and 
Other Papers, 1913-1917 (6 vols.; New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1925-1927), IV, 167. Hereafter cited as Baker 
and Dodd, Woodrow Wilson, Public Papers.
^Wilson to Hastings, July 28, 1916, Costigan Papers.
100t^Ibid.
"'"^Address of Acceptance of Renomination, Sept. 2, 
1916, Baker and Dodd, Woodrow Wilson, Public Papers, IV, 
278.
1Q2Ibid. , 289.
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Wilson wanted to make the tariff compatible with 
America's responsibilities and the realities of world 
trade, and the commission was to be an instrument to help 
him in these tasks. This was its main significance. He 
had no intention of repudiating the principles of the 
Underwood Tariff, for it had been predicated upon the idea 
of forcing business to face up to competition and to 
improve industry's producing and marketing capacities.
His appointments to the agency confirmed these 
motives and affirmed his desire to maintain a low tariff, 
for all the members sympathized with Wilson's views on 
protection. In selecting Edward P. Costigan to fill the 
final vacancy, the President confirmed his intentions of 
dealing with the tariff in the most rational, moderate 
manner possible. The Coloradan, anxious to serve in the 
federal government, quickly closed down his business in 
Denver and traveled to Washington. A new chapter in his 
life was about to begin.
CHAPTER II
WAR AND PEACE
The Revenue Act of 1916 did not take the tariff out 
of politics. Despite the desire of some Congressmen to 
have the commission set rates, the legislature refused to 
relinquish its control over that controversial task.'*' 
Progressive Senator George Norris of Nebraska claimed that 
the agency's only object was to gather data, a duty pleas­
ing to Progressives who wanted a scientific tariff
2stripped of excesses. Other Senators were doubtful that 
it could achieve this goal. Boise Penrose of Pennsylvania, 
a conservative Republican, pointed out that the agency's 
information would undoubtedly reflect the views of the men 
doing the work; it was not possible to collect informa­
tion which was immune to different interpretations. 
Congress realized this and took special efforts to keep
1U.S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1916, LIII, Part 12, 12019.
2Ibid., Part 13, 13850-13851.
3Ibid., 13806-13808.
unlimited control of the tariff.
Still, the Commission's supporters believed that 
legislators could derive much benefit from the agency.
Sound commercial relationships were becoming increasingly 
important, especially to a nation whose trade was the 
greatest in the world. Businessmen who wanted the Under­
wood duties raised backed the board, for they viewed it as 
the first step toward increased duties, and Wilson's con­
gressional supporters were also willing to endorse a 
tariff protecting businesses proving a genuine need.^
George W. Perkins summed up feeling on the issue when he 
stated that the nation needed "neither a high tariff nor 
a low tariff but a scientific tariff; . . .  a tariff made 
after exhaustive study and public hearings by men who 
gave . . . their entire time and earnest effort to this
great subject."^
A Commission created for these purposes bothered 
conservative Republicans. Some were afraid that a
40
4
4Thomas Walker Page, Making the Tariff in the 
United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924) , 30.
5U.S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1916, LIII, Part 13, 13795.
6Ibid., Part 11, 10592.
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scientific tariff might mean a reduced level of protection. 
Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio stated that, "We do not
7oppose a tariff commission," but he feared that under 
the Democrats such a board would harm American industry. 
What he and many others overlooked was Wilson's concern 
for business. The Commission was designed to study all 
aspects of protection, particularly those arising from the 
war, in the hope of finding the best methods by which
0
entrepreneurs could expand their foreign markets. Changes 
in the trading policies of the belligerent nations, as 
well as America's new creditor position in world finance, 
brought novel considerations into commercial dealings, and 
Wilson was determined to take them into account before 
planning any changes in the tariff. He was not fighting 
business; he simply had a greater understanding of finan­
cial realities than had many businessmen.
The agency's duties were hardly the sort to provoke
7Warren G. Harding to Republican National Conven­
tion, 1916, Republican Campaign Text-Book, 489, Costigan 
Papers.
0L. Domeratzky, Chief, Division of Foreign Tariffs, 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of 
Commerce, copy in ibid.
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controversy, yet as Wilson said, "men without preposses­
sions are hard to find, and when you find them they are 
generally empty of anything else."^ For this reason, and 
because he realized that other nations could balance their 
trade deficits only through sales in the United States, 
Wilson appointed Commissioners who were moderate protec­
tionists. Not one was an economic isolationist. All 
realized, as did the President, that American post-war 
prosperity depended, ultimately, on the economic health of 
other countries.
Wilson's selections for the commission revealed his 
desire to preserve the tariff principles of 1913. Frank 
W. Taussig was named Chairman. Fifty-seven years old, he 
had been Henry Lee Professor of Economics at Harvard since 
1901. There he had taught the classical economics of Adam 
Smith and Alfred Marshall, edited the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, and written the Tariff History of the United 
States. His work with Wilson in formulating the new
agency, along with his recognized leadership in the
gQuoted by Senator Jacob H. Gallinger, U.S., Con­
gressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part 
13, 13797.
■^Biographical sketches of Tariff Commission 
appointees, Wilson Papers.
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academic community, made him a good choice for the office. 
Cautiously optimistic of man's ability to control his 
environment, he subscribed to a moderate tariff.'*''*' Cer­
tain that the Commission's fact-finding duties could be
12pursued away from the convolutions of politics, Taussig 
accepted the position on condition that he could return to 
Harvard once the agency was underway.^
Daniel C. Roper was appointed Vice-Chairman. A 
South Carolina Democrat, he had served as First Assistant 
Postmaster-General, and clerk of the House Ways and Means 
Committee during the early years of Wilson's first admin­
istration. In that capacity he had compiled a tariff
handbook which was published as an appendix to the Under-
14wood-Simmons Tariff Report. He was well qualified for 
the position, and supported Wilson's tariff policy without
''■'^'Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American 
Civilization (4 vols.; London: G.G. Harrap, 1947), IV,
236.
12U.S., Tariff Commission, Outline of Its Work and 
Plans (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917) , 
passim.
“I OPhillip G. Wright, Tariff Making by Commission 
(Washington: Rawleigh Tariff Bureau, 1930), 17.
14Biographical sketches of Tariff Commission 
appointees, Wilson Papers.
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qualification. He left the agency after just a few months 
to become head of the Internal Revenue Service. The move 
probably reflected his desire for a more prestigious posi­
tion from which to seek the job of Postmaster-General
15should William G. McAdoo become President in 1920.
The third appointee, David J. Lewis, a Democrat,
16had represented Maryland in Congress from 1911 to 1917.
An active supporter of the parcel post and a devotee of 
moderate protection, his defeat in 1916 by Joseph I.
France in the Maryland senatorial contest left him without 
office.
William Kent, the fourth member, had experience in 
business, banking, and reform. Like costigan, he had been 
active as a Progressive, working as a member of the 
Chicago City Council from 1895 to 1897, and as president 
of the Municipal Voters League and the Illinois civil 
Service Association. His residence was Kentfield in Marin 
County, California, from which he had been elected United
15William S. Culbertson Diary, September 1917, 
William S. Culbertson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress. Hereafter cited as Culbertson Papers.
" ^ B i o g r a p h i c a l  sketches of Tariff Commission 
appointees, Wilson Papers.
States Representative from 1911 to 1917. Kent had sup­
ported Wilson's tariff revision and could be counted upon
18to argue for moderate protection.
The two remaining members represented the Great 
Plains and the Rocky Mountain regions. William S. 
Culbertson, sponsored by Kansas journalist William Allen 
White, Edward N. Hurley, Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the entire Kansas Congressional delega­
tion, had been a specialist for the Trade Commission and a
19consultant to Taft's Tariff Board. Egotistical, articu­
late, and extremely ambitious, Culbertson had sought
20appointment as chairman. He took a broad view of the 
tariff, feeling that rather than reflect specific inter­
ests in the business community, it should directly relate 
to the consumer's needs, revenue demands, and foreign 
affairs.^
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The last appointee, Edward P. Costigan, was well 
known to Wilson as his major Colorado supporter during the 
1916 campaign. A prominent lawyer, mine owner, and 
reformer, Costigan' s long experience in politics, as well 
as his low tariff views, made him a good choice for the 
Commission.
When Daniel Roper resigned in 1917, Thomas Walker
Page was named to replace him. Page had been a member of
Taft's Tariff Board and held a position as Professor of
Economics at the University of Virginia. Taussig, eager
to have him, described him to Wilson as "eminently sane
and sensible, obsessed by no prejudices or sweeping 
22theories." He held moderate protectionist views and
23worked well with the original appointees.
The Tariff Commission was created to help promote 
the nation's commerce and business. It was asked to 
investigate the administrative, fiscal, and industrial 
effects of the customs laws, inquire into tariff relations 
between the United States and other countries, and examine
22Taussig to Wilson, December 20, 1917, Wilson
Papers.
Wright, Tariff Making by Commission, 18.23
. . 24competition from foreign industry. Along with these
general duties, it was directed to examine the "dumping"
practices and commercial treaties of other nations and to
report its findings on all matters to Congress. To help
it gather data, power was granted to summon and examine
25witnesses, take testimony, and subpoena information.
The agency was a permanent, fact-finding body hav-
2 6ing no administrative function. Thus its organization
and operating methods were fairly simple. Economists,
statisticians, and secretarial personnel were hired to
supplement the main working force composed of the Cost of
Production Division in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, which was transferred to the Board. William M.
Steuart, former head of the Division of Manufacturers in
the Bureau of the Census, was appointed Chief Statistician
27and Acting Secretary. Conferences were immediately held 
with other federal departments such as Treasury, Commerce,
24U.S., Statutes at Large, XXXIX, Part 1, 795-796.
25Ibid., 797.
26 . .U.S., Tariff Commission, Outline of its Work and
Plans, 3.
27U.S., Tariff Commission, First Annual Report 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 4-5.
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and the Federal Trade commission to draw on their data and
28coordinate the work the agency planned for itself.
However, the war with Germany made it impossible to 
undertake many of its anticipated studies. Cost of pro­
duction inquiries which had been planned for commodities 
originating in Europe were indefinitely postponed, and the 
Commission was forced to concentrate on programs which 
might stimulate Congressional interest when the war was 
over. Attention was drawn to the confused and archaic 
condition of the customs laws, and a complete program for 
revising them was submitted to the House Ways and Means
Committee. It was a job long overdue, for no thorough
29study had been made since 1789.
In April, 1917, the Commission submitted a report 
on "interim" legislation. Preceding every tariff revi­
sion, during the period from the introduction to the 
eventual passage of an act, importers had bought huge 
quantities of goods under old rates and stored them for 
sale after new duties went into effect. As a result the
28Ibid.
29Ibid. , 10; U.S., Tariff Commission, Report Upon 
the Revision of the Customs Administration Laws (Washing­
ton; Government Printing Office, 1918), 5.
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government lost large revenues and the consumer was forced 
to pay an additional amount for goods which were raised in 
price to the new level of the duties. Congress was asked 
to make tariff legislation retroactive to the time a bill 
was introduced.^
The agency also suggested the possibility of estab­
lishing free ports. These cities were to be designated 
for free deposit of imported merchandise scheduled for
reshipment out of the country, thereby greatly benefitting
31the commercial community. However, after a year the
Commission had not obtained the support of Claude Kitchin,
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee; even
Wilson's urgings could not move a bill out of the
32committee.
Since it was a fact-finding agency, designed to 
help Congress legislate sound tariffs, one important 
aspect of the Commission's work was the Tariff Information 
Catalogue, a series of publications inaugurated in 1917,
30U.S., Tariff Commission, Report on Interim 
Legislation (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1917) , passim.
31U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, July 18,
1917.
32Wilson to Kitchin, July 12, 1918, Wilson Papers.
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giving descriptions of every dutied item, listing its main
foreign producer, stating its volume of sales in the
33United States and the existing duty. Surveys of the 
chemical and sugar industries in order to determine the 
amount and cost of domestic production were also 
completed.
The Commission devoted much attention to trade
relations. War in Europe, by forcing the Allies to turn
to the United States for financial aid and by destroying
their foreign markets, indicated that commercial treaties
and tariff arrangements between America and other nations
could be drastically revised.
The United States emerged during the war as the
creditor nation of the world, a position which demanded
great financial and commercial responsibility. Though
some experiments had been made with reciprocity and other
forms of trade agreements, America had never established a
35permanent commercial policy. Further, it had inter­
preted the most-favored-nation clause differently than did 
European nations, extending that principle only if the
33U.S., Tariff Commission, First Annual Report, 12.
34 35Ibid., 14, 15. Ibid., 16, 17.
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recipient bestowed equal concessions in return. In Europe
36 , ,these benefits were issued without conditions. Clearly, 
with the United States' new financial and trading superi­
ority, a firm, consistent trade policy seemed more than 
ever necessary.
The Commission was asked in early 1917 to study 
various forms and instruments of commercial policy and to
suggest means of improving the nation's bargaining and
37trading positions. The following year the agency issued
a report urging establishment of the principle of equality
as the basis for America's trade relations. Foreign
countries were to extend to the United States ' goods the
same rates and regulations they accorded to products of
other nations. In return, America was not to discriminate
38against foreign commodities. Such a policy could free 
world trade from the complications and impediments of 
national barriers. It was also advantageous to the United
Ibid., 18.
37Joseph M. Jones, Jr., Tariff Retaliation, Reper­
cussions of the Hawley-Smoot Bill (Philadelphia: Univer­
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1934), 3. Hereafter cited as 
Jones, Tariff Retaliation.
38U.S., Tariff Commission, Reciprocity and Commer­
cial Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1919), 10, 11.
States, for her manufacturing system and competitive posi­
tion in the world markets were superior to most other 
nations.
To implement this policy, Congress was asked to
provide a set of special duties applicable to the products
39of nations discriminating against American trade. The 
Commission made no recommendations on the use of the uncon­
ditional form of the most-favored-nation clause, but its 
adoption would have been compatible with a commercial 
policy of non-discrimination.4^
These were not the agency1 s only war-time activi­
ties. Much of its staff assumed duties directly related 
to the conflict. Frank Taussig served on the price-fixing 
committee of the War Industries Board and also worked with 
the Food Administration. Thomas Walker Page was an 
advisor on national meat policy, while Daniel Lewis was 
designated by Wilson to aid the Post Office Department's 
administration of the telephone and telegraph systems. 
Culbertson and Costigan made trips to Europe to gather 
what information they could on possible economic changes
52
39Ibid., 14.
40Jones, Tariff Retaliation, 3.
there.
The Commission's most important war effort was a
compilation of the commercial and tariff policies of other
nations for use at the peace conference. Culbertson had
sought such an assignment at the time the United States
entered the war. He wrote Costigan on April 4, 1917, that
"The services of this Commission will not be greatly in
demand for some months, . . .  we have an opportunity to
prepare for the demand which will be made upon our ser-
42vices when peace comes under consideration. "
The two men shared the view that the post-war world
needed to cooperate in its commercial dealings if all
43nations were to benefit from trade, and Culbertson was 
especially anxious to see the agency play a role in formu­
lating these policies. He even envisioned it as a perma­
nent Presidential tool, helping to negotiate commercial
44treaties.
41U.S., Tariff Commission, Second Annual Report 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 35.
42Culbertson Diary, Culbertson Papers.
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43Culbertson to Costigan, August 15, 1917, ibid. 
^Culbertson Diary, December 18, 1917, ibid.
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Culbertson had far more ambition for the commission 
than did the other members, including Costigan. The Kansan 
disliked its insignificance in prestige-conscious Washing­
ton and often spoke of how the agency could "spring into
prominence" if programs were established to bring it "honor
45and fame." Taussig, more reluctant to push the board
into areas before it was invited, waited until October,
1917, before volunteering the agency's services to help
46with peace plans. The offer accepted, the commission was
soon busy formulating data for the Inquiry, a program
designed to prepare American diplomats for peace talks in
47Versailles.
Taussig was keenly interested in the problems of
48post-war trade. Fearful that commercial by-products of
the conflict would make it difficult for nations to 
purchase raw materials, he had sent Wilson a plan, in 
the fall of 1918, to regulate the distribution of key
45culbertson Diary, April 4, 1917; Culbertson to 
Costigan, August 15, 1917, ibid.
^Taussig to Colonel E.M. House, October 2, 1917,ibid.
47U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, May 25,1918; Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry; American Prepara­
tion for Peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1963), 294-295.
48Taussig to Wilson, May 28, 1918, Wilson to 
Taussig, May 28, 1918, Wilson Papers.
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commodities such as cotton, wool, rubber, sugar, coffee,
49copper, and tin. Taussig hoped the President, if inter­
ested, could gather support for it at Versailles. Con­
cerned that the United States might be excluded from the 
new markets it had claimed during the war, the chairman 
hoped that a proposal for international distribution of
vital materials might protect America as well as other 
50nations.
Wilson was apparently impressed with Taussig's 
thoughts and asked him to attend the peace conference. 
There the Chairman assumed charge of an international sub­
committee responsible for drafting clauses on customs 
legislation. He clearly presented the American view on
reciprocity, tariff discrimination, and the post-war com-
51mercial treatment of Germany, but his appeal for sympa­
thetic treatment for the Weimar government failed to win 
acceptance.
49Frank W. Taussig, "International Allotment of Im­
portant Commodities,” October 24, 1918, Miscellaneous 
Addresses of Tariff Commissioners, 1917-1949 (Tariff Com­
mission Library, Washington D.C., n.d.), n.p.
50Taussig draft of suggestions on post-war policy, 
October 27, 1917, Costigan Papers.
51Taussig to Costigan, March 31, 1919, ibid.
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There was little chance that Germany would be
treated with moderation. Even before the Armistice, at
the Paris Economic Conference in June, 1916, the Allies
had devised a program to subject the Central Powers to
52commercial discrimination after the war. It was partly
in response to this proposal that Wilson had suggested in
his Fourteen Points that economic barriers to trade be
53removed, so far as possible. But the Allies failed to
realize that the defeated nations would have to achieve
economic recovery before they could pay their reparations
54and support world trade. Germany, if she was willing, 
had the capacity to pay her debts, and the peace provi­
sions should have been designed to prevent her
55alienation. But neither Britain, France, nor Italy
52U.S., Congress, Senate, Trade Agreements Abroad, 
64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, Senate Document 490, 65.
53Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts 
and World Prosperity (New York: Brookings Institution, The 
Century Company, 1932) , 375-376.
^^Frank W. Taussig, "Germany's Reparation Payments," 
American Economic Review Economic, Supplement, X (March,
1920), 43-45.
55Etienne Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace or the 
Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes (New York; Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1952), 93. Hereafter cited as Mantoux, 
The Carthaginian Peace. See also Arthur S. Link, Wilson 
the Diplomatist (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1957), 
121-122.
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realized this.
Etienne Mantoux1 s subsequent argument that the
three powers justifiably imposed inequalities upon Germany
ignored the Allies ' need to provide for their own prosper-
ity by supporting the Weimar Republic s economic revival.
Nor could extraction of most-favored-nation privileges
from Germany, along with the provisions for duty-free
exports from Poland, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine into
58 _that defeated nation, be held insignificant. These were
important, symbolic restrictions, particularly when Europe
was turning to a highly nationalistic policy of protection.
The economic health of the Allied states became
visibly weaker soon after the peace conference, but they
ignored the problems created by high tariff barriers and
59tried to stabilize the continent's monetary system. The 
Brussels Conference in 1920 and the Genoa Conference in
56Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Pros­
perity, 376; John M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of
the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920), 
226.
57 . .Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace, 90.
58^.„Ibid.
59Michael A. Heilpenn, The Trade of Nations (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1947), 148.
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1922 dealt more with this problem than with the growth of
60tariffs and other handicaps to trade. It was not until 
Austria, Hungary, and Germany collapsed in 1922-23 that it 
was finally recognized that there could be no recovery from 
the war until the defeated nations were economically 
sound. ^  The Dawes Plan, drawn up in 1924, confirmed
4.V  62this.
By this time, however, many European countries had 
modified their commercial framework, a development which 
made it difficult to remove trade barriers. Great Britain 
had been one of the first to act. In 1916, the Balfour 
Commission had considered the United Kingdom's future com­
mercial policies, reporting that the government should 
encourage manufactures vital to the nation's industrial 
position. While opposing a comprehensive tariff scheme, 
the Committee was willing to support minor efforts to meet
the demands of the dominions and colonies for special
. 63economic privileges.
60^. „Ibid.
^Moulton and Pasvolsky, War Debts and World 
Prosperity. 378-379.
/• <\
Ibid. , 379.
6 3Commerce Reports, No. 131, June 5, 1918, Costigan
Papers.
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Britain, along with this effort to increase her
competitive position in domestic and world markets,
applied wartime duties to some luxuries: motor cars,
clocks, and musical instruments. Originally designed to
64expire in a decade, they were renewed in 1925. In 1920, 
the Dyestuffs Duty marked the United Kingdom's decision to 
take the first step toward national protection, and the 
Safeguarding Duties in the following year, reinforced this 
move. In a world frought with nationalism no single 
debtor nation could refuse to protect itself and Britain 
extended preferences to parts of the Empire. Her era of 
general free trade had clearly come to a close, even 
though protection affected but one half of one per cent of 
her total imports.
France was much more aggressive. On April 23,
1918, she announced that unilateral bargaining served her 
interests best, and scrapped all of her most favored-
64Percy Bidwell, Our Trade With Britain: Bases for 
a Reciprocal Tariff Agreement (Council on Foreign Rela­
tions; New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1938), 55.
^Jones, Tariff Retaliation, 218; Wallace McClure,
A New American Commercial Policy, As Evidenced by Section 
317 of the Tariff Act of 1922 (Columbia University Studies 
in History, Economics and Political Science: New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1924), CXIV, 219. Hereafter 
cited as McClure, A New American Commercial Policy.
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nation treaties. Henceforth, her domestic market was pro­
tected by maximum and minimum rates. Concessions were
66made on the higher duties. In April, 1922, Spain adopted
6 7a similar policy. Canada, Belgium, Australia, India,
japan, and Italy soon followed this trend to establish
68higher trade barriers.
Europe's refusal to seek freer exchange damaged the
stability of international trade. The United States,
faced with new financial responsibilities, was no more
rational than her Atlantic neighbors, although Woodrow
Wilson tried to keep the Underwood Tariff intact.
The President was convinced that America needed
expanded foreign markets for her surpluses, and he hoped
that maintaining the Tariff of 1913 would encourage other
69nations to keep their low trade barriers. If this were
accomplished, it would establish a new era of inter-
70national trade. In any case, Wilson was determined that
^Jones, Tariff Retaliation, 156.
^7McClure, A New American Tariff Policy, 211-212.
68Thomas O. Marvin, "Post War Tariffs" (n.p., n.d., 
about 1922), costigan Papers.
69
70Ibid., 162.
Diamond, The Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson,
132-134.
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the United States repulse discrimination against her
71commerce.
To further the expansion of American exports, in 
1918, he signed the Webb-Pomerene Act, a measure suspend­
ing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for enterprises engaged 
primarily in foreign trade. The President believed that 
the consolidation of exporting firms was the only way that 
United States' goods could compete against foreign pro­
ducers in the world's markets. The act never fulfilled 
its purpose. Up to 1929 the highest volume of trade 
exported by corporations covered by the statute did not 
exceed 13 per cent of the total shipments abroad in any 
one year, and those businesses secured unnecessary advan­
tages in the home market since they also sold their 
72products there.
Wilson tried to convince the people in the United
73States that there was no need to seek more protection.
He pointed out that "No serious danger" threatened
7January 8, 1918, Baker and Dodd, Woodrow Wilson,
Public Papers, V, 289.
72Leslie T. Fournier, "The Webb-Pomerene Act," 
American Economic Review, XXXI (March, 1932), 18-33.
73May 20, 1919, Baker and Dodd, Woodrow Wilson, 
Public Papers, V, 492.
62
American industries, and that the country had emerged from
the war in a far better condition than any of the European
countries with which it had to compete. He looked forward
74to increased successes in world markets, and while pre­
pared to protect dye-goods and chemicals, products instru­
mental to the national defense, he had no plans to increase
75the general rates of the existing tariff.
However, the President knew that so long as Europe
remained economically unstable disturbances could cross
the Atlantic. In America's own interest, she must help
Europe revive herself, and he tried to impress this upon 
7 6the country. Wilson drew attention to the fact that the
United States had become a creditor nation, and that if
Europe wanted to repay her debts, she would have to
77accumulate dollars. There were only three ways she 
could do this. She could sell Americans her goods, she 
could ship them her gold, or she could establish credit 
with New York financiers.
Europe was in no position to send gold, for the war
74Ibid. 75Ibid. , 493.
^August 8, 1919, ibid. , 568-569.
77Ibid. , VI, 430.
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had drained much of her reserves. Furthermore, the United
7 8States did not want it. Thus foreign countries had to 
sell goods, for credits were no long-term solution to a 
trade deficit. Anything which tended to prevent France, 
Germany, and England from doing this was an obstacle to 
world recovery and to the economic health of the United 
States.
As Wilson cautioned Congress, "If we want to sell,
79we must be prepared to buy. ” When the legislature
passed the Emergency Agricultural Tariff in early 1921,
Wilson vetoed it, asserting that, "If there ever was a
time when America had anything to fear from foreign com-
80petition, that time has passed." Clearly this was not 
the time to raise trade barriers. The nation must dis­
charge its duty to itself and to the world by widening,
81not contracting, its domestic market.
Wilson was not trying to revive Europe's economy at 
the expense of American trade. What he wanted was a 
widened sphere of freer economic exchange in which his 
country's superiority in manufacturing and agricultural
78Ibid. 
8°Ibid. , 5 33.
7^Ibid., 431.
O 1Ibid., 534.
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production could produce profits. In turn domestic mar­
kets had to be opened to the products of nations who 
needed and wanted to buy from the United States. It was 
not a plan to destroy business under the mosaic flag of 
internationalism. It was an effort to reconstruct the 
world to its own best advantage and in the best interests 
of the United States.
Republican critics who had defeated Wilson on the 
Versailles issue were anxious to re-institute their tradi­
tional policy of protection, a program which asserted that 
the nation could achieve a satisfactory degree of self-
sufficiency no matter how other countries fared economi- 
82cally. As a spokesman for the American Worsted Yarn
Spinners Association stated, "I am not sitting up nights
worrying about Europe1 s problems . . . they are her
own . . . babies; but I am very much interested in the
8 3troubles we have got here."
Many businessmen agreed. They feared Europe's
82Jones, Tariff Retaliation, 300.
8 3Testimony of James A. Emorey, July 21, 1919 in 
National Employment System Hearings, 468-469, cited in 
Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, IV,
47.
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efforts to reclaim pre-war markets, and they pointed 
with alarm to statistics issued by the National City Bank 
of New York which stated that in the fiscal year 1920, the 
nation's favorable balance of trade was the smallest since 
1915. Although fearful of the threat of foreign competi­
tion, these same businessmen soon dominated the world's 
markets for manufactured goods. This hurt Europe 1s trade 
opportunities. The Republican tariff of 1922 further ham­
pered European efforts to make profits which could he con­
verted into dollars. Through the decade of the twenties,
many continental nations depended upon the United States
85for loans to finance purchases. American tariff policy, 
along with an insistence on repayment of war debts, were 
two measures which tended to weaken those countries finan-
•  i  ,  _  * * i * j _  86cial stability.
O AThomas Walker Page in the Saturday Evening Post,
July 3, 1920, clipping in Costigan Papers.
^Herbert Feis, Diplomacy of the Dollar (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 1950), passim? Alexander D. Noyes, The 
War Period of American Finance, 1908-1925 (New York: G.P. 
Putnams Sons, 1926), 291.
^jacob Viner, "Must the United States as a Creditor 
Nation Modify its Traditional Attitude Toward a Protective 
Tariff?" Annals of American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, XCIV (March, 1921) , 47-51; Benjamin
Dagwell Rhodes, "The United States and the War Debt Ques­
tion, 1917-34" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of 
History, University of Colorado, 1965), 384-389.
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Wilson failed to convince the country or the Senate 
of the need to ratify the Versailles Treaty, and the 
period of nationalism which followed guaranteed that no 
new era of freer trade was at hand. In 1920, the United 
States repudiated the President's policy and tried to 
return to the more familiar "isolationist" pattern of the 
past.
The Republicans had regained their political 
strength in 1918 when they won control of Congress. They 
expected to win in 1920 as well. This possibility 
instilled fears in Edward Costigan, for he believed the 
Grand Old Party might destroy the Tariff Commission's 
"non-partisan" status.
This danger provided Costigan with his first oppor­
tunity to compose his ideas on the agency's proper func­
tions. There was no doubt in his mind that Wilson's ideas 
on commercial policy were correct, and the Coloradan
believed that his colleagues on the Commission shared 
87these concepts. Any politically inspired effort to 
change the board's composition constituted a threat to its 
"unbiased" fact-finding capacity, and was certain to
87Costigan to Thomas Walker Page, February 28,
1920, Costigan papers.
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arouse Costigan1s opposition. After Taussig and William 
Kent resigned in the summer of 1920, the Coloradan suc­
cessfully pleaded with Thomas Walker Page to remain with
88the agency. The fewer vacancies there were on the 
Commission, the less opportunity the Republicans would 
have to change its composition.
Costigan had not lost the strong ties to Progres- 
sivism he had developed in Colorado during the century's 
first two decades. Wilsonian in his tariff thinking, a 
dedicated public servant, and a talented reformer, he 
wanted the Tariff Commission to support the program 
sketched by the President from 1918 to 1921. When the 
Republican party created a new function for the agency, 
administering the flexible tariff, costigan found the tool 
he needed to try and implement a Progressive program for 
the commission.
Copy of speech in ibid.88
CHAPTER III
A NEW TARIFF POLICY
Peace in Europe freed the Commissioners from their 
war-time duties and allowed them to turn full attention to 
tariff and commercial problems. From 1919 to 1921 they 
worked hard to interest Congress in needed legislation. 
Although most of their suggestions were the same ones put 
forward during the war, they did demonstrate that the 
agency could be constructive.
The board's Fifth Annual Report directed attention 
to the Tariff Information Surveys, inaugurated in 1917, 
and pointed out their usefulness to Congress if it decided 
to revise the tariff.'*' A report on "dumping" and other 
forms of unfair foreign competition was sent to the House 
Ways and Means Committee in 1919. "Dumping" was the prac­
tice of selling foreign goods in America at a lower price 
than that charged in the country of origin. The intent 
was to drive out all competition, allowing a foreign cor­
poration to dominate the United States' market for a
'‘U.S., Tariff Commission, Fifth Annual Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921) , 9.
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particular product. The Commission recommended that an
important federal officer head a single agency which could
2impose penalty duties on goods "dumped" in America.
The board also called the proposed codification of 
the Customs Administration Law to Representative Joseph W. 
Fordney's attention, and though he was uninterested in
3it, legislators later considered it more seriously.
Suggestions for interim legislation and free trade 
zones still did not interest Congress, though the Commis­
sion stressed both, along with a report on the wool grow­
ing industry, suggesting that fleece be assessed according
4to its scoured content. Ordinarily, imported wool was 
unwashed and greasy, weighing more than the scoured 
product. Since varying amounts of oil were in a given 
quantity of wool, tariff revenue was uncertain, and the 
agency's report reflected its interest in a more precise
2U.S., Tariff Commission, Information Concerning 
Dumping and Unfair Foreign Competition in the United 
States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919),
28, 29.
3Costigan Memorandum, July 11, 1919, Costigan
Papers.
4U.S., Tariff Commission, The Wool Growing Industry
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921) , 456.
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method of assessing duties. Since this device also offered 
a more certain level of protection, wool growers were 
interested, and it was eventually incorporated in the 
Fordney Tariff.
The Commission also published in 1919 a study of
5American commercial policies. It urged that the United 
States demand equal treatment for its commerce in the 
world's markets and extend similar privileges to nations 
trading in America. congress adopted this policy, though 
not until 1922, and it also insisted that the rights of 
most-favored-nation be granted unconditionally, a position 
informally favored by the agency.
The Commission's most difficult post-war issue was 
the proposed assessment of imports on the basis of Ameri­
can selling prices rather than foreign costs of production. 
Depreciation in foreign exchange rates from 1919 to 1925 
reduced gold prices precipitously, making it profitable to 
send greater amounts of goods to the United States. Pro­
tectionists suggested the American valuation as a device 
to raise duties and to appease distressed domestic pro­
ducers. Sentiment for the plan was especially strong in
5U.S., Tariff Commission, Reciprocity and Commer­
cial Treaties, 9, 19, 11.
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the House of Representatives.
When Congress asked the Tariff Commission for an 
opinion, the agency, refusing to judge the plan, responded 
with an enumeration of the administrative changes which 
such a program required.^ Costigan, Page, Culbertson, and 
Lewis were moderate protectionists. The American valua­
tion scheme did not appeal to them, but for political 
reasons they were careful to make their views as inoffen­
sive as possible.
The agency carefully evaded all issues which had 
partisan overtones. For example, it turned down requests 
for opinions on the amount of protection needed to equal­
ize the costs of producing goods in the United States and 
abroad, partly because there was no information on which
to base a judgment, but also because such advice was
7politically dangerous.
The agency's recommendations, although timely and 
valid, could not conceal its declining contribution to
^U.S., Tariff Commission, Information Concerning 
American Valuation as the Basis for Assessing Duties Ad 
Valorem (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921) , 17.
7Joseph Fordney to Thomas Walker Page, January 14, 
1921; Page to Fordney, January 15, 1921; Page to Fordney, 
January 19, 1921; Page to John A. Garner, January 13, 1921, 
Costigan Papers.
good, scientific government. Taussig's growing disinter­
est and resignation in 1920 lessened its activity and 
weakened its image as a useful collector of tariff data. 
Beginning in January, 1919, and continuing into 1921, most
of its meetings were adjourned without consideration of
8any business. Hostile Republicans noticed this listless­
ness and refused the Commission's request for a deficiency 
appropriation in early 1919. The following summer they 
made a minor effort to cut off all the agency's funds, 
much as the Democrats had done to the Tariff Board in
91911. Inadequately financed, the Commission transferred 
several staff members to other government bureaus.^
There was some danger that the agency might wither under 
Republican attacks and from its own inactivity.
The Commission was saved from possible extinction 
by Senator Warren G. Harding's successful campaign in 1920 
and the Republican party's decision to revise the Under­
wood Act. Harding had always favored a tariff board if it
QU.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, January 7, 
1919-October 1, 1922.
^Ibid., April 28, 1919; "The Tariff Commission in 
the Senate," New Republic, XIX (July 23, 1919), 275-376.
10U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, April 28,
1919.
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was controlled by Republicans and new protective legisla­
tion placed demands upon the agency for advice and 
information.
Warren Harding sold "normalcy" as well as himself, 
and it was to this man and his program that the electorate 
responded. Based upon the beliefs of a rural, isolation­
ist society, his creed, which should have perished with 
the war, was undeniably attractive to the voters. When he 
pleaded that it was well enough to preach Americanism, 
but "more important to practice it," he only told the pop­
ulace what it wanted hear.'*""*" Most people felt that what
the United States needed was "practical Americanism in
12business as well as . . . politics."
Harding did not seek to restore the old order, but
he called for a "sane normalcy," preserving those "funda-
13mentals" which were "unchangeable and everlasting."
Nationalism was clearly an enduring principle; it was in
14fact, "the very soul of highest Americanism.” yet he
Warren G. Harding's speech before the Ohio Soci­
ety of New York, January 6, 1920. Warren G. Harding 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Here­
after cited as Harding Papers.
12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid.
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defined it narrowly. The United States needed no advice
from other countries in formulating its policies. It was
fine to idealize, he stated, but it was "very practical to
make sure our own house is in perfect order, before we
15attempt the miracle of old-world stabilization."
Harding enunciated these ideas after he had 
acknowledged his interest in the Presidential nomination. 
He had learned, as do all political hopefuls, that the 
only way to achieve high office was to work actively for 
it.^ When neither General Leonard Wood nor Governor 
Frank 0. Lowden of Illinois received a majority, the Repub­
lican National Convention turned to the Ohio Senator. He 
was available, he was sound, and he looked like a 
President. Contrary to popular myth, he was not the hand- 
picked product of the Senate's old guard. Henry Cabot 
Lodge and Boise Penrose were no longer the powers they had 
once been. Although they supported Harding, his strength 
in Ohio, along with other assets, lured the convention to
15Ibid.
Harding to John L. Von Blon, December 22, 1919, 
ibid: Harding had announced his candidacy for the nomina­
tion, as a favorite-son of Ohio, on December 17, 1919.
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his candidacy.
The Republican landslide in 1920 obliterated any
hope Wilson might have had for his tariff policy. It was
certain that Congress would pass a new, higher tariff.
Harding, although aware of the nation's changed financial
relationship with the world, still wanted to pursue his
18party's traditional policy of protection. It was a 
position held by many responsible men besides the 
President.
Harding's public statements were unclear. He had
been quoted as saying that "The United States should adopt
a protective tariff of such a character as will help the
19struggling industries of Europe to get on their feet."
17Ray Baker Harris, Warren G. Harding, An Account 
of His Nomination (Washington D.C.: by the author, 1957), 
passim; Andrew Sinclair, The Available Man: The Life 
Behind the Masks of Warren Gamaliel Harding (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1965), 137, 141. Hereafter cited as Sin­
clair, The Available Man. For an account of Harding's 
nomination which, however, fails to acknowledge the Ohio 
Senator's political leadership in his own campaign, see 
Wesley M. Bagby, "The 'Smoke Filled Room' and the Nomina­
tion of Warren G. Harding," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XLI (March, 1955), 657-674.
18Sinclair, The Available Man, 91.
19Samuel H. Adams, Incredible Era, The Life and 
Times of warren Gamaliel Harding (Cambridge: Riverside 
Press, 1939), 223. Hereafter cited as Adams, Incredible 
Era.
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This seemed to indicate that he realized that Europe had
to sell in American markets in order to buy in return
American goods. At the same time he denied that the
country had any mission of world restoration, believing
that "our fortunate capacity for comparative self-
containment . . . afforded . . . the firm foundation on
20which to build for our own security. " It was "not an 
unworthy selfishness to seek to save ourselves, when the 
processes of that salvation are . . . not denied to
H21others."
Wilson had expressed a similar view, but he believed 
that Europe's economic salvation was dependent on outside 
financial and material support, as well as a moderate 
American tariff. Harding did not. Within a few months 
after taking office he signed the Emergency Agricultural 
Tariff, a bill similar to the one Wilson had vetoed, term­
ing it irrational and unnecessary.
Since the turn of the century, American farmers had 
experienced prosperity, and the war pushed profits to
20U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong. , 2d Sess. ,
1922, LXII, Part 1, 53.
especially high levels. However, prices on cotton, 
corn, wheat, and hogs began to drop rapidly after the con­
flict ended. By 1921 these commodities sold for one-third
23to two-thirds less than their war-time levels. This
placed a heavy burden on the farmers who had opened new
lands and purchased mechanized equipment in order to meet
demands for increased production. Farm bankruptcy jumped
from 6.4 per cent of all cases in 1920 to 18.77 per cent 
24by 1924, and the average price for land fell from $108
25to $76 per acre. Since there was no comparable defla­
tion in the cost of his purchases, the agrarian's real 
income declined rapidly.
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22
22Harold U. Faulkner, From Versailles to the New 
Deal; A Chronicle of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover Era (The 
Chronicle of America Series, Allan Nevins, ed. ; New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1950), 262. Hereafter cited as 
Faulkner, From Versailles to the New Deal.
23George Soule, Prosperity Decade; From War to 
Depression, 1917-1929 (The Economic History of the United 
States; New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1947), 99- 
100. Hereafter cited as Soule, Prosperity Decade.
24U.S., Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, 1789-1945 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1949), 111.
Faulkner, From Versailles to the New Deal, 263-25
264.
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Because of this depressed condition, the farmer
began to look for a device to raise his prices. Believing
that the tariff was responsible for much of industry's
success he began to agitate for agricultural protection in
order to restore his purchasing power and improve his
2 6standard of living.
Since Harding proposed no program for agricultural 
relief, Senators William S. Kenyon of Iowa and Arthur 
Capper of Kansas, along with the Farm Bureau Federation, 
organized and promoted a legislative program. Operating 
on the assumption that the farmer's well being was funda­
mental to the nation's prosperity, twenty-eight Senators
and ninety-five congressmen formed hard core support for
27the Emergency Agricultural Tariff.
This act was designed to combat falling staple 
prices until Congress could take time to incorporate 
higher duties into a general tariff. It placed high rates 
upon a long list of agricultural commodities and levied 
compensatory duties on cotton and woolen manufactures
2 6Soule, Prosperity Decade, 264.
27Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural 
Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison: Univer­
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1951), 321-322.
to offset duties placed on staple cotton and wool. The 
sugar duty was raised to two cents a pound, the highest in 
many years. Enacted for only six months, these rates were 
extended until the Fordney-McCumber Tariff became law.
The Fordney Act, the first general revision of pro­
tection since 1913, forced Congress to turn to the Tariff 
Commission for information. The agency was particularly
valuable in helping the House compose new chemical, tex-
29tile, and agricultural schedules. Asked in July, 1921,
to present its ideas on commercial policy and customs
administration, the board had the satisfaction of seeing
both reports incorporated into the new tariff, the latter
30almost verbatim.
The Senate Finance Committee used the Commission's 
staff even more extensively to help compose its recommen­
dations. The agency scrupulously maintained non-partisan 
views, so much so that the staff members found themselves 
compiling information for whatever position a Senator
28U.S., Tariff Commission, Dictionary of Tariff In­
formation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919) ,
2^Culbertson Memorandum, May 10, 1921, Culbertson
Papers.
30Culbertson Memorandum, July 1, 1921, ibid. 
Costigan to Taussig, July 19, 1921, Costigan Papers.
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wanted to support. This was not always appreciated. 
Senator Frank R. Gooding of Idaho described the difficul­
ties of the practice:
The most remarkable spectacle that I have ever seen 
occurs on the floor of the Senate every day. Experts 
sit with the Committee of Finance in the morning; they 
come into the Senate and divide up; one goes on the 
Republican side and the other on the Democratic side.
I do not know what 'dope' they hand out to each Sena­
tor, but I know that Senators do not then agree, 
while I know that they did agree in the morning.^2
Gooding wanted the Commission abolished since it
did little more than provide material for each Senator's 
33point of view. However, this sentiment was not wide­
spread. After the House had passed the new customs admin­
istration code, Costigan commented that "little if any of
the old talk about abolishing the Commission is now heard
34in Washington." The agency's work on the tariff enhanced 
its reputation.
Neither the Emergency Agricultural Tariff nor the
31
31Costigan to Taussig, July 20, 1922, Costigan
Papers.
32U.S., congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. , 
1922, LXII, Part 11, 11625.
34Costigan to Taussig, July 19, 1921, Costigan
Papers.
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Fordney Act helped agriculture. Both proved to be a
35"meaningless sop to the farmer." Agricultural prosper­
ity depended on foreign demand, a market which declined as 
European nations increased their food production and 
turned to Argentina and Australia for such staples as meat 
and wheat. Further, by reducing foreign purchasing power, 
high tariff rates may have been responsible for lowered
prices on pork, apples, winter wheat, and cotton seed
.. 36 oil.
There were also domestic causes for the farmer's 
declining prosperity. Dietary changes lessened consump­
tion of wheat and corn, and the spread of machinery which 
reduced the worker ' s expenditure of energy lowered per 
capita food consumption. These phenomona, combined with
expanding agricultural production, depressed prices
37severely.
The Fordney Act incorporated the Emergency Tariff1s 
high rates on wheat, corn, and livestock, and allowed the
35"Doubtful Aid for the Farmer," Literary Digest, 
LXVIII (January 8, 1921), 12.
36U.S., Tariff Commission, Dictionary of Tariff 
Information. 20.
37 Soule, Prosperity Decade, 232-234.
continued free admission of agricultural implements, but
38these were empty gestures. The United States produced
these items as cheaply as any other nation. Potash
remained on the free list, a genuine benefit to the farmer
because it was a heavily imported product. Wool, which
had been placed on the free list by the Underwood Act, was
39heavily protected, and its duty was assessed on the
scoured fleece, as the Commission had recommended.
Manufacturing benefited most from the Fordney
Tariff. Rates on cotton goods and hosiery remained at
previous high levels, and chinaware, laces, toys, and
40pottery were heavily protected. coal tar products, chem­
icals and dye stuffs duties were raised to extraordinary 
heights, reflecting the desire for more independence in 
munitions production.
The new act drew much adverse comment. The New 
York Times called it the "most prohibitive tariff bill
that has ever been proposed in the American Congress," and
41so it was. Yet record high rates, while excluding
38Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States,
455.
39 40 41Ibid. Ibid., 475-476. June 11, 1922.
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certain items, did not alter the relative sales of foreign
and domestic goods in the American market. High incomes
during the decade more than offset the increased rates,
and consumption of imported commodities remained at a high
42level. With the exception of chemicals and dye-stuffs
no war-created industry received special attention.
Further, the textile, agricultural, and chemical schedules
43were rearranged in a more logical order than ever before.
Nevertheless, Republican tariff policy ignored 
other nation's need to sell products to America. Unless 
Europe could gain a favorable balance of trade, she could 
not accumulate dollars and repay her war debts. Nor could 
she buy American goods. A sound commercial system 
required heavy American trade deficits to offset the 
United States ' control of merchant shipping, cargo insur­
ance, and other services which foreign nations had for-
44merly rendered to acquire dollars.
42Don Humphrey, American Imports (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), 103; For an exaggerated ef­
fect of the tariff see Karl Schriftgiesser, This was Nor­
ma lev: An Account of Party Politics in Twelve Republican 
Years, 1920-1932 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1948), 93.
43soule, Prosperity Decade, 131.
44Humphrey, American Imports, 103; John Kenneth 
Galbraith, The Great crash, 1929 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 
Co., 1961), 185-187.
Whatever the faults of the Fordney Act, it did 
revive the Commission' s prestige and preserved it from 
Republican attacks. In addition, Congress expanded the 
agency's role in maintaining American commercial policies.
Legislators, frightened at the prospect of foreign 
competition in American markets, had raised duties to very 
high levels in 192 2, hoping to equalize the cost of pro­
ducing goods in the United States and abroad. Supporters 
of this principle termed it the true standard of protec­
tion, though if achieved it would presumably prohibit
45trade on all dutiable items.
To maintain this guideline, Congress gave the
President power to change the duty on any article up to 5 0
per cent of the established rate, or if necessary to shift
46the basis of assessment to the American selling price.
It also gave to the Commission the responsibility of 
determining costs of producing items in the United States 
and in foreign countries. Using this and other data, the 
agency was to advise the Executive on the amount of
45Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States,
479-490.
46
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U.S., Statutes at Large, XLII, Part 1, 941-942.
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increase or decrease in the tariff necessary to maintain
47equality. This flexibility was to insure rates high 
enough to protect domestic producers.
The flexible tariff provision, termed Section 315, 
presented several economic and political difficulties. If 
production costs were to be compared, what was a "typical" 
manufacturer, the marginal or the most efficient producer? 
At what point in the United States were two competitors, 
one foreign and one domestic, to vie for the market, New 
York or Chicago? How was the agency to gain access to the 
accounting records of foreign companies in order to deter­
mine their production costs? Answers to these and other 
questions had to be found if the flexible provision was to 
work.
In addition, Congress, in delegating legislative 
authority to the President, had to establish acceptable 
guidelines for its application. Early efforts to make 
this principle that of "equalizing the conditions of com­
petition" failed because some Senators believed it to be
48too vague. Instead, Congress used the more specific
47Ibid. , 946-947.
48U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1922, LXII, Part 11, 1190.
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rule, "to equalize the costs of production" on items pro-
49duced by American and foreign companies.
Some Congressmen felt that Section 315 gave to the 
President little discretionary power, particularly since 
his proclamations changing rates had to be preceded by a 
Commission investigation. However, he was not limited by 
the agency's actions. In ascertaining the cost of produc­
tion, the President was instructed to take into considera­
tion certain information, and "any other advantages or
50disadvantages in competition. " In effect, this gave him 
authority to consider any factors he desired and to act on 
whatever data he felt was valid. At his discretion, the 
Commission's advice might be legally ignored or reversed.
"Equalizing the costs of production" provided con­
stitutional direction, while the order to consider "advan­
tages or disadvantages in competition" gave the Executive 
the discretion he needed to protect domestic industry. 
Senator McCumber admitted that the rates written into the 
tariff were often higher than the comparative costs of 
production indicated, because "Congress' intent was to
49Ibid., 11209, 11224.
50U.S., Statutes at Large, XLII, Part 1, 942.
look after American interests."
A few Congressmen were worried that the President
might move the rates upward, but Senator Reed Smoot of
Utah reassured them. "I think there will be many, many
more occasions when he will exercise it in lowering rates
than in increasing them; in fact, if the conditions become
normal, I expect the President . . .  to lower . . . the
52majority of the rates." Smoot's words, whether or not 
sincere, helped gather support for the measure.
Congress also specified how ad valorem duties were 
to be assessed. If possible, adjustments were to be based 
on the cost of production. If this was unavailable, the 
President was to use the stated export value, and, in the 
absence of all foreign information, he was to use the 
American selling price.^
Although interested in protecting manufacturers 
from foreign competitors, Harding probably supported Sec­
tion 315 for political reasons. He, along with Senator
51U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong. , 2d Sess. , 
1922, LXII, Part 11, 1194-1195.
52Ibid. , 1192-1193.
Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States,
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477-478.
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Smoot and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, believed 
that the Republican Party had to create the illusion of 
moderate protection in order to avoid a reaction by the 
electorate in 1922.54 Other party members who shared this 
view supported the flexible tariff.55 Even the Progres­
sive element in the party, led by Senators Arthur capper
of Kansas and Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin, backed the 
56measure.
The President called it a device to assure the
57scientific and just administration of the tariff. Aware 
that other nations had to sell in the United States, he 
was nevertheless incapable of revising the Republican 
position on protection. Section 315 was a compromise with 
himself and a safeguard against political repercussions. 
What he really wanted was high protection, political
54Culbertson Memorandum, October 12, 1921, Cul­
bertson Papers; Roscoe B. Fleming to George W. Norris, 
August 19, 1926, MS of article sent to Norris in George W. 
Norris Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
Hereafter cited as Norris Papers.
^Culbertson Memorandum, undated, Culbertson
Papers.
5V s .  , Congressional Record, 67th Cong. , 2d Sess. ,
1921, LXII, Part 1, 53.
57Sinclair, The Available Man, 251.
support, and European trade too.
Section 315 increased the Tariff Commission's work
load without enlarging its powers. Prior to 1922 the
agency had been organized solely for the purpose of
accumulating raw data for Congress. Its statisticians,
field investigators, and other personnel all operated from
Washington. While special divisions had been created to
coordinate the board's work, no one group had been assigned
the duty of gathering information on foreign production
costs. Divisions of transportation, law, imports and
exports, preferential tariffs, and special commodities
were involved primarily with the American market.
To handle the new duties some reorganization was
necessary. The special divisions were expanded and new
offices were opened in New York, Berlin, and Paris to
serve as regional headquarters for the enlarged scope of
operations. As before, the agency's overall direction
59came from Washington.
The Commission created a special administrative 
procedure for the flexible tariff. An Advisory Board was
C QIbid. , 218.
C. QU.S., Tariff Commission, Seventh Annual Report 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924) , 2.
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formed its function being to coordinate the technical, 
economic, and legal work of the different divisions, and to 
advise the Commissioners on particular studies.60 It was 
chaired by the Chief Economist and included the Chief 
Investigator, the head of the commodity division responsi­
ble for studying the item under consideration, and the 
Chief of the Legal Division.
An Executive Order of October 7, 1922, advised the 
Commission to establish rules and procedures for the 
implementation of Section 315. All applications for 
relief were to be submitted in writing to the agency. It 
reserved for itself the right to choose for investigation 
those cases which it felt affected the public interest, 
and asserted its power to initiate studies, again for the 
benefit of the public interest.62 Provision was also made 
for public hearings.
Normal procedure for conducting investigations 
requested under the flexible tariff clause was established
60U.S., Tariff Commission, Ninth Annual Report 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926), 5.
61U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, October 20,
1922.
62Ibid; U.S., Tariff Commission, Eighth Annual 
Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 9.
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as follows: The application was sent first to the commod­
ity division responsible for keeping data on the product 
under study. The division then issued a preliminary 
report to the Advisory Board, summarizing all available 
information relating to the article. The Advisory Board 
then formed its own analysis and sent it, along with the 
Commodity division's, to the Commissioners. Attached were 
recommendations either to continue or drop the inquiry.
The Commissioners then decided whether an investi­
gation was warranted. If so, the commodity division 
prepared a complete program of work, subject to the Com­
mission's approval, and a crew, working under the Chief 
Investigator, was assigned to gather information. Once
accumulated the data was submitted to the Commissioners,
6 3who then held public hearings on the study.
There additional information was elicited from 
interested parties who in turn had the opportunity to make 
exceptions to the preliminary data. Having gathered all 
the evidence, the Commissioners then interpreted it, and
r o
U.S., Tariff Commission, Ninth Annual Report, 
6-7; U.S., Tariff commission, Proceedings, July 20, 1923, 
July 23, 1923.
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submitted recommendations in writing to the President. 
According to law, he was free to follow their suggestions, 
ignore them, or act contrary to them, hut he could take no 
action to change the duty on any item until the agency had 
completed its inquiry.
The same procedure occurred when the agency inves­
tigated complaints under Sections 316 and 317. The former 
clause provided for reprisals against unfair foreign com­
petition in the American market while the latter allowed 
the imposition of penalty duties against the goods of
64countries which discriminated against American products.
The Commission's administration of these sections 
supported the popular impression that it raised or lowered 
specific duties. Many believed that it exercised broad 
powers and that it removed the tariff from politics by 
scientifically accumulating facts and recommending fair 
and accurate rates. But no judicial, legislative, or 
executive power had been granted to the agency. It was 
only a tool to be used by the President. It was the 
Executive who actually raised or lowered the tariff.
Many Progressives believed that the agency's
64U.S., Statutes at Large, XLII, Part 1, 943-947.
implementation of Section 315 was the first step toward a
CN Enscientific tariff. They were mistaken. Tariff policy 
remained in the hands of the party in power and flexed in 
whatever direction the President wanted it to. Edward P. 
Costigan should have been among the first to see the dis­
tribution of power embodied in the Act, for his training 
in law, politics, and reform had been extensive. His con­
cern over Harding's and Coolidge ' s attitude toward the 
agency suggests that he recognized the power the Executive 
held over the Commission, but he was reluctant to accept 
it.
Costigan understood that the tariff was partly the
result of post-war economic conditions throughout the
world, but he also believed that the flexible provision
was designed to lower duties once commercial stability 
, 66returned. He hoped for an aggressive effort by the com­
mission in this direction. Believing that domestic manu­
facturers should compete with foreign companies in the 
American market, and that consumers could benefit from a
65John Day Larkin, The President' s Control of the 
Tariff (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 1-18.
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Costigan Memorandum, about 1923-24, Costigan
Papers.
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lower tariff, he urged a liberal interpretation of Section
315 to permit the agency to select the items needing rate
6 Vadjustment. Unconcerned with the possibility that such
a program might arouse apprehensions and uncertainty in
the business community, he argued that some indecision was
preferable to the chaos which had resulted from periodic,
68radical tariff revision.
To this moral, tough-minded progressive, the 
Fordney-McCumber Act opened the way for the Commission to 
initiate tariff revision. It promised a welcome change 
from the generally dull routine which had characterized 
the board's activities since the end of World War I.
6 *7Ibid. ; Address to Buffalo Chapter of League of 
Women Voters, April 8, 1924, MS, ibid.
Costigan Memorandum, about 1923-24, ibid.68
CHAPTER IV
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND PROGRESSIVE ANSWERS
Creation of the flexible provision caused many 
Progressives to anticipate an era of scientific tariff 
reduction. Edward Costigan, anxious to expand the agency's 
activity and reduce trade barriers, realized that if these 
hopes were to be fulfilled, the Commission would have to 
detach itself from Executive control and maintain the out­
look characteristic of its original appointees.
For this reason, the constitutional relationship 
between the agency and the President, its legal director, 
was one of the most important issues confronting the 
Commission. Costigan, aware of the dangers inherent in 
Executive direction, was quick to defend the board's 
independence.
His arguments, usually well reasoned, aroused 
Harding and forced him to impress, personally, upon the 
Commission its subservience to the President. When 
Coolidge tried to pack the agency by abusing his right to 
make recess appointments, Costigan helped ignite a serious 
constitutional struggle between the Executive and the 
Senate.
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Harding and Coolidge based their treatment of the 
agency upon the theory that it was a Presidential body, 
responsible solely to the chief executive. They were 
unwilling to allow it to pursue studies which would embar­
rass the administration, or conflict with their policies. 
This was not an unreasonable position, and it was sup­
ported by the law governing Presidential relationships 
with executive bodies.
Nor was their handling of the Commission unique. 
Other agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
which, unlike the tariff board, were designed to be inde­
pendent of the President, also felt Executive influence. 
William E. Humphrey's appointment as Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission in 1925, completed a gradual 
change in that board's membership and altered its view­
points so that it shared the administration's tolerant 
view of trade associations.'*'
Humphrey's appointment also marked the end of the
2progressive's support for the Trade Commission, and
'*’G. Cullom Davis, "The Transformation of the Feder­
al Trade Commission, 1914-1929," Mississippi Valley His­
torical Review, XLIX (December, 1962), 440.
2Ibid., 45 3-454.
97
Coolidge's treatment of the tariff agency tended to con­
firm their disillusionment with independent boards. As 
political discontent became more widespread, Edward 
Costigan took the opportunity to make public many of the 
problems which handicapped the agency's work.
A highly principled individual who often viewed 
power conflicts as struggles between good and evil, 
Costigan's defense of the Commission's independence tended 
to present Coolidge as an immoral antagonist. However, 
the real difference between the two was Costigan's funda­
mental devotion to a moderate tariff and the maintenance 
of the agency's freedom and prestige.
For this reason, and because several constitutional 
issues dealing with the Commission threatened his ideals, 
Costigan was quick to formulate legal defenses for his 
position, but with limited success. His dedication to 
high standards of government often embarrassed Coolidge, 
but it also caused Costigan to misconstrue part of the 
Fordney-McCumber law and produced friction within the 
agency.
By clinging to the belief that the tariff board was 
capable of yielding a scientific tariff, Costigan lost 
touch with other reformers. He maintained that the agency
98
could become an effective force if there were changes in 
personnel and an end to the President's direction. Other 
progressives— George Norris, Robert La Follette Jr., and 
Frank Taussig— realized that the Executive's appointive 
power alone precluded a non-partisan, "independent" com­
mission. The law clearly made the Tariff Commission an 
instrument of the Executive.
The relationship between the Commission and the
President was easily misunderstood. Newspapers, and even
historians, sometimes assumed that the agency could change
3rates; this was a mistaken analysis. While Costigan 
recognized the actual distribution of power, he opposed 
the agency's narrow duties and its subordinate position 
to the Executive.
At first there was some reason to believe that 
Harding would allow the agency to follow an aggressive, 
independent course of action. At one point he stated the 
hope of cooperating with the board in making extensive use 
of the flexible clause. Furthermore, on October 7, 1922,
3Victor S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the 
United States (3 vols. ; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1929), III, 
330. Clark is not clear on this point. Neither is Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. , The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919- 
1933. Vol. I of The Age of Roosevelt (3 vols. ; Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), I, 64.
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he ordered all applications for relief to be filed with
the Commissioners, gave them permission to draw up their
own administrative rules, and indicated that they could
freely investigate items of their own choosing, even in
4the absence of a written request.
However, on the previous day, Harding had written a
private note to Thomas 0. Marvin stating that there would
be plenty to do without making inquiries into items other
5than those specifically requested by outside parties.
This directly contradicted his subsequent instructions to 
the Commission, indicating a conflict in the President's 
mind over the agency's proper role. He wanted it to be 
active, but it was not to pursue studies which might 
embarrass his administration.
The question of the board's independence was impor­
tant to Costigan, because he wanted it to publicize the 
need for tariff reductions on important consumer items.
But no decision was made until the following spring. In 
March, 1923, the Commission selected for study, on its own
4U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, October 29,
1922.
Papers.
5Harding to Marvin, October 6, 1922, Costigan
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initiative, a group of some 40 items. Apparently warned
by Burgess and Marvin that Costigan and the majority of
the board intended to examine a large number of articles,
Harding became alarmed. Extensive investigations could
produce disagreement over the amount of protection needed
on a few items, and might very well provoke a wide-ranging
discussion of the whole protective system. The President,
who did not want the tariff question reopened, charged
that the Commission's program perverted the usefulness of
Section 315, a device designed for only limited tariff
changes. Harding also believed that the project threatened
7his control of the agency.
Vice-Chairman Culbertson wanted the Commission to 
pursue a dynamic, widespread investigative program which 
would attract public attention. He pointed out that a 
relatively small number of items were under consideration
g
for study, and urged Harding to let the agency proceed. 
Senators Irvine Lenroot, Charles Curtis, Representative
^Larkin, The President's Control of the Tariff,
22-23.
7Culbertson Memorandum, March 4, 192 3, Culbertson
Papers.
Q
Papers.
Culbertson to Harding, March 4, 1923, Costigan
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Homer Hoch, and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover made
similar requests.^
Unimpressed, Harding asked the Justice Department
for a statement on his authority over the board. He viewed
it as an agency responsible to the President, not to the
10public, or to particular business interests.
The issue continued unresolved through most of 
March while the Commission processed written requests for 
investigations.'*'"*' On the 27th, Harding, suddenly con­
cerned at increasing protests over the rising price of
sugar, ordered an inquiry into the correlation between
12sugar duties and inflated consumer's costs.
The agency complied, but it was clear to Costigan 
and Culbertson that this directive set a precedent seri­
ously limiting the Commission's ability to publicize
13needed tariff changes. If the President had the right
^Culbertson Memorandum, March 4, 1923, Culbertson
Papers.
■^Harding to Culbertson, March 5, 192 3, Costigan
Papers.
■^ "''Tariff Commission to Harding, March 17, 1923; 
Harding to Tariff Commission, March 18, 1923, ibid.
12Harding to Tariff Commission, March 27, 1923,
ibid.
Marvin to Harding, March 27, 1923, ibid.13
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to initiate specific studies whenever he chose, the
board's freedom was ended. Costigan's alarm was not
shared by Marvin and Burgess. While reluctant to support
reductions in sugar duties, the two Harding appointees
were willing to use Presidential direction to prevent
inquiries which might lead to additional attacks on
14protection.
Harding resolved the matter at a meeting with the
Commissioners in late April. A public statement, issued
the following day, declared that they had agreed that
"where no petition has been filed . . . the Commission,
after conference with the President . . . "  could order any
15studies it felt the public interest warranted. The 
President had his way. Unless he gave consent, only 
inquiries on application were to be initiated, and even 
those were subject to further possible restrictions 
through his directive power.
Costigan strongly opposed Harding's assertion that
14Larkin, The President's Control of the Tariff,
21.
15Public statement to press, April 21, 1923, copy 
in Costigan Papers. Culbertson recorded that the cabinet 
was taking sides in the matter, but did not mention who 
supported Harding. Culbertson, Diary, March 24, 1923, 
Culbertson Papers.
the Commission was an Executive tool."*"^  The Coloradan
believed that its status was that of an independent board
17which set its own standards of operation. There was no
legal foundation for this contention, and Harding's view
was correct, but Costigan, believing that the agency, by
elevating its stature to that of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, could lead a movement for genuine tariff
revision, wanted freedom of action.
While outwardly the Commission appeared to work in
harmony, and Costigan endorsed a public statement issued
by the agency which denied the existence of internal
18discord, his views clearly contradicted those of his 
Republican colleagues. So long as Harding was alive, dis­
sension between the board and the Executive remained 
within reasonable limits. This was largely due to the 
President's desire to allow the group as much latitude as 
possible. When Calvin Coolidge assumed office, this 
initiative was seriously curtailed.
16Costigan Memorandum, April 21, 192 3, Costigan
Papers.
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18Culbertson Diary, April 23, 1923, Culbertson 
Papers; U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, May 22,
1923.
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Costigan, aware of the importance of the new 
president's attitude, wrote Culbertson in August that 
Coolidge had not declared himself with respect to the Com­
mission's work. "It is evident that he should be talked
19with at the earliest possible date." Less than a month 
later, the Vice-chairman sent a long letter to the Execu­
tive reviewing the flexible tariff's history and citing
the relationship established between the board and
20Harding. However, he failed to emphasize the fact that
in the last months of the previous administration, Marvin
. 21had limited the agency to two investigations.
Shortly afterward, in a conference with the Commis­
sioners, Coolidge made his views clear. The flexible 
clause was a constructive device to eliminate disorderly 
legislation, he stated, but like Harding, he did not 
regard it as an instrument for broad revision of the
19Costigan to Culbertson, August 10, 192 3, Costigan
Papers.
p nCulbertson to Coolidge, September 5, 1923,
ibid.
21Culbertson to Harding, May 24, 192 3, Costigan 
Papers; Culbertson, Diary, June 20, 1923, Culbertson 
Papers.
tariff. Unabashedly committed to the business community, 
the President was reluctant to reduce protection, whatever 
the justification. Having inherited a prosperous nation, 
he was content to make only token readjustments; anything 
more might upset the economy and weaken his political 
strength.
Nor did Coolidge have illusions about the Commis­
sion's responsibilities. It was not a court, nor were the
Commissioners judges. They were a fact-finding board to
23help the President. Responsible to the nation for main­
taining prosperity, Coolidge insisted that, whatever the 
opinions of individual members, all executive agencies 
follow his policies.
Costigan's views were directly opposed to the 
President's and the dispute smoldered until the following 
year, in the fall of 1923, the Bloedel-Donovan Lumber 
Company asked for a reduction in the duties on logs.
These rates had been imposed as penalties against foreign
22Costigan Memorandum of Conference, September 19,
1923, Costigan Papers.
23Coolidge to William Allen White, January 14,
1924. Cited in William Allen White, A Puritan in Babylon; 
The Story of Calvin Coolidge (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1959), 280. Hereafter cited as White, A Puritan
in Babylon.
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companies engaged in unfair trade practices. After some
deliberation, the Commission decided that because of the
punitive nature of the tariff in question, it could not
24conduct an investigation. Furthermore, since the logs
had not been originally subject to a normal duty, there
was no provision under Section 315 which enabled the
25President to transfer them from the free list.
Costigan opposed the decision to turn down Bloedel- 
Donovan's request. He felt that this denied the President
his authority to change rates under the flexible tariff
2 6provision. Nevertheless, on October 20, 1923, the 
agency informed Coolidge of its decision.
The President, anxious to preserve his constitu­
tional privileges, asked for a legal opinion. The 
Attorney-General' s view supported the Executive's power to 
issue proclamations as Costigan had urged, but at the same 
time undermined the Colorado progressive's position on the 
agency's prerogatives. The "act of 1922 . . .  has not
24U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, July 2,
192 3, October 12, 192 3.
2 5Coolidge to Marvin, October 29, 1923, Costigan
Papers.
26U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, October 12,
1923.
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changed the status of the Tariff Commission . . . the
powers of that tribunal remain limited to the ascertain-
27ment and report of facts."
The agency had misjudged its discretionary power.
It could not refuse to make studies the President
28requested. Costigan rejected this ruling. He wanted to 
preserve the Executive's power to declare changes in 
tariff rates, but he opposed external direction and con­
trol of the commission. Though Coolidge occasionally 
ordered particular studies and treated it as his own
instrument, Costigan continued to call it a quasi-judicial
. t 29 body.
This particular conflict was not resolved until 
Costigan left office. However, long before this time, the 
President's handling of the Commission had produced new 
issues and far more publicity.
Given Coolidge's view of the agency, it was natural 
for him to appoint men who agreed with his interpretation
27XXXIV Op. Atty. Gen. 80-81 (1924) .
28Ibid. , 79, 82. This construction was upheld in 
United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Company. 
Inc. , v. United States Tariff Commission, 274 U.S. 110 
(1926).
29U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, April 10,1924.
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of tariff policy and executive prerogatives. Control of 
the board was one of his major aims. Since the Tariff 
Commission was simply a fact-finding group, the President 
could not be rightfully charged with infringing the lib­
erty of an independent regulatory body, or with packing a 
semi-judicial agency. Other appointments, particularly 
those to the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, were more serious because those 
agencies had been created to act in a non-partisan fashion.
The President's right to direct the Tariff Commis­
sion was clearly established by the Supreme Court in 
Shurtleff v. United States. In this case, decided in 
1903, the court had held that President McKinley could 
summarily remove an officeholder from his position as gen­
eral appraiser of merchandise. "It would be a mistaken 
view, " the Court had ruled, "to hold that the mere speci­
fication in the statute of some causes for removal
'testricted the Executive's right to dismiss an officer he
30had appointed. The Tariff Commissioners, appointed by 
the President for varying terms, clearly came under this 
ruling. In deference to Congress, Coolidge moved
ID189 U.S. 311 (1903) .
cautiously, but he could have legally removed all of the 
agency's members whenever he wished.
In three years, Harding had filled three vacancies 
on the Commission with high protectionists: William 
Burgess, a pottery lobbyist; Thomas 0. Marvin, an officer 
of the Boston Home Market Club; and Henry H. Glassie, a 
Virginia lawyer who was closely associated with sugar pro­
ducing interests in Louisiana. There had been little pub­
lic or congressional reaction to these appointments.
However, when Coolidge attempted to force two mem­
bers off the Commission to make room for new appointments, 
he stirred up considerable controversy. Costigan, viewing 
this as a move to destroy the board's integrity, opposed 
the President and Chairman Thomas Marvin.
The first evidence of Coolidge's intentions came in 
late 1924. In the summer, David J. Lewis, a moderate 
protectionist and a Wilson appointee, had voted to reduce 
the duty on sugar. In early September, the New York Times
revealed an organized movement by the National Tariff
31Council of Denver to block Lewis' reappointment. The 
Council, which represented Colorado sugar-beet growers,
109
31September 1, 1924.
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was led by Jesse F. McDonald, former Governor of Colorado
and a political enemy of Costigan.
The Colorado Commissioner immediately went to work
to prevent Lewis' removal. In a letter to The Denver
Post, he charged McDonald with trying to pack the "tariff
32court of the country." In 1924, Congress had passed a
rider to an appropriation bill which excluded members of
the Commission from participation in investigations in
which they held a direct and substantial interest, and
Costigan claimed that this was clear evidence that the
agency had a fact-finding, quasi-judicial function. It
could operate properly only if it were free from political
33influence and other outside pressures.
In defending Lewis, Costigan broached a problem 
which he never resolved. If the Commission only collected 
facts, it made no difference who sat on it. On the other 
hand, if the data required interpretation, Costigan had no 
assurance that his views were the more valid. The answer 
to this difficulty lay in the President's power to appoint 
men to the agency who supported his policies. Since it
32The Denver Post, September 8, 1924.
33Ibid.
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was his responsibility to make changes in the law,
Coolidge had every right, perhaps even a duty, to let
Lewis go and replace him with someone amenable to the
administration's views.
There was, however, the danger that Lewis' removal
would irritate Democratic and progressive Senators, giving
them an excuse to delay confirmations of the President's
other appointments. For this reason, and because Culbert-
34son had spoken highly of Lewis' service, Coolidge made
the reappointment. However, he wanted an undated, signed
35resignation from Lewis, and when the Marylander refused,
the President let it be known that he could remove any
36Commissioner whenever he chose.
Coolidge was reluctant to keep Lewis and hoped to 
eliminate him from the Commission as quickly as possible. 
He reappointed him temporarily only because it was expedi­
ent to do so. The President wanted personnel on the board 
who reflected his views. Culbertson speculated that the
34Culbertson Memorandum, September 8, 1924,
Costigan Papers.
35Extract from Whaley-Eaton Service American Letter, 
No. 387, January 30, 1926, ibid.
<5 /■
Culbertson to Costigan, September 9, 1924; 
Costigan to Taussig, October 14, 1925, ibid.
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decision to keep Lewis indicated that Coolidge had
accepted the agency as a non-partisan body, but this was
37erroneous.
Coolidge' s power to remove any of the Commissioners
at will was upheld two years later, in Myers v. United
States (1926). Frank Myers, a postmaster appointed by
Wilson in 1917, was removed from office by the President
in 1920, without consultation with the Senate. The
Supreme Court held that the "power to remove inferior
executive officers, like that to remove superior executive
officers, is an incident of the power to appoint them, and
38is in its nature an executive power." ,
It is interesting to note that the Commission did
not gain immunity from executive power nine years later in
the case of Humphrey1 s Executor v. United States because
it dealt only with independent agencies, whose officers
39possessed legislative and judicial powers. William E. 
Humphrey, appointed as head of the Federal Trade Commis­
sion in 1925, was removed in 1933 by Franklin D. Roosevelt.
37Culbertson to Costigan, September 9, 1925, ibid.
38272 U.S. 161 (1926).
39295 U.S. 626-627 (1935).
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In restricting the President's removal power, the court
emphasized that the Federal Trade Commission's duties were
performed without Executive control, a condition not
40applicable to the Tariff commission.
Nor did the later decision of Wiener v. United
41States (1958) modify the agency's position. Here, in
overruling President Dwight Eisenhower's removal of Wiener
from the War Claims Commission, Felix Frankfurter stated
that the Humphrey case drew a sharp cleavage between
officials who were part of the executive establishment and
those who were to exercise judgment "without the leave or
hindrance of any other officer or any department of the
42government." The Tariff Commission clearly did not 
exercise independent judgment.
The Myers decision must have disappointed Costigan, 
for he had made inquiries into the possibility of con-
43testing the President's right to remove federal officers. 
His hope of pushing the Commission into an active program
4°Ibid., 628. 41357 U.S. 349 (1958).
42Ibid., 353.
43Costigan to Lewis, July 20, 1926, Costigan
Papers.
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of tariff revision was severely handicapped by the court's 
decision.
The the spring of 1925, Lewis' recess appointment 
expired and Coolidge succeeded in luring William Culbert­
son to a diplomatic post in Roumania, a job the Kansan had 
been seeking for some time. About all costigan could do 
was accuse Culbertson of "selling out," for there was now
a majority on the Commission opposed to the Coloradan's
44views. He was the sole survivor of Wilson's original 
appointments.
The resignations of Culbertson and Lewis did not 
complete the process of filling the agency with personnel 
who supported the administration's program. Resignations 
due to ill health, new opportunities, and weariness meant 
that more men with Coolidge's views would have to be 
found. In placing partisans on the Commission, Coolidge 
forced a contest with the Senate for the right of his 
appointees to hold office solely under a temporary 
appointment. A recess appointment was defined as one made 
to fill a vacancy which happened to exist after the Senate
Costigan Memorandum, April 23, 1925, ibid.44
had adjourned.
Coolidge1s difficulties began in June, 1925, when
he issued A.H. Baldwin, former chief of the Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, a recess appointment. It
was a poor choice. Costigan commented that he was one of
the "least communicative men I have ever met in public
46office." However, Baldwin was m  ill health. By 
Christmas, he had slipped dangerously and Costigan, fear­
ing that Coolidge planned to send a sick man's name to the 
Senate for confirmation, brought the matter into the open.
At the end of the month he made a speech to the 
American Economic Association in which he reaffirmed his 
belief in the usefulness of the Commission once it was 
removed from partisan politics, and among other things, he 
suggested that the Senate refuse to confirm Baldwin until 
the Commission was investigated.
Baldwin's recess appointment was allowed to expire. 
On June 23, 1926, Sherman J. Lowell, former member of the
45E.S. Corwin, Lester S. Joysas and Norman J.
Snell (eds.), Constitution of the United States Analyzed and 
Interpreted (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1964), 506.
46
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Costigan to Taussig, October 28, 1925, Costigan
Papers.
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New York Grange, was nominated to fill the vacancy. When
the Senate failed to confirm this assignment, coolidge
47extended Lowell a recess commission on July 6, 1926.
The third member involved in Coolidge 1 s fight with 
the Senate was E.B. Brossard, a friend of Senator Reed 
Smoot and a supporter of a high tariff. He was nominated 
on July 9, 1925, to fill Culbertson's position, and accord­
ing to law, drew his salary until the end of the next
session of the Senate, July 3, 1926. On that day he
48received another recess appointment.
The Senate's failure to confirm Baldwin, Lowell, and 
Brossard was no oversight. Costigan's speech before the 
Economic Association prompted closer scrutiny of Coolidge's 
handling of the agency and many Senators opposed the 
nominees because they felt the President had destroyed the 
Commission's non-partisan image. On March 11, 1926, 
Senator William H. King of Utah, attempted to amend an 
appropriations bill to cut off the salary of any Commis­
sioner serving under a recess appointment unless he was
47Decisions of the Comptroller General, VI, 147-149 
(1926). Hereafter cited as Dec. Compt. Gen.
48ibia.
confirmed before the end of the session.49
This was already provided for by law; King's pro­
posal was a hostile gesture to Coolidge, and evidence of 
growing concern by Democratic and progressive Congressmen 
over the President's harrassment of the board. Joseph T. 
Robinson, Senate minority leader, had already secured 
approval for an investigation of the Commission, and 
King' s motion made it clear that the two appointments had 
no chance of confirmation.
The President, angered by the Senate's treatment of 
his selections, extended new recess appointments to 
Brossard and Lowell immediately after Congress adjourned.
In conversations with Senators Robinson and Charles Curtis 
of Kansas, he suggested that the Senate remain in session 
until it confirmed the appointments. The embarrassed and
doubtlessly angered legislators replied that it was the
50President's problem, not theirs. A struggle was devel­
oping between the legislative and executive branches of 
government.
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U.S., Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1926, LXVII, Part 5, 5707-5708.
John Bethune to Costigan, July 6, 1926, Costigan50
Papers.
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Finally, on August 21, 1926, the dispute was
resolved. The Comptroller-General ruled that neither
Brossard nor Lowell could draw any salary until their
51appointments had been confirmed. Under law, the Presi­
dent could assign a man to a position while congress was 
not in session, but when it reconvened the Senate had to 
confirm the selection before it adjourned or the office 
was automatically vacated and no salary could be paid to
any subsequent appointee until he was confirmed in his 
. . 52position. Brossard and Lowell had been appointed to a
vacancy which existed while the Senate was in session, the
previously unconfirmed recess appointment not having
53filled the office. Therefore, they could not be paid.
Eventually, the two men were nominated again and
confirmed in office on March 1, 1927. Senate approval was
hastened by Coolidge's appointment of Lincoln Dixon, an
54Indiana Democrat, to another position on the board.
51VI Dec. Compt. Gen. 149 (1926); VII Dec. Compt. 
Gen. 329-330 (1927) .
Decisions of the Comptroller of the Treasury,
XIV, 901 (1908). Hereafter cited as Dec. Compt. Tr.; XXVI 
Dec. Compt. Tr. 922 (1920).
^VI Dec. Compt. Gen. 149 (1926) .
54U.S., Tariff Commission, Eleventh Annual Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928) , 1; Extract
Coolidge lost this struggle with the Senate. One 
reason for his failure was Costigan's public accusations, 
for Democrats and progressive Republicans who had sup­
ported the flexible tariff in 1922 were quick to react to 
charges that Coolidge was "packing" the Commission. While 
this was an inaccurate indictment and certainly irrelevant 
in view of the agency's functions, it gathered support for 
Costigan's crusade against Executive interference with the 
board.
Other constitutional issues threatened to undermine 
the Commission's effectiveness. The first was the ques­
tion of the agency's ability to hold hearings and issue 
findings, subject to judicial review, on charges that 
foreign competitors were engaging in unfair trade prac­
tices. While the President was the only officer who could 
impose penalties under Section 316 of the Fordney Act, the
Commission was required to make recommendations before he
55acted.
On December 16, 1925, the Bakelite Corporation
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from journal of commerce, January 27, 1927, 3, in George 
L. Norris Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
Hereafter cited as Norris Papers.
55U.S., Statutes at Large, XLII, Part 1, 944.
filed charges with the Commission claiming that foreign
producers were infringing their patent rights by selling
synthetic phenolic resin (form C) in the United States
without acknowledging its control of that process. The
agency ordered an inquiry under the provisions of Section
316, and the President issued a proclamation temporarily
barring the entry of the goods involved in the charges.
Eight months later, the board reported to Coolidge
that two of the patents upon which the complaint was based
would expire on December 6, 1926, and it asked that the
56exclusion order be rescinded. This was done.
While the Commission was investigating Bakelite's
charges, Fisher and Co., Inc., one of the foreign firms
involved in the controversy, decided to question the
57agency's jurisdiction over patent controversies.
Costigan had some doubts about the issue and suggested 
that the board seek an opinion from the Attorney-General. 
The Coloradan pointed out that a District Court decision 
in Lowry v Hert, (1921) had held that the federal courts
held exclusive jurisdiction in any case where title to a
56Costigan Memorandum of Bakelite Controversy, May, 
1927, Costigan Papers.
57273 Fed. 698 (1921).
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patent or any claim of infringement against it was the
5 8subject of a suit. Should this position be upheld in 
other courts it could bar the Commission from one of its 
assigned duties. The agency agreed with Costigan's sug­
gestions and a legal defense of Section 316 was drafted
5 9and presented in the court of Customs Appeals.
Before the Court ruled on the issue raised by the 
Fisher Co. , the Bakelite Corporation filed a protest ques­
tioning its jurisdiction. The corporation had benefited 
from the Tariff Commission's ruling and wanted the agency 
to retain its authority in future cases.
Bakelite insisted that the issue before the Court 
did not constitute a case or controversy within the mean­
ing of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The 
Court rejected this contention in a decision delivered in 
early 1928. Relying on Muskrat v. United States, (1911)
which defined a case or controversy as "claims of litigants 
brought before the Courts for determination by such regu­
lar proceedings as are established by law or custom for
121
5 8Costigan Memorandum, May, 1927, Costigan Papers.
59U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, May 6,
1925.
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the protection or enforcement of rights, or the preven­
tion, redress, or punishment of wrongs,"60 the court of 
Appeals ruled that since real parties whose rights and 
status were affected by the litigation were present, a
• J_ 61case did exist.
This was the key issue in Bakelite's protest, for
both it and the Fisher Company conceded that the Court was
an inferior one, created under Article III, Sec. 8, and
6 2capable of hearing cases brought before it. The Court
then decided that the Commission had jurisdiction to
determine whether unfair foreign competition was being
practiced in the home market, even in patent cases.
Lowry v. Hert was ignored since Congress had established
the agency's jurisdiction in legislation passed in 1922.
While the Commission had no power to enforce its findings,
the Court held that they were subject to judicial
63review.
The prestige and authority which the commission 
derived from this decision were undermined by a Senate
60219 U.S. 346 (1911) .
^In re Fisher and Co. (Inc.) et al, 16 Ct. Customs
Appeals 204-205 (1928).
62Ibid., 196. 63Ibid. , 213.
investigation, begun in 1926, which was highly critical of 
the agency. However, Costigan had successfully alerted 
the Commission to the judicial challenge presented by 
Fisher and Co. This indicated once again his devotion to 
the board and the possibility that it could claim an area 
of authority and competency free from Executive domination.
One other major constitutional question affected
the Commission, the crucial issue of the flexible tariff's
validity. During Congressional debates on the Fordney-
McCumber Act various points of view had been presented
criticizing the guidelines suggested for the President's
action under Section 315. Some Senators had argued that
the phrase, "to equalize the conditions in competition
between foreign and domestic producers" was too vague and
difficult to implement. They pointed out that there was
no provision for judicial review of the Executive's action
under the flexible clause, and asked that Congress accept
the more definite standard "to equalize the difference in
64cost of production. " There were difficulties in apply­
ing even this, but it was more specific.65
64
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1922, LXII, Part 7, 6494-6495.
65Ibid. . 7089-7098.
One difficulty in employing the flexible provision 
was the problem of securing enough data to determine dif­
ferences in costs of production. Domestic and foreign 
producers were hesitant to release trade information and 
production figures which might weaken their competitive 
positions. In addition, effective implementation was 
limited by the administration's interpretation. Coolidge 
viewed it as a device for raising the tariff, and Chairman 
Thomas Marvin thought it was an unconstitutional delega­
tion of legislative authority.66
Costigan opposed both views. He pointed out that 
Congress' intention was clearly stated in the statute and 
that the flexible tariff was designed to lower as well as 
to raise duties. As for the laws validity, he argued that 
the standard assigned was clear and legal. It was true 
that the determination of costs of production required a 
judgment of the accumulated data, but he pointed out that 
all facts of life were subjective; it was their reasonable­
ness which made them factual, and in law reasonableness 
had been used to give validity. ^ 7 He cited the power of
^Bureau of the Journal of Commerce, April 28,
1925, clipping; Editorial in Farm Stock and Home, October
1, 1924, clipping, in Costigan Papers.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix "just and
reasonable" rates as an example of how similar commissions 
68operated, and declared that the Tariff Commission only
applied the standards set by Congress to existing
. . 69conditions.
In using the Interstate Commerce commission as an 
example, Costigan overlooked its completely different com­
position and powers. The Tariff Commission declared its 
findings, but the President was free to disregard them.
He could even act contrary to them if he chose. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission had never been subjected to 
this type of control and after the Hepburn Act of 1906, 
its rate-setting powers were restrained only by the 
courts.
However, Costigan's defense of the flexible tariff
provision was sound, and in J.W. Hampton, Jr. , and Company
70v. United States (1928), the Supreme Court held that 
Congress' intent in creating Section 315 was clear. The
68Costigan Memorandum, undated, Costigan Papers.
69Costigan Speech to National League of Women 
Voters, Buffalo, April 24, 1924, ibid.
70276 U.S. 404.
Commission only ascertained differences in costs of pro­
duction. While these were difficult to determine, Chief 
justice Taft held that the goal was specific and intelli­
gible. Neither the Commission nor the President were to
decide what the law should be, and thus congress' action
71was a valid exercise of legislative power.
Again Costigan had correctly interpreted a consti­
tutional question and contributed to the Commission's 
prestige. The court's decision might have been even more 
significant had it not been for the Senate investigation 
which was discrediting the board.
Costigan had sought legal sanction for his belief 
that the Tariff Commission should be treated as an inde­
pendent agency, capable of formulating its own policies. 
Constitutional controversies affecting the board destroyed 
that concept, for the Supreme Court clearly held that the 
Commission was a fact-finding body acting under Executive 
direction.
On the other hand, court decisions did uphold the 
board's jurisdiction over cases resulting from unfair 
foreign competition, and the constitutionality of the
126
71Ibid. , 409.
flexible tariff provision. Further, Costigan succeeded in 
arousing Congress to oppose Coolidge's efforts to pack the 
agency, and though the President eventually controlled its 
membership, his abuse of recess appointments was checked. 
Executive instrument or not, progressives and Democrats 
were offended by Coolidge's attempt to make it a partisan 
agency, and the Senate was particularly incensed with the 
President's attempt to sidestep its right to confirm 
Executive appointments.
Failure to limit Coolidge ' s powers meant that the 
Commission could not function as an independent advocate 
of tariff revision or as a non-partisan source of tariff 
information. To compound this failure, friction within 
the agency over policy issues forced Costigan into an 
increasingly isolated position. Since he would not 
abandon this posture, nor leave the board, his relations 
with other Commissioners degenerated. As a result the 
agency nearly ceased to function, and public disclosure of 
this state of affairs led to a Senate investigation which 
forced Costigan to leave the board.
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CHAPTER V
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN
The Republican Party, on returning to power in 
1921, wasted little time in reversing the nation's tariff 
policy. Whereas the Underwood Act had been designed to 
force domestic industry into competition with foreign pro­
ducer^  and allow other countries to sell in the American 
market, the Fordney-McCumber Tariff embodied the more tra­
ditional policy of high protection.
Republicans adopted the classical arguments of 
protection. New industries had to be sheltered until they 
matured enough to supply the nation's need for their 
products, labor had to be guarded from ruinous wages which 
prevailed abroad, and the domestic market had to be iso­
lated from foreign-based economic dislocations.
Some industries deserved special treatment because 
they were essential for defense. In this case there was 
no effort to justify protection under the "infant industry" 
argument. National security required that these enter­
prises be subsidized, whatever the cost.
Harding and Coolidge subscribed to these economic 
arguments to justify protection, but they also had
political reasons for maintaining a high tariff. Both 
strongly supported the business classes of the country and 
manufacturers associated the tariff of 1922 with the 
decade's prosperity. Any readjustments might cause unset­
tled business conditions. Therefore, neither Harding nor 
Coolidge wanted to bring up the issue while they were in 
office.
Edward Costigan was critical of Republican protec­
tionist doctrine and eager to publicly discuss the issue. 
As a progressive reformer who held strong feelings about 
the rights of the consumer, he suspected that many of the 
traditional arguments were false. He believed that 
labor’s wages were related to its productivity, not the 
tariff, or that they would be if the working population 
was organized. He was also aware that most "infant indus­
tries" never considered themselves as having left "child­
hood" when reformers proposed rate reductions. As a 
result, the consumer seldom benefited from a high tariff.
Costigan did not believe in free trade. He was 
willing to let marginally efficient industries languish if 
the cost of maintaining them was too great. What he 
wanted was the elimination of excessive tariff rates, 
which he defined as duties above the level needed to allow
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130
an industry to meet foreign competition. Protection which 
exceeded this amount forced the consumer to pay an addi­
tional, unnecessary tax to support enterprise. For this 
reason, and because he realized that foreign nations had 
to sell in the American market, Costigan supported the 
Tariff Commission's assignment to investigate the costs of 
producing goods in the United States and in other 
countries.
A tariff which equalized, or tried to equalize, 
differences in costs offered the consumer the greatest 
benefit possible under a protective system. Simultaneously, 
it had little detrimental effect on labor's wages, while 
affording sufficient protection to domestic industry, and 
allowing foreign producers to sell in the American market. 
It was true that this tariff theory prohibited trade on 
dutied items, because it would not be profitable for other 
nations to sell here. But in practice it operated as a 
device to secure lower rates on specific items and offered 
an adequate measure of protection.
Costigan objected to the views of Coolidge and of 
his appointees to the Tariff Commission. There were bound 
to be politically motivated differences of opinion over 
the board's policies. The Coloradan fought to preserve
what he considered to be its proper functions.
For a time, David Lewis and William Culbertson 
shared this fear of disruptive political influences, but 
after the spring of 1925, Costigan was virtually alone, 
finding only occasional support from Alfred P. Dennis.
The latter, a personal friend of Coolidge, tried to uphold 
the administration's viewpoint as frequently as possible. 
But in many cases he could not. A Democrat with moderate 
protectionist views, Dennis was interested in pursuing 
some tariff revision under Section 315, and the persistence 
of Marvin in defense of high protection often forced him 
to side with Costigan.
Marvin, who had been appointed Chairman in 1921 by 
Harding, was supported by three Republican colleagues.
They were all high protectionists, Marvin being the most 
extreme. As he once put it, allowing "imports into the 
United States is like ceding a portion of the national 
doma in." ^
Henry Glassie's appointment to the Commission, in 
March of 1923, had elated domestic sugar producers because 
he had close contacts with Louisiana cane growers.
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"''Costigan Memorandum, July 23, 1925, Costigan
Papers.
Because his wife was the daughter of former Senator
Donelson Caffrey, of Louisiana, Glassie was expected to
support sugar tariffs as strongly as his father-in-law 
2had.
William Burgess, appointed in 1921, had been Secre-
3tary of the Potters Association and an effective lobbyist, 
for which, it was charged, he received 50 cents on every
4potter's oven fired in the United States. He was a poor 
choice for a commission which dealt extensively with manu­
facturers in foreign countries. Burgess had participated 
in a Treasury Department survey of the French ceramic 
industry in 1907 and was subsequently charged with having 
used privileged information to undercut French competition
5in the pottery market.
E.B. Brossard had worked in the Commission's agri­
cultural division from September, 1923 to July, 1925, the 
time of his appointment. His preparation included a
2Facts About Sugar, March 3, 1923, clipping in
ibid.
3Wright, Tariff Making by Commission, 21.
4American Consul W.F. Doty to American Embassy, 
March 29, 1921, Costigan Papers.
5Gilbert Hirsch to Thomas Marvin, November 28,
1923, ibid.
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Bachelor's degree in economics from the University of 
Utah/ and graduate work at Cornell and the University of 
Minnesota. Senator Reed Smoot and Secretary of Agricul­
ture Dr. W.M. Jardine sponsored his selection.
Marvin and his supporters were not interested in 
tariff reductions. Costigan found it impossible to agree 
with their policies. This split the Commission into two 
factions, Costigan and Dennis being constantly in the 
minority.6
By far the most controversial part of the Commis­
sion's duties was its work under Section 315. In over two 
and a half years, 430 applications for relief were filed
with the agency; only 47 were acted upon, and, of these,
7eight were completed and sent to the President. This 
poor performance, along with the board's failure to study 
the tariff's effects on industry and labor, forced
g
Costigan into an increasingly hostile attitude. Conclud­
ing that the Commission was filled with hopelessly biased
6Wright, Tariff Making by Commission, 24.
7U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, May 29,
1925.
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8Costigan Memorandum, May 8, 1924, Costigan
Papers.
men who were intent on destroying its true functions, he
viewed his conflict with them as a "fundamental issue of
government and public morality. " He vowed to continue the
struggle, even though the agency might be ruined in the
9process.
The first investigation conducted under Section 315, 
the Wheat Report, brought this fight into the open.
Despite the Emergency Agricultural Tariff and the Fordney- 
McCumber Act which had fixed the wheat duty at 30 cents 
per bushel, Canadian grains poured across the border.
On November 1, 192 3, Sydney Anderson, President of the 
Wheat Council of the United States, filed an application 
with the agency asking for a higher rate."'''*'
Marvin told Coolidge that an inquiry under the 
flexible tariff could not help the wheat producer because 
of the time consumed in investigating and compiling data 
on which to base recommendations. However, the President 
asked the Commission to proceed in order to indicate his
9Ibid.
10Saloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in 
the Middle West, 1900-1939, 375.
"^Tariff Commission to Coolidge, November 14, 1923, 
Costigan Papers.
134
sympathy with grain farmers.
The report, delivered to Coolidge in early March,
revealed a split in the Commission. Costigan, Culbertson,
and Lewis recommended a slight increase, based on an
examination of foreign costs for a three year period.
Burgess and Marvin, confining their data to one year's
13production, asked for a much greater increment. The
choice of different time segments reflected the two group's
biases toward the tariff issue and gave each the evidence
needed to support its position.
Because of the divergent opinions, Coolidge was
14reluctant to release the study to the public. Instead, 
he issued a statement pointing out the confidential char­
acter of certain materials submitted to him under Section
315, and declared that the Commission would later publish
^  15a summary of its report.
Costigan immediately stated objections to this
135
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1 9Coolidge to Tariff Commission, November 13, 1923,
ibid.
13U.S., Tariff Commission, Wheat Report (Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1924), 37.
■^Culbertson Memorandum, March 21, 1924, Costigan
Papers.
15Costigan Memorandum, March 21, 1924, ibid.
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procedure. Unless the Commission's work were publicized,
it could not provoke public support for tariff reduction.
He claimed that the President had an obligation to reveal
publicly the alternatives suggested by the agency.'*’6 On
March 24, 1924, perhaps because of Costigan' s dissent,
Coolidge released the report. The board immediately had
171,000 copies printed for distribution.
The Wheat Report produced another conflict within 
the agency, one which again brought Coolidge into the 
board's controversies. The problem was whether transpor­
tation charges should be included in computations of pro­
duction costs. Transportation was a large factor in a 
foreign manufacturer's expense of competing in the Ameri­
can market. If this data were included, it would often 
justify a lower duty. For this reason, Costigan, Culbert­
son, and Lewis wanted to use this information. Since 
Marvin and Coolidge favored protection, they did not.
Costigan and his colleagues argued that subdivision 
(c) of Section 315 instructed the President to consider
17U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, March 25,
1924.
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any factors which affected competition between foreign and
18domestic producers. Marvin opposed this construction, 
arguing that the agency's authority to include transporta­
tion was not specifically spelled out and was of question- 
19able legality. He also asserted that the term "cost of
production" was used, in part, because it was narrow
enough to preclude the use of transportation and other
costs. In his opinion there was no relation between sub-
20division (c) and the main body of Section 315.
Costigan and his colleagues won a questionable vic­
tory when Coolidge proclaimed an increase in the wheat
21duty to 42 cents per bushel, the amount they had advised. 
Costigan noted that if the Commission had not included 
transportation, its recommendations would have been even 
less than the 12 cents per bushel. This was due to the 
higher rates American farmers paid to ship their wheat to 
markets in comparison to their Canadian competitors rela­
tively low expense for the same service. Since transpor­
tation raised the United States' producer's total costs,
18U.S., Statutes at Large, XLII, Part 1, 943.
19U.S., Tariff Commission, Wheat Report, 32.
20Ibia. 21Ibia., 71.
wheat was eligible, under Section 315's dictum to equalize 
the cost of production, to receive more protection.
Considering Coolidge's desire to do something to 
please wheat farmers it is probable that he accepted the 
use of transportation because it justified a higher duty. 
While Marvin and Burgess had recommended even greater 
increases, the President had to follow the majority's 
suggestions if he wanted to act without stirring up public 
controversy.
A year and a half later, the transportation issue
arose again. The Commission recommended higher duties on
gold leaf, print rollers, and halibut. If transportation
was not used in determining relative costs of production,
the agency suggested a small increase in the duty on print
rollers and a reduction on gold leaf. Halibut was not
affected since American and foreign transportation costs
22were about the same.
In the case of gold leaf, the burden of transporta­
tion was with the foreign manufacturer, for his shipments 
to the United States exceeded in cost those of the domes­
tic producer. This made the total cost of foreign gold
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Costigan Papers.
leaf greater than the American product. The flexible 
tariff principle thus indicated a reduction in duty. The 
same factors limited the increase in the duty on print 
rollers.
Coolidge wanted higher tariffs on all three items.
After consulting with Marvin, the President asked the
Attorney-General for an opinion on the Commission's use of 
2 3transportation. The agency's Legal Division prepared
24briefs for both sides of the controversy.
To force a fair presentation of his views, costigan 
asked the legal staff to prepare a memorandum setting 
forth arguments in favor of the Commission's use of trans— 
portation. He was suspicious of the agency's technical 
personnel. The previous March he had learned of a severe 
split in the Economic Division, and he had no reason to 
believe that other personnel had escaped the factionalism
sweeping the board.
The Colorado reformer wanted the Attorney—General
2^Marvin to Coolidge, October 6, 1925, ibid.
24Legal Division to Costigan, November 13, 1925,
ibid.
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25Costigan to Legal Division, November 12, 1925,
ibid.
to rule that the agency had to include transportation data
in its investigations under Section 315. This would lead
to a general reduction in the tariff. Costigan realized
that transportation rates were inextricably tied to the
cost of producing and marketing a product. His experience
in his home state as a critic of the basing point system
used in establishing freight rates had made him an expert
on the subject of transportation costs and their impact on
26consumer prices.
He studied the debates in Congress on the Fordney- 
McCumber bills to find support for his opinion. This 
tactic was disappointing. Senator Irvine Lenroot of Wis­
consin had argued that to include transportation costs as 
a part of the expense of production might allow producers
in the Far West to claim charges into markets they had
27never before penetrated. Senator Frank R. Gooding of 
Idaho took the opposite view, stressing the barriers 
against western producer's entrance into the national
Colin B. Goodykoontz, ed. , Papers of Edward P. 
Costigan Relating to the Progressive Movement in Colorado, 
1902-1917 (Denver: World Press, 1941), 112-142. Hereafter 
cited as Goodykoontz, Papers of Edward _P. Costigan.
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market. Each took a position in the interests of his 
constituents.
There was, however, another argument which justified 
the use of transportation data in estimating production 
costs. Subsection (c) of Section 315 allowed the President 
to take into consideration whatever factors he felt were 
necessary to maintain equal conditions of competition 
between American and foreign producers. Transportation 
costs were a vital item in determining the ability of 
other nation's exports to compete with American goods, and 
Costigan wanted them included.
On November 17, 1925, the commission sent legal 
briefs to the Attorney-General. Six days later the 
Supreme Court, in the case Louisville and Nashville Rail­
road Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Company, ruled 
that "When a seller enters a competitive market with a 
standard article he must meet offerings from other 
sources."29 If products were sold without charge for the 
cost of transporting them to their destination, the court 
stated, freight charges were, in effect, a part of the 
manufacturer's cost of production. "An excessive freight
141
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29269 U.S. 237-238 (1925).
charge for delivery of the finished article affects him as 
directly as does a like charge upon his raw material.
Costigan took it upon himself to bring this deci-
O Ision to the Attorney-General1 s attention. He also sent
along another summary of his views on the question.
Glassie, infuriated with Costigan for what he termed an
effort to get a special hearing, insisted that once the
issue was submitted to the Justice Department, both
parties should await the decision without further argu-
32ment. The Coloradan replied that this was not a 
judicial matter but rather a question of legal construc­
tion. Since the Supreme Court had given a timely sugges­
tion as to how the law should be viewed, he felt he had a 
responsibility to keep the Attorney-General informed of 
the latest judicial pronouncements. Also, he refused to 
be lectured on ethics by a member of the bar who had
served as judge in a case in which he had a direct
33interest.
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O pCostigan Memorandum, December 30, 1925, ibid.
33Ibid. Costigan referred to Glassie's stand in 
the sugar investigation.
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Costigan1 s relations with the other Commissioners 
were clearly strained. Further, his contention that the 
matter before the Attorney-General was not judicial seemed 
peculiar indeed in light of the powers he claimed for the 
agency.
The Justice Department' s opinion on the transporta­
tion issue was equivocal. it clearly upheld executive 
authority over the Commission, and stated that the Presi­
dent should take into account the facts of each case, 
including the cost of transportation, when it was "an 
advantage or disadvantage in competition between foreign
and American producers," but he was to do this only "so
34far as he finds it practicable."
Alfred Dennis and Costigan interpreted the decision
35as a victory for the Coloradan's position. Both were 
mistaken. If the President found it impracticable to use 
transportation data it could be ignored, and according to 
the Attorney-General's view, the Executive decided what 
was "practicable." This settled one major dispute within 
the agency.
3^XXV Op. Atty. Gen. 29 (1926) .
35Costigan Memorandum, February 6, 1926, Costigan
Papers.
Another controversy revolving around Section 315 
was the practice of investigating foreign producer's books 
and procedures. This was a repugnant policy to foreign 
businessmen. The Treasury Department had already incurred 
criticism by abusing similar privileges, and post-war 
nationalism reinforced this hostility. More than one 
manufacturer pointed out that his own government did not 
have access to his records, and refused to cooperate with 
the Commission's agents.36
These field studies were a serious problem. The 
agency's success in obtaining some data was a tribute to 
its representative's persuasiveness. It also reflected 
foreign producer's fears that American tariff rates might 
rise even higher if they did not demonstrate substantial 
costs. All in all it was an unhappy business, and a move­
ment arose within the Commission to abandon field 
investigations.
The alternative was to use foreign invoices to 
estimate production costs. Alfred Dennis, addressing the 
National Association of Manufacturers at St. Louis in 
October, 1925, pointed out that it sometimes took from two
144
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to three years to collect data abroad. What concerned 
domestic producers, he asserted, was the actual competi­
tive condition they held vis-a—vis foreign products in the 
American market, and he urged that invoices be used to 
establish those conditions. Such a move would reduce 
investigative costs and shorten the period of study before 
the Commission could submit its recommendation.
The agency did not formally consider Dennis' pro-
38posal until the middle of November. Costigan immedi­
ately expressed opposition. Invoices did not represent 
normal prices, he argued, nor did they always reflect 
foreign costs. Furthermore, the law assigned to the 
agency the duty of comparing production costs, a responsi­
bility which required field investigations. Marvin, with­
out explaining his position, also voted against the use of
39invoices at this time.
The Commission took the matter up again the follow­
ing July. Growing foreign opposition to its work caused 
Marvin to suggest that if the State Department desired,
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the agency could change to the invoice method of 
40appraisal. Costigan, again argued at length against the
proposal, and finally decided to make a trip to Europe to
41investigate the situation for himself. He left in the 
fall of 1926, visiting parts of France, Germany, and 
England.
His findings were perplexing. Evidence of foreign
hostility was readily available. American companies were
accused of extracting trade secrets through official
investigations and of using the stolen knowledge to close
foreign competitors out of markets in the United States.
Costigan believed that unless the Tariff Commission
improved its European image, retaliation would eventually
42block the exchange of information on production costs.
This conclusion posed a dilemma for Costigan. One 
way to improve the United States ' reputation was to sus­
pend the Tariff Commission's foreign investigations. Yet 
this would force the agency to turn to invoices as a 
source of information, and Costigan opposed this procedure.
40 . .Costigan Memorandum, July 23, 1926, ibid.
41Ibid.
42Costigan Memorandum of European Trip, undated, 
ibid., New York Times, October 8 , 1926.
-Ihere was no satisfactory solution to this problem. With­
in a few months, the agency decided to adopt the new 
method of gathering data.
In February, 1927, the Commission sent to the 
President a report based on foreign invoice data dealing 
with the pig-iron industry. Costigan filed a dissenting 
statement pointing out that a majority of the Commis­
sioners chose India as the principle competing country, 
though for the entire previous year Germany had held that
distinction, exporting 137,475 tons to the United States.
43In 1926, India had sent only 81,229 tons to America.
Furthermore, Costigan stated, the cost data used by the
majority had been compiled in 1924. Since then many
domestic steel producers had rebuilt their plants into
44modern, efficient systems. The Coloradan also argued
that invoices were not reliable guides to foreign costs,
information which could only be gathered through a formal
inquiry. His protests were futile, for Coolidge raised
45the duty the full amount allowed by law.
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Five months later, when the Commission completed an 
investigation, based on invoice data, of the Japanese rag- 
rug industry, Costigan again expressed disapproval. The 
majority defended this practice on the ground that a 
report was urgently needed, and industrial conditions in
japan precluded an accurate investigation of production
4-6costs. Costigan pointed out that since the agency had 
spent two years compiling a report using invoices, time 
did not appear to be too pressing. He also stated that a 
few Japanese factories, fearing increases in duties, had 
offered the Commission's investigators access to their 
books.47 Costigan insisted that there was no substitute 
for field studies, particularly when they were feasible.
Again, the Coloradan forced his colleagues to seek 
a ruling from the Attorney-General. That officer ruled 
that the President was required to take wages, costs of 
materials and other items of production into considera­
tion, "so far as he finds it practicable," and unless he 
made such a finding, the commission was required to
46Costigan dissent, July 11, 1927, copy in
Costigan Papers.
investigate these factors. But he went on to say that
the Executive had complete discretion to decide whether a
49field investigation was practicable.
Costigan had lost another battle. The Attorney- 
General's opinion gave the President unlimited control of 
the Commission's investigative techniques. While foreign 
hostility over field investigations might still be averted, 
it would be at the expense of what Costigan considered the 
clear meaning of the law.
The Commission's duties also confused foreign 
nations. For example, Spain and France viewed the agency 
as a tool of the President, capable of turning out what­
ever decision he wanted.
In 1923, the United States entered into commercial 
negotiations with Spain. In return for reciprocity and
most-favored-nation treatment Spain suggested that the
50Tariff Commission reduce duties on a number of items.
The implication was clear that the Coolidge administration 
could manipulate the agency's findings. While it was true
48XXXV Op. Atty. Gen. 325 (1927).
49 .Ibid. , 326.
50Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to 
Coolidge, November 23, 1923, Costigan Papers.
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that the President could make whatever proclamation he
desired once a study was completed, he could not dictate
the Commission's conclusions. coolidge, uninterested in
the Spanish plan, refused to initiate the studies.
A similar situation arose in connection with Franco-
American commercial negotiations in 1926 and 1927. Again
the government made it clear that it could not, or would
not, guarantee the results of a Commission inquiry, and
51the problem did not arise again. At no time did it 
create controversy within the agency.
There were other issues which caused discussion, 
however, and Costigan often found himself in the minority. 
Most of his protests were futile. He failed in attempts 
to expedite important studies. When he admonished his 
colleagues for using data from non-competitive nations, 
they ignored him.53 His pointed remarks on the gathering 
of insufficient and erroneous data and other questionable 
practices served only to provoke personal antagonisms.
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Differences of opinion were an acceptable form of 
friction within the agency, even though they often 
weakened its image as a non-partisan body. However, the 
intensely personal hostility which began to emerge after 
Coolidge became president quickly weakened the agency's 
usefulness.
Some of the disputes were ridiculous. When the 
Commission's Parisian representative, Gilbert Hirsch, 
resigned in 1924, Culbertson accused Glassie of trying to 
cover up the causes for his departure. Glassie called 
Culbertson a liar. The latter promptly picked up 
Costigan's tobacco pouch and hurled it into Glassie s
54
face. A brawl was narrowly avoided.
Costigan frequently objected to Marvin's practice 
of writing letters offering the Commission's opinion on 
matters for which Costigan had not expressed a judgment. 
Marvin's use of the agency as a political haven for needy 
Republicans also repelled the Coloradan.55 The chairman, 
on the other hand, charged his antagonist with exposing
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54Costigan Memorandum, November 25, 1924, costigan
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55 Tariff commission, Proceedings, February
20, 1924; cosiigan Memorandum, February 20, 1924, July 13,
1926, Costigan papers.
the board s problems, thereby damaging its prestige.5  ^ By 
March, 1926, their relationship was so strained that when 
Marvin termed one of Costigan's requests for information 
"impertinent," the latter left the meeting.57 After wait­
ing "more than a full day, " he finally received a personal
apology from Marvin, but stubbornly insisted upon another
5 8one before the entire Commission. This Marvin refused 
to do.
Alfred Dennis engaged in similar pettiness, 
threatening on one occasion to boycott meetings unless he 
was given additional speaking time. By his reckoning, he 
shared one-tenth of the meeting time with one other Com—
« ■  • a- 59missioner, and he felt this allotment was insufficient. 
When Henry Glassie left the Commission, and Brossard 
attempted to move into Glassie1s old office, Dennis became 
furious because he had planned to claim it for himself.
56Costigan Memorandum, April 17, 1923, Costigan
Papers.
57U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings,, March 19,
1926.
5^Costigan Memorandum, March 20, 1926, Costigan
Papers.
59Costigan Memorandum, November 20, 1925, ibid.
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Factionalism even spread to the staff. on March 
25/ 1925, Charles W. Mixter, an economist, confided to 
Costigan that until the previous October (1924) , he had 
served as an "attorney" for the Coloradan's position while
George P. Comer and Charles E. McNabb had defended
61Marvin. The Commission's data was clearly far from 
being impartial or scientific.
Dedicated to the belief that the flexible tariff 
could make a real contribution to the nation's economic 
health and the consumer's interests, Costigan had to make 
his dissent public. In time he forced an investigation of 
the Commission, for he recognized that without corrective 
legislation, the agency could never escape from Presiden­
tial influence and that of his appointees. Rather than 
resign, letting Coolidge have his way, Costigan preferred 
to take his case to Congress and to the people.
15 3
61Costigan Memorandum, March 25, 1925, ibid.
CHAPTER VI
THE FIGHT WITHOUT
Costigan's decision to publicize the controversy 
within the agency was the logical result of his Progres­
sive experience. He believed that public officials should 
respond to the demands of general interests rather than to 
those of special influences. In Colorado, corrupt agree­
ments between businessmen and politicians had motivated 
his reforming career; similar experiences on the Tariff 
Commission provoked the same response.
The tariff prompted loud pleadings from self- 
seeking groups; it also offered costigan an opportunity to 
help the consumer. He hoped to use the agency as a 
tariff-revising body and to publicize unnecessarily high 
rates. For this reason, he supported publication of the 
Commission's reports, intensive surveys of important con­
sumer items such as sugar and wheat, and strict adherence 
to the principles stated in Section 315 of the Fordney- 
McCumber Act.
Progressives had never advocated completely free
trade. ^  Even Wilson, who had predicated his import legis­
lation upon the need to restore competition between Ameri­
can and foreign producers, wanted to insure United States' 
manufacturers a fair profit, and this demanded a moderate 
level of protection. Costigan was not outside this cur­
rent of economic thought. As a reformer he was concerned 
with reducing needless rates which raised the level of 
prices.
When Costigan's attempt to use the Commission as a 
sounding board failed, he naturally turned to the people's 
representatives, and even to the public itself, to get the 
support he needed. His plea was basic to Progressivism. 
Let the people see what lay in the path of good, honest 
government and they could correct the evil. Let them see 
what their real interests were and they could support the 
public leader who sought to achieve those goals.
This was confused thinking, since there was no 
reason to believe that the people were any more honest, 
moral, or discerning than their representatives, but it 
was an article of faith for many Progressives, and for
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2Costigan. Because of this dedication to democracy, the 
Coloradan found the strength he needed to combat short­
sighted and perverted policies, and to maintain his prin­
ciples of government.
Left alone as the sole "public minded" representa­
tive on the Tariff Commission, Costigan, after 1925, took 
on the role of a martyr. Hopelessly outnumbered on every 
issue, consistently overruled by the President on policy 
decisions, the constant target of personal criticisms from 
his colleagues, he refused to leave the board. Richard 
Hofstadter has commented that to the Progressive, "Bad 
people had pressure groups; the Man of Good Will had only 
his civic organizations." To Costigan, the Tariff Com­
mission was a tool for public service. To Coolidge it was 
an instrument of politics, and the conflicts between these 
opposing philosophies dominated the agency's history 
during most of Coolidge's second administration.
Among the Tariff Commission's many activities, none
The Morality of Politics: The 
y, " .Tournal of American His­
tory , LII (December, 1965), 533.
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aroused more controversy than the sugar investigation of 
1923 and 1924. It pointed up the Coloradan's views on the 
agency's duties and made his fight for honesty and moral­
ity in government a public issue.
The Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 had imposed a duty 
of two cents per pound on raw sugar, and the Fordney Act 
raised that figure to 2.203 cents. By early April of the 
next year, sugar prices rose from their previous level of 
3.165 cents to a high of 5.85 cents per pound. This 
caused Harding to ask the Commission to study the tariff's 
relation to the increase.
It reported that while factors other than imposts 
had been responsible for the inflation, the duty on raw 
sugar had been incorporated in wholesale and retail 
prices.4 Costigan forced this statement by informing his 
colleagues that he would file a dissenting report unless 
they dealt with the effect of the tariff on long term
prices. He was convinced that the duty on that product
5cost the consumer millions of dollars a year.
^U.S. , Tariff Commission, The Relation .of. the ^ 
Tariff on Sugar to the Rise in Priqe of FebruarY-Apr.il,
1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), 14.
5Costigan Memorandum, April 19, 1923, Costigan
Papers.
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Sugar producers were afraid that the Commission's 
study might force Harding to lower the tariff. On the 
other hand, sugar refiners were anxious to see the prod­
uct's price decline. The issue brought a quick response 
from Senator Reed Smoot of Utah who telegraphed the Com­
mission that: "If they /sugar refiners/ succeed in
reducing tariff rate to destroy American industry God help
g
the American consumer." As the leading defender of sugar
beet producers, Smoot's concern was understandable.
But even Harding got more than he expected. When
he first saw the report and its statement that the tariff
on sugar was being passed along to the consumer, he told
Marvin that it was a "God-damned report to submit to me,
7when the prices of sugar are jumping the way they are." 
While supporting tbe flexible tariff, Harding didn t 
want it to become "disturbing to the many industries of 
the country— politically."8 He finally accepted and 
authorized the study's publication because he felt it
^Smoot to Tariff Commission, March 27 , 1923, ibid.
7Marvin Memorandum on Meeting with President,
April 19, 1923, ibid.
8Ibid.
demonstrated the work of the agency, hut he was aware of
the sugar community’s sensitivity to criticism.9
The Commission, after initiating the study of sugar
prices, had begun, as authorized under Section 315, an
extended investigation of the entire industry. It was not
a unanimous decision. Henry Glassie's recent appointment
(March 1, 1923) added to the board a man who was closely
identified with Louisiana sugar interests. Arguing that
it would be unwise to act without the President's specific
10consent, he made a strong stand against the inquiry.
Despite this opposition the study was formally 
ordered on March 27 , 192 3.^ After several weeks no
action had been taken on the investigation, and Costigan 
and Culbertson were becoming anxious. It was evident that 
Marvin and Harding were not interested in pursuing it.
On July 31, four months after the study had been 
initiated, the two western Commissioners forced through a 
resolution asking that the Advisory Board report its plans
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11U.S. Tariff Commission, Proceedings, March 16,
1923.
for the inquiry. There was no immediate response and
the Commission was forced to devote most of that summer to
discussions of personnel employment and other studies 
13already begun. Not until the middle of October, after
Glassie had conferred with Coolidge, was a date set for
^  _ 14the hearings.
Prior to the time the Commission began taking 
testimony, Costigan became concerned that Glassie might 
not disqualify himself from the investigation. The 
Coloradan anticipated the great pressure to be exerted on 
his colleagues to reach conclusions favorable to pro­
ducers, and Glassie was in a vulnerable position.
On December 14, 1923, Costigan had been approached
by two representatives of the Holly Sugar Company who 
asked what the chances were for a unanimous decision in 
the case.15 This was a subtle way of determining if 
Costigan, Culbertson, and Lewis had changed their minds
12Culbertson Memorandum, May 23, 1923, Costigan
Papers.
13U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings, July 31,
1923.
14Ibid. , October 16, 1923.
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since the preliminary report had been issued the previous 
spring. When Costigan replied that he had no way of know­
ing what the study would produce, the lobbyists suggested 
that they might be willing to support the Children's 
Bureau and to withdraw from the sugar-beet fields children 
under twelve years of age.'*'6
The Children's Bureau, established in 1912, was an 
agency within the Department of Labor which gathered 
information and formulated legislation affecting minors.
It was one indication of growing support for federal 
action to outlaw child labor. When this was accomplished, 
under the Keating—Owen Act in 1916, the Supreme Court 
struck down the law on the grounds that it was an uncon-
17 •stitutional exercise of the commerce power. This pro
duced another act to achieve the same end, this time 
through the taxing authority of the government. When this 
too was declared invalid, supporters of the child labor 
acts tried to secure a constitutional amendment to accom­
plish their goal.
(1922) .
~*~6Ibid.
17Hamner v. nagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
1SBailev v. nrexel Furniture Co. 259 U.S. 20
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Costigan had long supported the child Labor Amend­
ment and the lobbyist's offer must have tempted him.
19Nevertheless, he firmly rejected it. He could not 
betray a trust, and he was equally concerned that other 
Commissioners avoided compromising positions.
These fears were directed particularly to Henry 
Glassie. His relationship with sugar interests seemed to 
preclude his participation, even though the agency had 
never formulated rules governing such cases. costigan, 
convinced that the Commission functioned as a quasi­
judicial body, urged the other members to guard against 
conflicts of interest. Pointing to the interstate Com­
merce Commission's policy which prohibited its members 
from participating in cases in which they had a direct 
interest, the Coloradan asked for similar standards. On 
December 19, 1923, this proposal was rejected by a 3-3
vote.20
Failing to carry the agency with him, Costigan drew 
Coolidge's attention to the problem. He threatened the
19Costigan Memorandum, December 15, 1923, Costigan
Papers.
20u.s., Tariff commission, Proceedings, December
19, 1923.
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president with a public airing of the issue if he did not
21compel Glassie to disqualify himself from the inquiry.
Coolidge was reluctant to act, a posture which had proved
successful throughout his career. He felt the Commission
was an executive instrument, exercising an advisory rather
than a judicial function. In his opinion, it was proper
for Burgess and Glassie to have specialized knowledge of
the pottery and sugar industries, and he did nothing to
22resolve Costigan's dilemma.
When the hearing opened on January 15, 1924,
Costigan entered a formal protest against Glassie's par­
ticipation. Arguing that the agency's judicial responsi­
bilities required its members to act objectively, he 
asserted that since there was no way to determine Glassie s 
impartiality, the Virginia lawyer should withdraw from the 
proceedings.23 Glassie replied that he was not in the 
sugar producing business; it was his wife who held that 
interest.24 Furthermore, he believed that the Commission
2Costigan to Coolidge, January 9, 1924, Costigan
22Culbertson Memorandum, January 10, 1924, ibid.
23Costigan speech, January 15, 1924, MS in ibid.
Papers.
24Ibid.
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was only a fact-finding group, possessing no power but
that of recommendation, having no judicial character at
25all. This assertion drew support from Porter McCumber,
former Senator and co-sponsor of the act creating the
flexible tariff. He stated that "when you get to the
essence of the subject, the one thing that you are to
ascertain— the difference between the cost of production
of the thing abroad and at home —  it does not smack in any
26respect of a judicial character."
Marvin finally concluded the dispute in Glassie's 
favor by reading a message from Coolidge stating that the 
President expected the Commissioners to conduct their 
business in accordance with the provisions of the law and 
to proceed harmoniously, coolidge counseled Glassie to do 
his duty as the Virginian saw fit, and offered Executive 
support for any decision the Commissioner made. Later in 
the day, the President appointed Marvin chairman for 
another year.27
25Henry F Glassie, "The Tariff Commission and the 
Flexible Tariff," Virginia Law_ Review, XI (March and 
April, 1925), 329-435, 442-466.
26Testimony, Tariff Commission Hearing, January 15, 
1924, Costigan Papers.
27Statement by Marvin, Tariff Commission Hearing, 
January if M24 ibid; ".S., Tariff Commission, Proceed- 
ings, January 15, 1924, January 16, 1924.
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Comments on the affair ranged from indignation to
despair. The Baltimore Sun pointed out that "Glassie's
stubborn insistence on his right to take part in the
decision of the sugar schedule will not tend to increase
public confidence in the principles and practices of a
2 8protective tariff. " The Locomotive Engineers Journal
felt that ordinary decency should have forced Glassie to 
2 9remove himself. Both publications seemed to confuse the
board's ability to hold hearings with the power to change 
rates, a responsibility it did not possess. The Colombus 
Ohio Dispatch felt that the flexible tariff had been dis­
appointing, producing no changes worth mentioning, and
30that it made little difference who sat on the Commission. 
Again there was no distinction between the power of recom­
mendation and the authority to alter existing duties.
28Baltimore Sun, January 17, 1924.
2 9Locomotive Engineers Journal (April, 1924), 243, 
clipping in Costigan Papers.
30Colombus Ohio Dispatch, January 17, 1924, clipping
in ibid. Much newspaper comment was probably eliminated 
by Arkansas Senator Thaddeus Caraway's exposure of the 
Teapot Dome Scandel on January 16, 1924. See The Denver 
Post and the Rocky Mountain News, January 16-18, 1924.
The New York Times noted only that the affair produced 
some sentiment in the House for an investigation of the 
Commission. January 17, 1924.
Coolidge had successfully asserted his theory that 
the Commission was simply a fact-finding agency. Whatever 
his apparent bias, each member was entitled to participate 
in any investigation and to discover the facts for him­
self. The President correctly denied that the board had 
legal power to withdraw this right from any of its 
members.31
Costigan's crusade was near collapse when Congress 
finally acted to block Glassie's participation. It was an 
election year, and the scandals of Harding's administra­
tion were already being brought to light. Furthermore, 
the resurgence of Democrats and progressives in the previ­
ous off-year elections helped to create a more critical 
attitude toward the administration's policies. In April,
1924, Congress so modified an executive appropriation bill 
that it forbade the use of funds to pay the salary of any 
Commissioner who took part in proceedings in which he or 
any member of his family had any special, direct, or 
pecuniary interest, or in a matter in which he had acted 
as an attorney, legislative agent, or special
166
31calvin coolidge, Autobiography (New York: Cos­
mopolitan Book Corporation, 1929), 199 200.
representative.
Even this support disappointed Coolidge1s critics.
Culbertson stated, upon seeing that thirty Senators had
voted against the measure: "if so plain a moral issue can
not win a clean cut victory, our government is not all it 
33should be." Although Glassie accepted the act as dis­
qualifying him from further participation in the sugar 
case, he maintained that the agency had been created with 
the idea that each member was entitled to participate
fully in all investigations, and he denied that the board's
. . , . 34decisions had any judicial meaning.
Costigan viewed Congress ' action as a victory for 
his position. Defining the controversy as a crucial moral 
issue, he asserted that the public was entitled to a Com­
mission which held morality and judicial impartiality as 
sound principles of conduct. His attachment to those
32U.S., Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 6, 5527. This measure was intro­
duced by Homer Hoch, Kansas Representative, and was 
labeled the "Hoch Amendment."
33Culbertson to Costigan, April 12, 1924, Costigan
Papers.
34New York Daily News Record, April 14, 1924, 
clipping in ibid.
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32
Address to the National League of Women Voters, 
Buffalo, New York, April 24, 1924, MS in ibid.
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standards, having already provoked a conflict with the 
president, soon invited further efforts to hamper the 
sugar study.
Costigan, at the suggestion of Senator Smoot, met 
in late May, 1924, with a group of Congressmen and repre­
sentatives of the sugar industry. After some preliminary 
comments, the sugar producers confronted the Coloradan
36with complaints about his attitude toward the industry.
He assured them that his criticisms of Glassie were not 
necessarily an attack upon the entire sugar community. 
Since all other means of resolving the dispute had been 
exhausted, public exposure was the only alternative. While 
he stated his support for national protection, costigan 
also pointed out that it was his duty to carry out the 
letter of the law.37 Privately, he believed that the con­
ference indicated a drive was then underway by the indus-
4- 38try to prevent issuance of a report.
The activities of some Commissioners confirmed this 
analysis. On May 23, the Senate asked for a report on 
butter, and Glassie, interested in getting on with that
36Costigan Memorandum, May 24, 1924, ibid.
37ibid. 38a ^ -
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study so the sugar report could be delayed, urged the
Advisory Board to have its preliminary study ready by June
2. To expedite the work on sugar, costigan forced through
a motion requiring the Commission to meet on May 26 to
39take up the data collected on that study. He then 
secured passage of another resolution which set aside 
three days of every six solely for consideration of the
40sugar inquiry.
If unhampered by the administration, Costigan, 
Culbertson, and Lewis believed the Commission could issue 
a report before the end of the summer. Their concern 
about outside pressures was not unwarranted. With Glassie 
eliminated, Costigan and his colleagues formed a majority 
of the commission. They were certain to he less sympa­
thetic to sugar growers than Burgess and Marvin. Recog­
nizing this threat the high protectionists in Congress
41
tried to neutralize or reverse this imbal n
It was possible to revive the deadlock by bringing 
about dismissal of one of the two men who were especially
39U.S., Tariff commission, proceedings, May 23,
1924.
40lbid. ■ May 26, 1924.
41White, A Puritan in BabiO°a' 280'
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vulnerable. Culbertson, by taking a job as a salaried 
lecturer at Georgetown University, had violated the 
Revenue Act of 1916 which prohibited Commissioners from 
holding outside employment. If he resisted too strongly, 
Lewis was an alternative. His appointment expired in 
September, 1924, and Coolidge could easily replace him 
with a high protectionist, avoiding the embarrassment of a 
report contrary to his own views.
A more effective solution was a delay of the sugar 
report until Culbertson and Lewis had left the agency. In 
any case, Coolidge wanted to continue the study until after 
the November election.
In late May, on the day that Costigan met with the
sugar lobbyists, Culbertson was invited to face the same
group. The industry's representatives subtly suggested
that he modify his position in the sugar case. This
42Culbertson refused to consider. Then, in July, he was 
suddenly informed that charges had been filed against him
42u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of 
Tariff commission: Hearings Before £he S u b committee or
investigation of the Tariff Commission, 69th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office 1928) 544.
Hereafter cited as U.S., Senate, Investigation of the 
Tariff commission.
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because of his a c ademic employment. The accusation, 
made by an unsuccessful petitioner who wanted an investi­
gation into bentwood chairs, demanded Culbertson's 
dismissal.
On July 25, he answered Coolidge's summons to the
White House. The President told him to discontinue the
lectures, and though not mentioning Culbertson's possible
dismissal, he did suggest that it would be appreciated if
44the sugar report were delayed at least a month. The 
Kansan made no commitment on the matter.
Coolidge did not make an issue of Culbertson s out 
side employment bec a u s e  legal advice had made it clear 
that there was no case for his removal.45 Attorney-General 
Harlan Fiske Stone told the President that the general 
executive powers w e r e  sufficient to dismiss any Commis­
sioner. Whether Culbertson should be removed for malfea-
46
sance in office w a s  a moot question.
This disrupted Coolidge's plans. He had hoped to 
point to a portion of law which insisted upon removal. 
Since he had a choice, Culbertson's dismissal could pro­
voke political controversy, for without definite legal
43
43 , 44Ibid-, 547-552,Ibid. , 551.
45 46Ibid.Ibid.
172
justification there was a danger of Congressional reaction.
Even before confronting Culbertson, coolidge had
made one other effort to delay the report. On July 9, he
asked the agency to suspend all other work, if necessary,
in order to move ahead with the butter investigation.
Throughout the rest of the month Costigan carried on a
continuous battle with Marvin over the meaning of the
request, and charged both the President and the Chairman
47with conspiring to delay the sugar study. This attack 
forced the Commission to deal directly with the report and 
it became clear that it would be sent to Coolidge well 
before the election.
Once completed, the sugar study would place the 
President in a difficult spot. If he acted on it, he 
might alienate supporters in the sugar producing areas in 
the Rocky Mountain West and Louisiana. To ignore it or to 
act against the recommendations of the majority would 
offend Progressive elements in his own party and supply 
the Democrats with political ammunition for the fall
campaign.
Coolidge wanted the sugar duty maintained for the
47U.S., Tariff Commission, Proceedings., July 9,
1924; July 15, 1924; July 19' 1924.
moment. "If a man is drowning he needs immediate help,1
he told Culbertson, " but if he merely needs a bath he can
48wait until Saturday night." The sugar industry was in 
no danger of perishing and the consumer could wait a 
little longer for tariff relief.
At the end of July the report was sent to the 
President. The Commission's opinion was divided. Costi­
gan, Culbertson, and Lewis supported a reduction from
2.202 to 1.54 cents per pound, while Marvin and Burgess
49believed the tariff should remain the same.
The chief difference between the two groups was
Marvin's and Burgess' commitment to protect all domestic
sugar producers, marginal as well as efficient, cane as
well as beet, costigan's group was less concerned with
the beet producers than they were with the costs of pro-
50tection to the consumer.
Protectionist groups throughout the country brought
immediate pressure on Coolidge to delay action on the
48Culbertson to William Allen White, July 25, 1925, 
Costigan Papers.
49 Tari f f  Commission, S u g a r  Report (Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1926), 69, 13
17 3
50Ibid. , 135.
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report. The National Grange, the American Protective
Tariff League, and scores of other interested parties sent
etters and telegrams to the White House protesting the
51majority recommendations. They apparently had an effect.
When questioned in early August if he was going to take
the report with him to Vermont, Coolidge replied, "I don't
know whether I will . . .  or not." He declared its 256
pages a "voluminous document" and mentioned that he would
, •, 52take it with him mentally.
On September 27, 1924, the President issued a
statement noting the severe differences of opinion within
the commission. He stated that the conflict forced him to
determine what a complex set of figures meant, a duty he
felt unprepared to handle. He asked the commission for
53more information.
5American Protective Tariff League to Bascom C. 
Slemp, August 5. 1924; William E Humphreys-to Coolidge,
July 21, 1924; L.J. Taber to Coolidge August 5, 1924.^ 
Calvin coolidge papers, Manuscript Divi ■
Congress. Hereafter cited as Coolidg
52Howard H. Zu^  p^gident^Ainherst: Univer-Calvin Coolidge, The Talkative ±L_--^
sity of Massachusetts Press, 1964), 9.
53Coolidge to Tariff Commission, September 27,
1924, costigan Papers.
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That ended Costigan's hopes that Coolidge would 
respect the agency's integrity. Although he had obtained 
a majority in sympathy with his position, only the Presi­
dent held the power to implement the Commission's findings, 
|and he had forestalled the issue by asking for more 
information. Coolidge knew that the report, along with
| another on linseed-oil, offended important groups of
54voters in the West and Northwest. Any Presidential 
action on these studies was political folly. By procras­
tinating, he hoped to hold the support of voters who 
| approved and opposed the reports, since each could hope 
for a favorable decision after the election. coolidge
did not act until June, seven months after the election.
| Then he refused to change the duty and indicated he would
56
not do so unless sugar prices continued to rise.
By mid-1925, the composition of the commission had 
changed. Lewis had resigned under pressure, and Culbert- 
had accepted an appointment as Ambassador to Roumania.son
Costigan was alone The majority of the agency were high
N a t i o n , CXX (May 27, 1925), 592.
55 .,Ibid.
56Coolidge statement to press, June 15, 1925,
Costigan Papers.
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protectionists. Costigan's views had been repudiated, yet 
he remained another three years, fighting a losing battle 
to maintain the Commission's integrity.
After 1925, Costigan's public addresses contributed 
to Congress' disenchantment with the agency. In a speech 
delivered before the Grace Community Forum on October 4,
1925, he urged that the Commission promote the national 
welfare rather than local interests and asked for legis­
lative changes which would force it to report directly to 
Congress, avoiding executive manipulation.
Coolidge, Marvin, and Glassie shared Costigan's 
concern for the general interest, but they believed that 
the consumer benefited from high protection for manufac­
turers and other enterprises. To costigan, tariff reduc­
tions which led to lower retail prices were more helpful 
to the public, particularly when existing duties often 
protected inefficient, marginal industries.
Costigan viewed coolidge's appointment of high pro­
tectionists to the Tariff Commission as an extension of 
his efforts to undermine the Federal Trade commission and 
the Interstate commerce commission. Seeing this
570ctober 4. 1925. MS in ibid
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threat to progressive goals he offered drastic solutions.
On December 8 , 1925, he suggested to Taussig that biased
members were the cause of the Commission's ills. Unless
Coolidge's influence was removed it might be well for
Congress to cut off appropriations until the agency was
. 5 8reorganized under a new administration.
Later in the month, at the annual meeting of the 
American Economic Association, Costigan dealt the Commis­
sion a heavy blow. Replying to Taussig's assertion before 
the gathering that the flexible tariff provision was 
responsible for the controversy and inefficiency affecting 
the board, Costigan stated that this was an unduly pessi­
mistic interpretation. Its logical conclusion, he felt, 
was the belief that the courts of the nation were incap­
able of rendering unbiased judgments, a possibility that
59was more likely than he wanted to admit. In any case, 
the judiciary was immune from short term pressure whereas 
the agency, often viewed as the actual power in adjusting 
tariff rates, was not protected at all. Members had to 
follow the administration's lead or face eventual removal.
58Costigan to Taussig, December 8 , 1925, ibid.
59U.S., c o n g r e s s i o n a l  Record, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1926, LXVII / Part 2 ' 1389 *
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Affirming his faith in the possibility of securing
just men to work on the Commission, Costigan declared that
it had ceased to represent non-partisan independence.
After calling for a Congressional investigation to pave
the way for corrective legislation, he suggested that the
Commission's appropriations be suspended until its members
^  60were cleansed from the influence of special interests.
Although the commission had been created to take 
the tariff out of politics, Costigan felt it had become 
the "storm center around which far-reaching controversies 
may soon be precipitated."61 He opposed returning to old- 
fashioned tariff making methods since that would "repudiate 
the combined judgment . . .  of American statesmen . . .
/Jnd7 our leading business men."62 It also meant an end to
any hope of a scientific tariff.
The Colorado reformer denied that coolidge had a
 ^ x. 4-^  nlace men of his persuasion on right, perhaps a duty, to place m
the commission, and to direct its activities. Costigan s 
claims that the agency was a judicial body were fanciful
6°Ibid. , 1389-1290.
61rostiaan Memorandum, January 31, 1926, CostiganCostigan
Papers.
62ibid.
17 9
indeed, though he was to convince many people that he was 
right. Initially, Costigan had been encouraged. He had 
gained some support in Congress and other critics of the 
agency lent strength to his effort. The result was a 
Senate investigation which put his faith in the people and 
their representatives to the test.
CHAPTER VII
THE TEST
Costigan's faith in the people reflected his pro­
gressive mentality. Always before when honest government 
had been threatened by corrupt alliances between public 
officials and special interests, he had taken his case to 
the voters. In Colorado, from 1902 to 1914, he had fre­
quently pursued this device to establish the justice of 
his cause. He had repeatedly lost. Only in 1916, in 
backing Wilson, and in 1924, in attacking Glassie, had he 
achieved his political goals. In creating Congressional 
interest in the commission's problems, he faced the possi­
bility that Congress might disagree with his solution and
abolish the agency.
Costigan had hoped that the Tariff Commission could 
provide the American consumer, laborer, and manufacturer 
with the greatest possible benefits consistent with a 
reasonable protective system. When Republican majorities 
blocked these objectives, he turned to the public for
support.
The meeting of the American Economic Association on 
December 29, 1925, marked the beginning of Costigan's
final effort to turn the frari f^ n «Commission into an instru­
ment for reform. Conditions ,ltlons within the agency had deteri­
orated to the point where he had no choice but to make a
public appeal to professional economists and ultimately, 
to Congress, the only group who could resolve his 
difficulties.
Costigan had frequently spoken publicly of the 
board's problems, but never in a comprehensive manner. On 
that evening in New York, he delineated the agency's 
handicaps, charging the Republican administration with 
undermining its true function. First, he asserted that 
the board had ceased to function as a non-partisan group. 
The pressures exerted on Culbertson and Costigan on behalf 
of the sugar interests illustrated the outside influences 
which hampered the board, and he charged that Marvin and 
Coolidge had used their positions to safeguard a high 
tariff.
He also stated that the public had not been ade­
quately informed of the Commission's reports and findings. 
Consequently, it was unable to express support for tariff 
revision. He urged Congress to look into the board's 
difficulties, sure that an investigation would confirm his 
charges and force dismissal of the agency's high
181
protectionist members.1
Finally, Costigan asked the Senate to refuse to
confirm the nominations of E.B. Brossard and A.H. Baldwin,
and to cease appropriating funds for the Commission until
steps were taken to insure that it would confirm to the
standards of disinterested, public service which he pro-
2posed for it. This was a serious indictment, indicating 
the depth of Costigan's convictions as well as his des­
perate position within the board, but it was not the only 
public criticism of the commission.
Frank Taussig, also discussed the agency's problems 
before the Economic Association that December night, but 
he differed from Costigan, in that the former Chairman of 
the board felt its difficulties were derived from its 
administration of the flexible tariff. Taussig had come 
to this conclusion soon after the new provision was 
inaugurated, suggesting that it would prove to be espe­
cially controversial because some of the commissioners 
appointed by Wilson opposed Harding's and Coolidge's
182
1U . s . c o n g r e s s i o n a l  Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1926, LXVII, Part 2, 1389-1390.
^Ibid.
tariff views. Furthermore, he reasoned, no Commission 
could remain immune to the pressures special interests
4exerted m  order to obtain a high level of protection.
The Commission’s frequent examination of important econom­
ic commodities provoked business uncertainty, and this 
produced strong pressures against the use of the flexible 
tariff.J Taussig thought it would be far better for 
tariff rates to be established and left alone, allowing 
businesses to adjust to them. This would take the agency 
out of politics, away from Presidential direction, placing 
it where it belonged, under the control of Congress.
Unless this were done, Taussig was convinced the board
g
would be dissolved.
Another former Commissioner had a similar view. 
Thomas Walker Page believed that Section 315 gave the 
agency impossible responsibilities. It was for this
3 . . .  Frank W. Taussig, "United States Tariff Commission
and the Tariff, " American Economic Review, XIV, Supplement
(March, 1924), 17 6 .
4U.S., Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1926, LXVII, Part 2, 1387-1388.
5Journal of Commerce (December 31, 1925) , 6, 
Costigan Papers.
6Taussig, "United States Tariff Commission and the 
Tariff, • 178.
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reason that he had resigned in 1922. Like Taussig, Page 
was convinced that the costs of production could never be 
established accurately enough to allow the Commission to 
recommend rate changes, and he lamented the political
8involvement the flexible provision forced upon the board.
Other progressives continued the attack on the 
Commission. In 1924, during debate on the agency's appro­
priation, Kansas Representative Homer Hoch had pointed out 
that the Commission's effectiveness depended on public
9confidence. There were signs that this faith was weaken­
ing, and Costigan's campaign against Coolidge's policy 
contributed further to the board's poor image.
During the 1924 Presidential campaign, George 
Norris had charged that Coolidge had tried to force 
through a sugar report favoring the producers. The issue, 
while failing to arouse popular interest, did not die. In 
the following spring Senators Borah, Norris, King, and 
Burton K. Wheeler asked for the agency's dissolution,
7U.S. Senate, Tariff commission Investigation, 50, 
57; Thomas Walker Page Memorandum, July 20, 1927, Costigan
Papers.
8 Ibid.
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9U.S., congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1924, LXV, Part 6, 5529.
along with that of the Federal Trade Commission, because 
30th had "fallen into the hands of reactionaries and no
10l.onger serve the purposes for which they were created."
The Nation, unhappy with the board's work, reasoned 
that it could not create a scientific tariff unless it 
avoided partisan politics.11 Like other critics, it 
failed to understand that the agency, in order to function 
properly under the Fordney-McCurriber Tariff had to be 
staffed by Republicans, devoted adherents of the President.
Business sentiment in favor of modifying the Com­
mission's duties was expressed in the summer of 1925 by 
the United States Chamber of Commerce's proposal to reor- 
ganize the flexible tariff, allowing the President to make 
reciprocal trade agreements.12 Businessmen were seeking, 
somehow, to get the tariff issue into calmer waters.
Agitation arose again in the fall when Senator 
Norris resumed his attack against the "packing of the U.S.
185
10"Tariff commission Scandal," Nation, CXIX 
(August 13, 1924) , 156.
llBaltimore American, May 25, 1925, clipping in
Costigan Papers.
12iournal of Sommerce (June 22, 1925), clipping in
ibid.
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13Tariff Commission," demanding that it be disbanded. This
promoted other requests that Congress do something about 
14the agency.
In December, 1925, Representative Cordell Hull of
Tennessee, outlining a "little economic program which
15. . . will appeal to many legitimate people, " attacked 
Coolidge, the Commission, and the tariff. He condemned the 
administration's high tariff policies because they did not 
recognize the new economic framework produced by World War 
I; American trade could not expand unless other countries 
were able to sell goods in the United States. He demanded 
immediate reductions to moderate levels. Hull also sug­
gested that the Commission's appropriations be suspended
until Congress removed its biased personnel and restored 
16its integrity.
Later in the month, Costigan's address before the
IJ
13Nation, CXX (May 27, 1925), 591.
^National Progressive Bulletin, I (October, 1925), 
passim: Peoples Reconstruction League to Senate, December 
12, 1925, clippings in Costigan Papers.
15Hull to Mrs. Benton McMillan, December 10, 1925, 
Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress.
16U.S., sonarassicnal Record. 69th Cong., 1st sess.,
1925, LXVII, Part 2, 1182-1183.
Economic Association Gcho^d uni n ■Hul1 s suggestions, and empha-
187
of the flexible tariff when he had to work with a group of 
prejudiced associates.17
The Nation was impressed. Repulsed by the views of 
William R. Wood, Chairman of the Republican National con­
gressional Committee, who believed that "we ought to have 
a commission . . . that is in sympathy with the adminis­
tration, " it boasted that "so long as he ^/costigan/
remains on deck, the Tariff Commission will never be safe
18for plutocracy."
Costigan's speech capped the progressive's attack
against Coolidge ' s handling of the Tariff Commission and
19improved the Coloradan's public stature. But while he,
Norris, La Follette, and others successfully exposed the
President's mismanagement of the agency, they did not
20arouse popular concern over the issue. A few months
17Ibid., 1926, LXVII/ Part 2, 1389-1390.
18"Wanted: A Little Sympathy," Nation, CXXII (March 
24, 1926), 308; N a t i o n , CXXII (January 27, 1926), 83.
19 .Ibid.
20"Mr. Norris Indicts the President," ibid., CXXII 
(February 10, 1926) , 131.
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later, after the Senate had begun an examination of the
board, the Baltimore Sun expressed the frustrations of
many reformers when it commented that "things have come to
a pretty pass when it is necessary to name a fact-finding
commission of the Senate to investigate a fact-finding
21commission of the government." Many businessmen, unhappy
with the controversy surrounding the flexible tariff, were
22convinced that Congress should dissolve the board.
Other critics of the agency agreed.
Although responsible reformers had pointed out the 
difficulties within the Commission and influential publi­
cations had illuminated the conflict between the President 
and Costigan, they were unable to arouse public concern. 
This apathy blocked reform of the Commission.
On the eve of the presidential campaign m  1928, 
Rexford G. Tugwell summarized the feelings of men who had
lost faith in the Tariff Commission. "It is perfectly
23. , . /t v “7 has been sabotaged." Whileclear, now, that • • •
21-The Tariff Commission Under Fire," Literary 
Digest, LXXXVIII (March 27, 1926), 8.
2:2Journal of Commerce (December 31, 1925), 6,
clipping in Costigan Papers.
2^Rexford G. Tugwell. "What is a Scientific Tariff." 
New Republic, LV (June 13, 19
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he pointed out technical difficulties which made it impos­
sible for the agency to do more than guess at production 
costs, and emphasized the difficulties inherent in foreign 
investigations, he was clearly unhappy with the board's 
decay.
However, Tugwell realized that coolidge's handling
of the agency was consistent with the President's general
24economic policies. With this insight he revealed the 
major cause for the progressive's disillusionment. The 
board was the Executive's instrument, not an independent 
commission. They were wrong in expecting Coolidge to 
treat it any differently than he did.
Reformers, in seeking a scientific tariff, were 
bound to be disappointed, unless they could protect the 
agency from Presidential control and staff it with men of 
their own persuasion. Since the Fordney Act was not modi 
fied until 1930, and no Democrat was elected to the White 
House until after that date, neither move was possible and 
progressive disenchantment with the commission was 
inevitable.
Despite coolidge's reasonable, legal, and just
24Ibid.
handling of the board, embittered progressives and office-
hunting Democrats eventually forced a Senate investigation.
They hoped to prove that the President had exceeded his
constitutional authority, or at least that he had done
something morally wrong.
The possibility of an inquiry had been raised as
early as January 1925, when Joseph T. Robinson, the Senate
minority leader, asked for an investigation of Coolidge's
25treatment of the Commission during the sugar study.
Nothing came of this proposal, probably because the Senate 
did not want to disturb the administration. However, 1926 
was an election year and a coalition of progressives and 
Democrats, irritated with Coolidge's general conduct and 
encouraged by Costigan's revelations before the American 
Economic Association, made a vigorous effort to embarrass
the President.
Senator George Norris pointed to Coolidge's 
handling of David Lewis, tied it to the sugar report, and 
accused the Chief Executive of enticing Culbertson from 
office in order to pack the agency.26 Norris labeled the
25u.S ., congressional Record, 68 th Cong. , 2d Sess., 
1925, LXVI, Part 2, 1063.
26Ibid. , 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1926, LXVII, Part
3, 2630-2631.
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Commission a judicial foody, a characterization supported
by Senators Furnifold M. Simmons of North Carolina and
James A. Reed of Missouri. Simmons explained/ "under the
law the commission finds the facts and applies the law;
2 7the President approves or disapproves its findings."
These reformers also pointed to the repeated renewal of
the Hoch Amendment as an indication of the agency's
28judicial nature.
Other critics pointed out that almost $5,000,000 
had been spent by the board since 1917 and expressed doubt 
that the nation had received full value for its expendi­
tures. They also cited resolutions by the National Board 
of Farm Organizations and other groups charging that the
Commission was disreputably managed and hopelessly
29biased.
On March 2, 1926, several congressmen once again
attacked the commission. Representative Hull repeated his
proposal to abolish the agency, insisting that it had
30 , .ceased to function as a non-partisan body. Republican 
progressives and Democrats, disillusioned with Coolidge s
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treatment of the board and anxious to express their hos­
tility, supported Senator Robinson's new motion to inves­
tigate the agency.
The Senate was determined to have a thorough 
investigation. This was indicated in Reed Smoot's failure 
to gain control of the inquiry when Senator Norris charged 
that "we can^Tot/ investigate the action of the Tariff
Commission on the sugar question without investigating the
31senior Senator from Utah." A majority concurred. The 
inquiry divided the Senate along a liberal-conservative 
line, being supported by 11 progressive Republicans, 28 
Democrats and one Farmer-Laborite. A combination of 28 
Republicans and two Democrats opposed it.
The Senate selected a special committee, headed by 
Robinson, to conduct the investigation. It was dominated 
by Democrats and progressives. William Cabell Bruce, 
Democrat from Maryland, and Robert La Follette Jr. , Pro 
gressive from Wisconsin, along with Robinson comprised the 
majority. David A. Reed of Pennsylvania and James 
Wadsworth Jr., of New York were the Republican members. 
Robinson’s resolution instructed the special cononittee to
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examine the sugar controversy, dissension within the
agency, methods of compiling data, and its freedom to
32operate independently of the President.
The success of the resolution indicated that the 
Senate was no longer willing to see the Commission wallow 
in inactivity and charges of corruption. Also it was a 
blow against Coolidge's authority and an attempt to embar­
rass him in an election year. The Washington Post 
remarked that the President was in the position of having 
to defend himself "against charges that he used the 
influence of his office to affect the official action of
members of a body which by law was made independent of
33executive influence or control." That newspaper, along 
with other disappointed supporters of the Commission, had 
distorted its functions in order to strike at the 
President.
Hearings opened in late March, 1926. In the next 
two years, with an extended recess during the fall elec- 
tions, the committee heard testimony describing the prob­
lems costigan had endured during his years in opposition.
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The Coloradan's difficulties with the other commissioners, 
his interpretation of the flexible tariff's meaning and 
the frustrations he experienced in trying to implement it 
were all delineated. Other witnesses emphasized the 
president's efforts to make the agency responsive to his 
34policies.
The hearings also revealed the efforts of Marvin,
Burgess, and Glassie to select data which justified a high 
35tariff. Their reaction to these charges was expressed 
by Burgess who described the whole inquiry as a politi­
cally motivated attempt to damage Coolidge and the Repub-
36licans in an election year.
The committee's six months recess during the fall 
of 1926 supported this charge. The investigation could 
not be completed in time to issue a formal report before 
the elections of that year. By delaying, the President's 
antagonists were able to use their findings in 1928 when 
Coolidge, or his successor, ran for office.
In addition to harrassing Republicans and the
^Senate, Tariff commission Investigation, 78, 84,
140, 241-300, 348, 403.
35Ibid., 144-145, 941-975, 1288-1373.
36Ibid., 1193.
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president, the investigation focused on the question of
whether the flexible provisions were workable, and if so,
37how? Costigan, an important witness, presented a
lengthy history of the agency and documented what he felt
38was its proper function. He reiterated his hope of 
using the Commission to publicize information which indi­
cated the value of lower duties to the farmers and 
laborers.
The drama reached a climax when Costigan charged 
that William S. Culbertson had deceived the committee. 
Recalled from Roumania to testify, Culbertson had defended 
Coolidge1 s treatment of the Commission and the general 
tenor of Republican tariff policies. He denied that he 
had ever been critical of the President's relations with 
the agency, or that he had been asked to delay the sugar 
report. Also, he demurred that he had not been forced off 
the board.39 costigan refuted this testimony by producing 
a personal letter Culbertson had sent him from Bucharest, 
expressing a critical view of the Commission's activities
37Ibid., 28, 50, 405, 539.
38Ibid., 241-410. 39Ibid. , 753-755.
and lamenting Coolidge1 s treatment of it.40
In introducing this evidence, Costigan undermined 
Culbertson's efforts to defend the administration, and he 
also damaged the Kansan's public career. When chastised 
by Culbertson for using personal correspondence without 
permission, Costigan defended his action by stating that 
the public interest required him to speak. Privately, he
viewed Culbertson's exposure as a "great personal
n „41 tragedy.
At the risk of alienating important allies both in 
and out of Congress, Costigan blindly pursued his fight 
against Coolidge and the other Commissioners in the hope
of forcing the agency's reorganization. His treatment of 
Culbertson weakened the Coloradan’s image in Congress. It 
struck many people as being in extremely bad taste, and 
particularly offended Culbertson's influential Kansas
supporters. william Allen White thought it deplorable
42 ,and a discredit to all concerned," and Homer Hoch
4°Ibid., 589-590.
41Costigan Memorandum, May 19, 1926, Costigan
Papers.
42.White to Culbertson, March 6. 1926. Culbertson
Papers.
characterized Costigan1 s move as a "very gross sort of
,,4 3 thing. "
In private correspondence with Robinson, Costigan 
urged that the board be renamed the Federal Tariff Commis­
sion, convinced that a prestigious name would insure the
44board's independence. By that time, Robinson preferred 
to abolish the flexible tariff, and to make the Commission 
a legislative research bureau. This was a blow to Costi­
gan's efforts to forge the group into a conspicuous public 
agency. Congressional opinion, moreover, was clearly
behind Robinson.
The report submitted to the Senate on May 29, 1928,
recommended repeal of Section 315. Robinson, Bruce, and 
La Follette claimed that the Tariff Commission had no 
practical value, that the President was unable to devote 
proper time to its administration and that tariff-making 
was an exclusive Congressional duty. It adopted Robin 
son's view that the agency be modified into a fact-finding 
body. The majority suggested that if the flexible 
were not abolished, steps be taken to protect the board
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from special influences and to insure public scrutiny of
4- 45its reports.
Senator Wadsworth had failed of re-election in
1926, but the minority report which Senator Reed delivered
to the Senate reflected both their views. Reed pointed
out that changes in the Commission’s personnel had already
put an end to the bickering which had handicapped its
work, and that questions of policy, such as the use of
invoices and the inclusion of transportation charges had
been settled by the Attorney-General. The Pennsylvanian
expressed the hope that the board would reach speedier
46conclusions, justifying the flexible tariff.
The change in personnel, to which Reed referred, 
had occurred on March 14, 1928. On that date, Edward
Costigan finally resigned from the Commission. Convinced 
at first that the tariff had caught the nation’s attention,
he believed that major changes in the country’s industrial
.. 47and commercial policies could not be far oft.
4~*U.S. , congressional Record, 70th Cong. , 1st 
Sess., 1928, LXVIX, Part 10, 10547.
46Ibid., 10552.
47Costigan Memorandum, October 25, 1927.
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When he realized that he was wrong, that there was 
no support for his position either in Congress or the 
country, he lost hope of ever seeing the Commission publi­
cize desirable tariff reform. Robinson was not interested 
in the Coloradan's program. When Coolidge reappointed 
Marvin chairman of the agency in January, 1928, it was 
clear to Costigan that his program was futile. As reports 
of the Senate Committee's recommendations leaked out it 
became obvious that his only course was to resign.
On March 15, Senator Robinson inserted Costigan's 
departing statement into the Congressional Record. It out­
lined the reforming Commissioner's long effort to preserve 
what he considered to be the proper functions and ideals of 
the agency. It was Costigan's final effort to arouse 
public interest in the fate of the Tariff Commission.
PUbXic service still demanded public fidelity and he
felt that one last protest was in order. "I am therefore
,,48returning my official Commission to the Government. He
reviewed earlier charges that the agency had failed to 
examine the myths which misled consumers into supporting 
extreme protection, and he asserted again that Harding and
48U.S., congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess
1928, LXVIX, Part 5, 47 36.
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Coolidge had undermined the Commission's integrity.49 
Since the summer of 1925/ lie stated, Coolidge had prevented 
the scientific application of Section 315, and pointed out 
that "sharply different interpretations of facts and law
50have featured the Commission's reports to the President." 
Costigan cautioned that "In an era which history may yet 
summarize as the age of Dougherty, Fall, and Sinclair,
. . . the fates and fortunes of the Tariff Commission may
51 . . .be thought unimportant." No part of the public edifice
could be undermined without danger to the whole structure.
For three years, Costigan had fought a hopeless 
struggle. Internal reform was impossible, and the Senate 
investigation was taking an unsatisfactory direction. In 
submitting his resignation he tried to again save the 
agency by creating a public controversy. In this way he 
hoped to force the Senate to preserve the flexible tariff 
while removing the Commission s prejudiced member
Costigan's plea for a type of civil service immunity 
for the agency ignored its true responsibility as well as 
the realities of politics. From the progressive's view­
point, however, his position was defensible, and letters of
49Ibid., 4735. 5°Ibid-. 4736. 51Ibid.
support flowed in from many sympathizers, among them,
52Gifford Pinchot and Herbert Feis. As one writer has
stated, Costigan was honest and conscientious, and he set
for himself high standards of public service. His parting
with the President should have been a matter of national 
53concern.
The failure of Costigan's resignation to create a 
controversy was an indication of the apathy of the decade 
and the esteem with which Coolidge was viewed. Issues con­
cerning morality and dedicated public service did not
arouse the public.
Brossard commented that costigan reminded him of the
soldier who complained to his captain, They re all out of
step but me."54 Perhaps the Literary Digest described the
situation best when it reported that "Commissioner Costigan
tells his colleagues on the Tariff Board that he can't
stand their company any longer, and they reply that in
resigning, Mr. Costigan is leaving a job he was never
52 .Pinchot to Costigan, April 4, 1928; Feis to Costi-
gan, March 20, 1928, Costigan Papers.
53Goodykoontz, "Costigan and the Tariff Commission,"419.
54 ,Baltimore Sun, March 16, 1928.
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fitted for anyway. " The Nation was convinced that his
r e s i g n a t i o n  confirmed the hopelessness of scientific tariff 
56 . .making. Disillusionment was complete.
William Raine, writing about Costigan in 1930, com­
mented that the Coloradan had always displayed a practical
attitude toward politics, despite his willingness to "break
57a lance for a worthy forlorn hope." This was not true of 
Costigan's service on the Commission. He probably should 
have resigned in the spring of 1925 when Culbertson was 
appointed to a diplomatic post, for his cause was virtually 
hopeless. Instead, he remained to interfere with Coolidge's 
right to run his own administration. In the next three 
years he was a constant problem. Hoover made certain that 
the agency was filled with his own appointees.
By that time the flexible tariff was an anathema to
r  oprogressives and Democrats. Hoover had to insist that
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58Marion C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor: University of 
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without it he would veto the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. When 
Section 336, the flexible tariff in the new act, was 
finally passed, it provided that the President could 
replace all the Commission's personnel. ^  Since the entire 
agency was now atuned to the Executive, the flexible pro­
vision was no longer a source of discord.
Extensive investigations which had preceded procla­
mations under Section 315 gave way to general surveys, 
demanding less exhaustive data, which were completed more 
quickly. Under Hoover, the agency produced 60 reports 
dealing with over 100 commodities. Over two-thirds of 
these studies were sent to the President and he increased
the rates on 13 commodities, and decreased them on 19 
61items.
Costigan had been right. The Commission's personnel 
had hampered its deliberations. However, he refused to
59Herbert Hoover, The cabinet and the Presidency, 
1920-193.3. Vol. Ill of Memoirs (3 vols.; New York: the 
Macmillan Co. , 1952), III, 294.
6°U.S., Statutes at Large, XLVI, Part 1, 701.
61U.S. , Tariff Commission, Work of the Tariff Com­
mission since its Reorganization in 1930, June 18, 1930- 
30, 1932 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1932) , l; e . Pendleton Herring, "The Political Context of 
the Tariff Commission," Political Science Quarterly, XLIX 
(September, 1934), 438.
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recognize that he was the personnel problem. The agency's 
job was to carry out the President's orders and policies. 
When its members agreed with the administration, it func­
tioned well. When Coolidge had to contend with Costigan, 
harmony had been lost and the board's usefulness impaired.
Section 336 of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff provided 
fewer opportunities for political complications. The Com­
mission was directed to use transportation and invoice data 
to estimate production costs, and specific penalties were 
provided for persons who tried to influence a Commissioner's
Work. The President accepted or rejected the board's
6 3reports; he could not change them. Since the Commission 
had to be consulted if the Executive wanted to act, it was 
essential that it reflect the President's policies.
Businessmen were happy with the reorganized Commis­
sion, describing it as one more sensible and practicable 
than before.^4 Since it could act more quickly, it was 
also more responsible to their needs.
r  r\
U.S., Statutes at Large, XLVI, Part 1, 702, 707.
63Ibid., 701.
64 "Flexible Clauses in Tariff May Really Mean More 
Now," Business Week (July 16, 1930), 27, clipping in 
Costigan Papers.
Costigan was disappointed with the new law, labeling
it a device to create a partisan, administration-directed
65agency. While correct, his analysis overlooked the fact 
that the Commission had always been an Executive body. 
Coolidge and Harding treated it no differently than Wilson 
would have had he been in office during the decade.
Costigan* s ordeal had ended. When he returned to 
Washington in 1931, as a United States Senator, he was in 
a position which sanctioned publicity, and he faced a far 
more receptive audience. In the days of the New Deal con­
cepts of national economic regulation, support for deprived 
societal groups, and legislation to benefit the consumer 
were more in tune with the political and social environment.
Previously, these notions, along with the Tariff 
Commission, had received only passing attention, for as 
Costigan stated, there was no room for a Teapot Dome and a 
Tariff Commission scandal too. His tools, the reservoir of 
public morality and the curing hand of democracy had failed 
him. He returned to Denver virtually unnoticed, his career 
an index of the weakness of public sentiment for reform in 
the Republican years.
. -
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COSTIGAN, THE COMMISSION, AND THE NEW DEAL
Edward Costigan's career on the Tariff Commission 
illustrated the weaknesses of one reform program in the 
decade of the twenties. Progressives supported the agency 
when it was created in 1916, because they felt it would 
take the tariff out of politics. Others supported it in 
the belief that it might be a useful device to raise pro­
tection. However, by the middle of the next decade, 
reformers were disillusioned with the idea of scientific 
tariff revision. Consequently, they gave only sporadic 
support to Costigan1 s effort to preserve the Commission s
non-partisan image.
The board was originally designed to accumulate 
information dealing with the tariff and post war trade. It 
was certainly one exception to the assertion of Thomas C. 
Cochran and William Miller, that most Progressive legisla­
tion was connected with the hope for Allied victory or 
national preparedness for war.1 The commission would have
CHAPTER VIII
1 Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, M
Enterprise: A social History of Industrial Amer.ic_ ( .
ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1961),
been equally useful had Germany defeated Britain, and 
Progressives intended for it to function as a collector of 
data which could be used to strengthen, and in some cases, 
to reduce duties.
Until 1922, Costigan had little reason to be unhappy 
with the Commission or its relationship with the President. 
But after the flexible provision was adopted, he saw the 
possibility of using the board to modify the tariff. He 
committed himself to that goal. When Coolidge opposed 
revision, Costigan attacked the Chief Executive's authority, 
but it was a futile task. Public support was absent and 
Congressional interest waned at crucial moments. The 
result was a series of intra-commission conflicts and 
public denunciations of the President which undermined the 
board's image and its capacity for producing objective 
reports.
Costigan, one of the Commission's original 
appointees, brought to his position extensive experience in 
reform politics. For this reason, he was aware of the 
threats special interests posed to good government, and he 
was determined to preserve the agency's non-partisan image. 
Joseph Huthmacher has drawn attention to the importance of 
the urban working classes in the Progressive movement.
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Because this group experienced hard times, it supported
innovative legislation in the hope of improving conditions
for wage earners. Huthmacher contends that the success of
the reform leader came from the voting support these
2classes gave him. Yet Costigan's career demonstrated that 
the Progressive leader was not without experience of his 
own, and that exposure to the "school of hard knocks" 
helped make him more responsive to the harsh environment of 
the city. More often than not, the reform leader was quite 
willing to use the government's power to force legislation 
benefiting the middle, laboring, and lower classes.
Costigan grew up, politically, in an urban environ­
ment. He saw the despair which sapped the city's anonymous 
poor, the corruption between government and business, and 
the need to organize laborers in mines and industries. His 
political career was inspired by confrontations with urban 
politics and municipal problems which offended his inherent 
sense of morality and fair play, and which stimulated his
desire to govern.
George Mowry's assertion that Populism was the
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seedbed of Progressivism does not explain Costigan's 
career, for it was inspired by an urban rather than a rural
3environment. Yet Mowry 1 s suggestion that Progressive 
political leaders were motivated by an eclipse in their 
community status has some validity when applied to Costi-
4gan's early life. One student has carefully refined this
idea by showing that Costigan was not reacting against a
loss of status, he was merely trying to improve his posi-
5tion in Denver's public hierarchy.
Samuel P. Hays has offered a different challenge to
the Mowry concept of a status revolt and Richard
6Hofstadter ' s elaboration of the same thesis. Hays asserts 
that opposition to the Progressive politicians came from 
persons in the same social and economic classes as the
^George Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt ^nd th§. Progres 
sive Movement (First American Century Series Edition, 1960; 
originally published in New York: Hill and Wang, 1946) , 11.
4George Mowry, The California Progressive^  (Berke­
ley: University of California Press, 1951), passim.
5DeLorme, "Costigan," 69, 237, 238.
6Samuel P Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Munici-. * __ P.r-s . " Pacific Northwestpal Government in the Progressive a.rt>, —
Quarterlv LV (October, 1964), 157-169. Hereafter citedquarterly, LV Ppform ». Hofstadter, The Age ofas Hays, "The Politics of Reiorm, , nu
Reform. 131-173.
reformers. Hence, any analysis of public minded citizens 
based on their* social background or occupation is meaning- 
less. Hays believes that proclaimed political ideology is 
not a key to the political motivations of reformers, for 
research has shown that it was the upper classes, that is 
corporation leaders and the professional and business 
elite, who led the Progressive movement for municipal
Qreform. Their motivations had no relation to their 
status; it was rather the logical result of their desire to 
exercise their superior capacities for government. To 
accomplish their aim, the destruction of the ward-system of 
voting, they had to overcome the opposition of both the
9middle and lower classes to a change in government. They 
did this by enunciating the rhetoric of democracy, but 
their real goal was power. Once centralized, municipal 
government was subject to control in the interests of those 
who held economic power, the upper classes. Thus, munici­
pal Progressive reform was a conservative movemen
Costigan's oareet in Denver offered some support for 
this thesis. He was certainly not hostile to the ambitions
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and programs of the middle and lower classes, nor was his 
economic position in the community so great that it forced 
him to seek political power. But his belief that govern­
ment could successfully intervene into the social and 
economic problems of the day clearly coincides with his 
drive to get into politics. In a sense, he was seeking, as 
Hays suggests many reformers were, to bring his capacity 
for government to bear on the political system.
yet, this is hardly a new revelation. Hofstadter 
has pointed out that it was this same drive which caused 
some lawyers, teachers, preachers, and editors of the 
country to support reform. They felt they could govern 
better than the politicos.^  whether they were suffering 
from a loss of status was irrelevant. More important was 
their willingness to contest the entrenched ruling element 
for control of government. Furthermore, the reformers made 
no effort to conceal their ideological commitment to the 
improvement of men through the re-allocation of national 
wealth, and the control of large, abusive corporations.
Many of them even supported the organization of labor. If 
they were not sincere in their ideological beliefs, they
10Hofstadter, The Age of Reform- 131-173.
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nevertheless aroused real desires to alleviate the problems 
of American society, both on the municipal and national 
levels.
Costigan's public career illustrated this. He was
clearly in the same tradition as Theodore Roosevelt and
George Perkins, who accepted the new industrial order and
America's growing international responsibilities. The
rural traditions which were so appealing to William
Jennings Bryan and Robert La Follette appeared unrealistic
to Costigan. While the Coloradan's sympathy for the labor
movement exceeded that of many Progressives, he was clearly
11within the tradition of the New Nationalism.
Hays1 thesis suggests that the Progressive's plans 
for greater democracy were but a sham, designed to allow 
them to acquire power.12 Regardless of the validity of 
this charge, it is true that Progressivism propounded the 
belief that more democracy would help solve society's
n For an incisive characterization of the two domi- 
n leadership, see John Braeman,nant types of Progres:sive leader^rationalists, " Business 
"Seven Profiles: Modernists and T Teonard
Historical Review, XXXV (Winter, ' conservationBates, -puliHISg American Democracy;^**
Movement, 1907-1921," MississieEl valley Historical Review, 
XLIV (June, 1957), 30.
12Hays, "The Politics of Reform," 167-168.
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problems. Yet, believing that men in politics had weak­
nesses which were easily exploited by special interests, 
reformers often turned to the independent commission as a 
device to protect the people's interests.
The individual's position as a consumer was 
important. The tariff touched directly upon this role, for 
domestic manufacturers, often capable of underselling 
foreign competitors, moved their prices up to the full 
amount of the duty and thus raised retail costs.
It was this special benefit for the manufacturer 
that costigan combated while he was on the Tariff 
Commission. His struggle and eventual failure pointed up 
what one author has termed "The great error of the Progres­
sives," the belief that it was possible to avoid corruption
_ ,, . 13by taking regulation of economic affairs out of politics.
The New Nationalists often viewed independent commissions
as agencies performing roles which gave stability and con-
14i tinuity to the government. Thus the Federal Trade Com­
mission, the interstate Commerce Commission, and the Tariff
Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Inde­
pendent Commission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
^55), 36.
14David Noble, The Paradox of Progressive Thought 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), 75.
Commission were viewed as sterilized instruments (free from 
political pressure) which could successfully operate on the 
economic system. Yet when they were confronted with polit­
ical and public inertia, undermining their administrative 
procedures, Progressives became indifferent and disillu­
sioned with reform.^
Paul Glad has suggested that the chief cause of pro­
gressive weakness in the Republican years was their inabil­
ity to express principles and programs upon which they 
could agree. He has pointed to the peculiar rhetoric of
the reformer which produced such phrases as moral 
crusade," "more effective democracy," and "the will of the 
people," as a force which united liberals when issues and 
programs could not. But in the decade of the twenties,
Glad states, businessmen and politicians began to speak the 
same kind of language and this confused the progressives.
In an effort to distinguish themselves, reformers tried to 
state their principles more specifically and offered con­
crete programs, but this merely contributed to their
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fragmentation. The vacuity of generalities had unified
them. In the period from 1920 to 1930, specific proposals
17helped destroy organized reform.
Many progressives were unable, for example, to 
pursue the President's treatment of the Tariff Commission 
beyond what proved to be a listless Senate investigation. 
During the decade normalcy proved to be far more important 
than reform, perhaps because many Americans believed that 
the changes of the Roosevelt and Wilson eras "had elimi­
nated the threat of the trusts and controlled the chicanery 
of the speculators.1,18 But a more cogent argument holds 
that for various reasons reformers were simply 
unorganized.
Progressives were active throughout the decade, and
Edward Costigan was one of the most energetic, yet his
-i-n i-hat of most reformers, how experience proved, more so than
2 0futile it was to picture the world in black and white.
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Many of the Progressive's innovations proved inade­
quate to deal with the complexities of economic and politi­
cal life- Certainly the Tariff Commission was a good 
illustration of this. During the years of Harding and 
Coolidge, a time of general prosperity, the agency was 
forced to desist from investigations which popularized 
tariff reform. The consumer while theoretically provided
(for, was actually ignored.
During the next decade, when depression overwhelmed
I the nation, the Commission was discarded as an effective 
tool, because New Dealers realized that the flexible tariff 
was inadequate to make the widespread changes necessary to 
improve America's foreign trade. Instead, broad, nearly 
unlimited power was given to the president to raise or
I lower tariffs.
Instead of popularizing tariff reductions, the Com- 
Imission became a research bureau, serving the President, 
the Secretary of State, and Congress. Only in this sense 
did the progressives succeed in forging a tool to deal with 
|economic crises.
The Hawley-Smoot Tariff, adopted in 1930, reduced 
the need for extensive and costly foreign investigations, 
and provided for the re-appointment of the entire Commission.
■Thereafter all its members followed the administration's 
policies. Even the change in national leadership in 1933 
did not alienate the board from the President. In part 
this was due to the board's singular fact-finding role but 
other developments during Franklin Roosevelt's administra­
tion hastened the Commission's insulation from politics.
The National Industrial Recovery Act was designed to 
organize and regulate the economy through a set of codes 
which were drawn up by each major industry and approved by 
the government.21 To insure that American trade policies 
did not undermine the effort to establish a nationally 
directed economy, the Act instructed the President, after
obtaining advice from the Tariff Commission, to restrict or
. . . 22ban imports threatening any Blue Eagle industry.
This legislation impaired the usefulness of Section 
336, for under the National Industrial Recovery Act, the 
President was no longer limited to increases or reductions
equal to 50 per cent of an item’s duty. The cost
a<?irte as a device for protect-production standard was set 
ing American trade.
217
21U.S.. statutes at Large, XLVHI. Part 1. 195.
2 3, . ,99 _ Ibid.-Ibid. , 196-197.
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Responding to these new responsibilities, the Com­
mission set up a special statistical service to help the
National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural
24Adjustment Administration keep track of imports. It also
began to work with the State Department, accumulating data
for the reciprocal trade program Secretary of State Cordell
Hull planned to inaugurate. When Congress approved the
act, the agency expanded its fact-finding program and made
25a large contribution to reciprocity.
The Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, estab­
lished the policy of expanding American trade through 
reciprocal agreements with foreign countries. In time, 
three coordinating committees were established to direct 
the program, the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy, 
the Committee on Foreign Trade Agreements, and the Commit­
tee for Reciprocity Information. The Tariff Commission 
sent representatives to all of them, and after 1934, it
devoted most of its resources to the task of furnishing
. . 2 6  aata for Hull, Roosevelt, and the three committees.
The reciprocal trade act also allowed the President
24U.S., Tariff Commission, Seventeenth Annua1 Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), 2.
^^Ibid. ^Ibid.
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to proclaim a change in the tariff of up to 50 per cent of 
the established duty on an article if he felt it was neces­
sary to improve American trade. Since he could also nego­
tiate tariff reductions with other nations, under the same 
percentage limitations, it was clear that the flexible 
tariff was no longer considered a useful device for improv­
ing trade. To emphasize this, the act stated that the 
flexible provisions did not apply to items included in 
reciprocal agreements.27
Costigan's dream for the Commission had been 
thwarted by Coolidge and sapped by Hoover. The New Deal 
destroyed it. On the other hand, the Coloradan had the 
satisfaction of seeing a new device, the reciprocal trade 
program, achieve the non-political tariff revision he had
fought for during the previous decade.
Elected to the United States Senate in 1930, Costi
gan supported New Deal type legislation even b
j 28 Throucrliout the depression Roosevelt was inaugurated. ±n 9
27U s Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Part 1, 942-944; U.S. , Statu cnecial and administrative Provi-U.S., Tariff Commission, S£|c^i ff ^  ^  ^
sions (Titles III and IV) _ _  - — Q (washington:
Amended as in effect on pecemb —  — * — r-------“ — 1961)/ 43.amended as in -- 77\ A'*Government Printing Office, 19
9R _ . Pnrrorc of Edward P. Costigan, 369?Goodykoontz, PaP^£- and jjgw Deal, 1932-1944William E. Leuchtenburg, F.D.R- --
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d e c a d e  he supported legislation for unemployment relief, 
r e g u l a t i o n  of wages and hours, and social security for the
[indigent and aged.
In a sense, Costigan's experiences and temperament 
were not compatible with the spirit of the New Deal. He 
was inflexible in his reform goals and he maintained rigid 
standards of morality, whereas the New Deal was pragmatic 
and opportunistic. Furthermore, the Coloradan had never 
dealt with economic depression. His reformist activities 
had always operated within a framework of prosperity. Yet 
he shared with the Roosevelt administration a humanitarian 
concern for the disadvantaged and a willingness to express 
that interest with a broad program of social and economic
I legislation.
Costigan’s career on the Tariff Commission was a 
jfrustrating one and so, in a sense, was his entire pub 
life. He never achieved the recognition and public fame 
which his position in government seemed to entitle him. 
During his senatorial career, while helping 
revolutionary attack on economic and social hardship, he 
j had to expend his energies in political fights at home.
As a senator, Costigan controlled much of the fed­
eral patronage distributed in Colorado, and he used this
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Edto build an effective base of support in Denver. After
Johnson, an ambitious young Democrat, was elected Governor
in 1932, a struggle began between these two men for control
29of the state's Democratic Party.
Johnson made numerous charges that Costigan used
federal relief funds to build his support in the capital
city, and the political bickering which continued through
the next four years drained the Senator s marginal
strength. He became ill in April, 1936, and announced that
he would not run for re-election. A few days later,
. 3 °Johnson announced his candidacy for the Senate.
Costigan began his political career imbued with a 
stern dedication to the ideals of democracy, reform, and 
public responsibility. He had not been able to press these 
standards on others, and he injured his own political for- 
tunes in the effort, yet the substance of other hopes-for 
a regulated economic system, for a humanitarian minded 
government, for the creation of legal sanctions for labor, 
and for increased respect for the consumer-were achieved.
29 M,rar1-V "Rio Ed Johnson of Colo-Patrick Fargo MCC" y^ Ushed „.A. thesis. Dept.
rado— A political Portrait ( P colorado, 1958), 24,
of Political Science, University
41-43.
30Ibid., 44-45, 62-64.
In the Republican era Costigan chose to make a con­
t r i b u t i o n  to society through the Tariff Commission. It was 
a poor selection. The President was responsible for the 
n a t i o n ' s  economic well-being, and independent commissions 
s u c h  a s  the Federal Trade Commission could not function 
u n l e s s  they reflected the Chief Executive's will.
The Tariff Commission was immune to Costigan’s 
efforts to direct its program, without popular or Congres­
sional support, he was destined to fail. Only his Senator­
ial career prevented him from remaining unknown to his own 
generation.
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